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Civil Society in East Asia  
RECENT TOPICS AND TRENDS
Abstract: This article proposes an argument that research on civil society in East Asia has been attracting increasingly more 
attention from scholars of various fields that leads to more diverse and complex academic output. To verify the claim, this article 
provides an overview of recent topics and trends of research in the field both in quantitative and qualitative terms. This allows 
to indicate the main trends and spot less used approaches and overlooked researched areas. The results proved the initial argu-
ment to be largely true, especially starting with the new millennia when the number and variety of scholarly works jumped to 
unprecedented heights. Since the interest shows no particular signs of slowing down, we can expect that the research output at 
the beginning of 21st century will allow us to enjoy growing complexity and variety in the field.
Keywoards: civil society, East Asia, research trends
Pilietinė visuomenė Rytų Azijoje: naujausios tematikos ir tendencijos
Santrauka: Straipsnyje iškeliamas argumentas, kad Rytų Azijos pilietinės visuomenės tyrimai sulaukia vis daugiau įvairių sričių 
mokslininkų dėmesio, ir tai didina akademinių publikacijų įvairovę bei plečia jų kompleksiškumą. Siekiant patvirtinti šį teig-
inį, straipsnyje pateikiama kokybinė ir kiekybinė naujausių Rytų Azijos pilietinės visuomenės tyrimų tematikų ir tendencijų 
apžvalga. Tai leidžia išskirti pagrindines kryptis, atkreipti dėmesį į mažiau paplitusias prieigas, pastebėti netyrinėtas sritis. Gauti 
rezultatai iš esmės patvirtino pirminį teiginį, ypač vertinant šio tūkstantmečio pradžią, kai tyrimų skaičius ir įvairovė pasiekė 
anksčiau nematytas aukštumas. Vertinant tai, kad susidomėjimas Rytų Azijos pilietinės visuomenės tema nerodo atslūgimo 
ženklų, galima tikėtis, kad šios srities tyrinėjimai XXI a. pradžiugins vis augančiu sudėtingumu ir įvairove.
Reikšminiai žodžiai: pilietinė visuomenė, Rytų Azija, tyrimų tendencijos.
Introduction
This article proposes an argument that research on civil society in East Asia1 has been attracting 
increasingly more attention from scholars of various fields that led to more diverse and complex ac-
ademic output. This follows a more general trend that was indicated by some authors. For example, 
Edwards (2004: 11) states that the end of the Cold War “gave the idea of civil society a prominence it 
had not enjoyed since the Enlightenment”. This prominence gave boost to scholarship that approach 
civil society from political, legal, social and many other perspectives, and keep the field expanding 
and further developing.
To verify the claim, this article provides an overview of recent topics and trends of research in the 
aforementioned field both in quantitative and qualitative terms. The review covers only publications 
1  East Asia is defined here as a region that is comprised of People’s Republic of China, Republic of China, Republic of Korea, 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and Japan.
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made in English language and acknowledges the limitations tied with such a choice that was mainly 
made due to practical reasons: lack of access to non-English academic databases and author’s limited 
knowledge of Chinese and Korean languages. Although few would doubt that internationalization of 
academic publications has progressed significantly in the recent decades, research published in ver-
nacular languages can still offer a rich ground for those who would like to perform a similar review 
on scholarly works written in Chinese, Korean or Japanese.
This article is divided into two main parts. The first one is an overview of thematic spectrum of 
research done about civil society in East Asia. It helps to indicate the main trends and spot less used 
approaches and overlooked researched areas. The articles that the readers can find in this volume are 
also presented here. The second part provides quantitative data to illustrate publication trends and 
to verify the argument about the expanding quantitative nature of this research field. The article is 
finished with conclusions.
The spectrum of topics
An overview of existing literature on civil society in East Asia allows us to make a robust argument 
for using the Cold War as a line that sparked a period of much more dynamic scholarship about civil 
society in China, Korea and Japan. Research done before 1990 was rather limited and mainly done 
from the political science perspective by borrowing approaches that can be seen in the works written 
about the Western countries. We can mention such authors as Nee and Mozingo (1983) who wrote 
about state-society nexus in China, Leung (1982) who focused on community participation in Hong 
Kong, McKean (1981), Reich (1984) and Broadbent (1986) who looked at environmental movements 
in Japan, and Edmunds (1983) who was one of the pioneers of research on clashes between local com-
munities and nuclear power industry in Japan.
Japan receives the most attention among researchers compared to China and Korea, and produces 
research that took a while to reach other countries in the region. For example, Matsui (1990) who 
analysed feminist movements in Japan. In contrast with China and Korea, Japan was able to provide 
easier access to its domestic politics and supply numerous cases of civic movements whose activity 
peaked in the 1960s and 1970s. As the second largest economy in the world, it also generated much 
curiosity about its development model and society’s role in it. Finally, Japanese scholars themselves 
produced literature in English language this way enriching international scholarship and boosting 
foreign interest. Meanwhile, in-depth research on Korean and Taiwanese civil society is almost absent 
before 1990, with only few exceptions, such as Moore (1988) and Hsiao (1990), and rather limited 
when it comes to China. This is about to change soon when the legacy of democratization, envi-
ronmental and labour movements becomes more widely acknowledged, especially after democratic 
reforms in South Korea and Taiwan.
The last decade of 20th century marked a growing interest in the power of the people to topple 
regimes and contribute to creation of dynamic democracies (Edwards 2004: 11-12). South Korea and 
Taiwan were two good case studies to analyse this process in East Asia, while China and North Korea 
acted as examples where civic movements have limited influence over politics. For example, in the 
1990s we see first in-depth analysis of South Korea’s case by such authors as Ahn (1992), Koo (1993), 
Suh (1998), Kim (2000) and others. However, few authors depart from democratization issues and 
look at other perspectives. Examples of that could be Dalton and Cotton (1996) and Lee (1999). 
Scholarship on China was also inspired by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Brook and Frolic 
(1997) presented a detailed critical description of China’s civil society. Other authors attempted to 
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take a more nuanced look, like Madsen (1998) who analysed the state of China’s Catholics, or Lollar 
(1997) and Zhao (2000) who inquired whether China’s economic reforms had any impact on civil 
society activism. Meanwhile, research on Taiwan follows more general trends that resemble scholar-
ship tied with South Korea: here we can see general overviews (Hsiao 1996), emergence of new social 
movements (Chang 1997) and analysis of environmental activism (Hsiao 1999).
The 1990s also mark emergence of first examples of regional comparative studies. Serrano (1994) 
was one of the first authors who provided a broad overview of civil activism in East Asia, covering 
China, Japan and South Korea. This was followed by study of Yamamoto (1996) and Compton (2000). 
Meanwhile, Arne and Persoon (1998) and later Lee and So (1999) released a much-needed compara-
tive analysis of Asia’s environmental movements. Smaller studies that compared social movements of 
two countries also emerged: Chu (1998), Harashima and Morita (1998), He (1999), Kim (2000) and 
others.
During the 1990s Japan remained a case that can provide insights in how civil society functions 
in highly developed mature democracies (see Salamon and Sokolowski 1999 or Florini 2000). Sev-
eral authors entered the debate to question how much the Western approach to civil society fits the 
Japanese context (Knight 1996, McVeigh 1998) while others continued expanding our understanding 
about civil society’s role in different spheres. Environmental protection proved to be most popular 
subject. Broadbent (1999) and Lam (1999) painted a detailed picture of environmental movements in 
Japan by describing their networks and strategies of interaction with the government. However, other 
authors (Moore 1997, AMPO-Japan Asia Quarterly Review 1996) looked beyond that and covered a 
wider variety of social movements.
Compared to the 1980s, civil society research showed both deepening and expansion outwards. 
Political science approach that previously dominated was supplemented with sociological and an-
thropological analysis. Although Japanese civil society remained the most researched compared to 
other East Asian countries, China, Taiwan and Korea began to receive a well-deserved attention. We 
also see emergence of first comparative studies that allow us to grasp variety of contexts in which civil 
society must function in East Asia. Thematically, the global and regional context of the 1990s dictated 
that democratization and environmental protection were most widely covered topics. After all, East 
Asia proved to be a rich ground for this kind of research. All this growing variety laid good founda-
tion for expansion to other fields, which we will see in the following paragraphs.
Most recent two decades of 21st century continue expanding and deepening civil society research. 
Analysis done in the previous years gave strength to arguments about the synergy between a strong 
civil society and a strong state. It is now widely accepted that each side benefits from the other, creat-
ing numerous positive effects ranging from safeguarding democracy to proposing progressive ideas 
to ensuring provision of basic services to the citizens (Weller 2005). This opened the doors for re-
searching what effect civil society has on every niche of public life (for example, see Broadbent and 
Brockman 2011 or Pekkanen 2006). 
Political science approach still seemingly holds the leading position. Numerous books appeared 
since 2001 to provide new insights how the government interacts with society in East Asian region: 
Weller (2004), Lele and Quadir (2004), Alagappa (2004), Armstrong et al. (2010) and others. Indi-
vidual countries also received in-depth coverage: see Ma (2005), Wang (2011), Simon (2013), Tai 
(2014), Teets (2014) and others for China; Chang (2010), Fell (2017), Šarka (2017) and others for 
Taiwan; Armstrong (2006), Park (2008), Shin & Chang (2011), Cho et el. (2013), Kim (2016) and 
others for South Korea; Schwartz and Pharr (2003), Pekkanen (2006), Ogawa (2009), Vinken et al. 
(2010), Cavaliere (2015) and others for Japan. These authors continue the debate about civil society’s 
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role in democratization, ability of social activists to operate in restrictive environments, and their role 
in representing silenced or weaker voices of the society.
Outside of this more usual approach to civil society research, new century brought plenty of new 
perspectives. For example, Hasan & Onyx (2008) provided one of the first detailed comparative anal-
ysis of legal regulation of civil society in East Asia, while Douglass et al. (2007) looked at civil society’s 
impact on East Asia’s urban spaces. The 2000s also marked the beginning of research on cyber activ-
ism and virtual civil society. For China’s case there was Tai (2006) and Negro (2017), Ducke (2007) 
for Japan, and Lee (2017) for South Korea. Meanwhile, Buzan and Zhang (2014) investigated global-
ization and emergence of “international society” in East Asia. All this shows the ability to find new 
perspectives to look at civil society and paint a more complex and multi-layered picture. Although 
there can be few doubts that political science is one of the starting points to approach civil society, an-
thropological, legal, cultural or sociological research provides a more nuanced understanding. There-
fore, the research output at the beginning of 21st century allows to us to indicate growing complexity 
and variety in this field.
Articles presented in this volume reflect the expansion of thematic subjects rather well. Bruce 
Grover’s article is a good example how the concept of civil society can be used in largely historical 
research. In this case it helps to unveil new insights about leftist movements in interwar Japan. Jan 
Niggemeier transfers our focus to more contemporary Japan and provides analysis of labour move-
ments that give voice back to the community and challenge mainstream labour unions. Hao-Tzu Ho 
provides a nuanced story of Hong Kong where seemingly post-materialistic agriculture movements 
re-emerge to transform a very much urban landscape. Runya Qiaoan focuses on more classical topic 
– environmental movements – but in her text we can find new insights how social activists adapt to 
the difficult conditions dominated by the Chinese Communist Party and invent strategies to use the 
circumstances for their own benefit. Sunhyuk Kim moves our attention to South Korea and updates 
much discussed link between civil movements and Korean democratization by adding most recent 
developments to the overall mix. This allows us not only to review the history but also connect lessons 
of the past with the ongoing struggles that civil society is facing in South Korea. Yuree Kim keeps us 
focused on Korea but includes North-South dimension. This allows to explore relatively little dis-
cussed question how much and in what ways can civil society contribute to Korean unification.
This overview of qualitative characteristics reveals several gaps and imbalance that exist in re-
search on civil society in East Asia. First, the geographical coverage did not develop uniformly, and 
the attention given to East Asian countries/territories is still not divided equally. While the knowledge 
about China’s and South Korea’s civil society improved greatly in the past 20 years and caught up with 
the leading country Japan, Taiwan and Hong Kong still receive less attention. Due to practical com-
plications, North Korea remains a country where the idea of civil society is either simply dismissed or 
data about social activism largely relies on guessing and indirect estimations. Hopefully, this situation 
will change in the future.
If we consider the domestic level of each country, the concentration to urban activism is also 
noticeable, while the rural social movements remain less explored. This could be explained by the 
fact that most civil society research is done from political science perspective. This choice shifts fo-
cus to interest groups that are most capable to influence politics, and directs research to large and 
resource-rich city-based organizations and movements. Analysis of municipal-level politics or cul-
tural/anthropological research could enrich the current scholarship by bringing fresh insights and 
perspectives.
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Second, institutionalization and legal regulation of civil society have not been thoroughly ad-
dressed in the current research. There are few works written on how administration of civil society 
sector works in each East Asian country and with what structural problems civic organizations must 
deal in their daily lives. In addition, this knowledge would be useful to include in political science or 
even cultural research to better grasp motivations of social activists and options available to them to 
reach their goals. Until now only Hasan & Onyx (2008) provided an in-depth study of such kind and 
it needs to be updated, expanded and further connected with civil society research in other fields.
Finally, there is a need to rethink civil society in East Asian terms and to refine country-specific 
methodologies. This has been done to certain extent in Japan-related scholarship but remains largely 
unexplored when it comes to remaining East Asian countries. This is not to say that general approach-
es to civil society that were developed by Western scholars are not working in East Asia. However, a 
more nuanced approach that is tweaked according to local specifics could lead to further advance-
ments in the future.
Quantitative data
Thematic expansion that was presented in the previous part inspired new kinds of research and 
resulted in seemingly growing quantity of publications on civil society in East Asia. This impression 
originates in hundreds of book titles that were published in the past two decades alone and extensive 
results given by Google Scholar search engine when one searches for academic articles about civil 
society in China, Japan or Korea. To verify this impression, Google Books and Google Scholar search 
was performed with keywords mentioning civil society and East Asian countries and the results sum-
marized by grouping them chronologically into decades.
Google Books search revealed almost 20-fold increase in results when comparing the 1990s and 
2010s. In the 1990s, 47 items were returned, and the results kept growing to reach 220 items in the 
2000s and 816 items in the 2010s. Due to specifics of Google Books search engine and the way how it 
displays results, it would be inaccurate to say that there were 816 book titles published between 2010 
and 2018. However, even without pinpointing exact number of book titles, we can be certain that the 
field of civil society studies tied with East Asia gained much prominence in the last three decades.
Google Scholar search results showed a steady increase in academic articles published during the 
last three decades. The increase was not that drastic as in the case of book titles, but it was an impres-
sive one nonetheless. While the search returned 290 items published during the 1990s, the number 
grew to 783 in the 2000s and stood at 705 in the year 2010-2018. Considering that in the latter case we 
are comparing a decade with eight years, most likely the 2010s will end up with around 850 academic 
publications.
Conclusions
This article started with an argument that “research on civil society in East Asia has been attract-
ing increasingly more attention from scholars of various fields that leads to more diverse and complex 
academic output.” This proved to be largely the case, especially starting with the new millennia when 
the number and variety of scholarly works jumped to unprecedented heights. This is fuelled not only 
by the growing importance of East Asia in global affairs but also internationalization of local scholars, 
general interest and favourable attitude towards civil society after the end of the Cold War which al-
lowed scholars to gravitate towards this field, and democratization processes in East Asian countries. 
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Since the interest shows no particular signs of slowing down, we can expect that the research output 
at the beginning of 21st century will allow us to enjoy growing complexity and variety in the field. The 
progress should soon fill remaining gaps in the English scholarship, considering that international-
ization of academia will make more research easily available. Further analysis of research done in 
vernacular languages could give us a further insight whether the problem lies in the gap of languages, 
or there is an actual need for new research projects. 
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The Emergence of a Civil Society Movement  
and its Fragility in post-World War I Era 
A STUDY OF INDEPENDENT LABOR EDUCATION  
IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD
Abstract: In response to severe social problems and the influx of new concepts of society following in the tumultuous wake of 
the First World War in Japan, a small yet prominent group of social reformers sought to develop an autonomous workers’ edu-
cation movement to extend educational opportunity and provide independence from a bourgeois socio-economic and cultural 
system they saw as fundamentally exploitative to the working class. This un-centralized movement endeavored to empower the 
working class through an interconnected network of leftist settlements, labor schools and ‘free universities’ and was informed 
by new concepts of how to concretely implement change; namely, empirical analysis of actual social conditions through surveys 
and the need to discover and address the demands of the people. The ideals of elite progressives converged with the aspirations 
of many local workers for a more just society through educational opportunity making this social educational movement appear 
as the potential beginning of a sustainable civil society movement. Economic shocks and geo-political uncertainty in the 1930s, 
however, prompted many of the same reformist idealists to turn to state power and ethnic nationalism leading to a collapse in 
the respect for pluralism and the fluid range of subjective values within society necessary for a thriving civil society.
Keywords: labor education, settlement house movement, labor school movement, free university movement, workers’ autono-
my, student movement, social progress within systemic exploitation, pluralism, ideological conversion (Tenkō), Suehirō Izutarō, 
Tsuchida Kyōson  
Pilietienės visuomenės atsiradimas ir jos trapumas po Pirmojo pasaulinio karo: nepriklausomo tarpukario 
darbininkų švietimo atvejo studija
Santrauka: Reaguodama į sunkias socialines problemas ir naujų visuomenės sampratų antplūdį, įvykusį po audringo Pirmojo 
pasaulinio karo Japonijoje, maža, tačiau iškili socialinių reformatorių grupė siekė sukurti autonominį darbininkų švietimo judė-
jimą. Tuo siekta išplėsti mokymosi galimybes bei suteikti nepriklausomybę nuo buržuazinės socioekonominės ir kultūrinės siste-
mos, kurią judėjimas vertino kaip iš esmės kenkiančią darbininkų klasei. Šis necentralizuotas judėjimas siekė įgalinti darbininkų 
klasę, naudodamas tarpusavyje susijusį kairiųjų pažiūrų gyvenviečių tinklą, darbininkų mokyklas ir „laisvuosius universitetus“. 
Judėjimas buvo susipažinęs su naujausiomis pokyčių įgyvendinimo idėjomis – empirine realių socialinių sąlygų analize, atli-
ekant apklausas, bei būtinybe suprasti ir atsiliepti į gyventojų poreikius. Progresyviųjų elito narių idealai sutapo su daugumos 
vietinių darbininkų siekiais sukurti teisingesnę visuomenę plėtojant švietimą. Tai lėmė, kad šis judėjimas tapo vertinamas kaip 
potencialus tvarios pilietinės visuomenės kūrėjas. Ekonominiai sukrėtimai ir geopolitiniai neramumai 4-ajame XX a. dešimt-
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metyje daugumą reformacijos idealistų paskatino atsigręžti į valstybės galią ir etninį nacionalizmą, vedantį prie pagarbos pli-
uralizmui ir visuomenėje egzistuojančių subjektyvių vertybių, reikalingų pilietinei visuomenei klestėti, žlugimą.
Reikšminiai žodžiai: darbuotojų švietimas, bendruomenės namų judėjimas, darbuotojų mokyklų judėjimas, laisvojo univer-
siteto judėjimas, darbuotojų autonomija, socialinis progresas sistematinio išnaudojimo salygomis, pliuralizmas, ideologinis 
virsmas, Suehirō Izutarō, Tsuchida Kyōson.
Introduction
In 1925, an elite group of Tokyo Imperial University students who served as volunteer lecturers at 
the Tokyo Imperial University Settlement Labor School accompanied a young factory worker from 
the slum ward of Honjo named Ashika Kaku to Tokyo Station to board a night train to his home in 
Tottori. The reticent young Ashika had been among the most avid and committed of their first new 
crop of students to graduate from the labor school and the Tokyo University student lecturers en-
couraged him to apply what he had learned by organizing an agrarian labor movement in his home 
province. On the station platform among the roar of the night locomotives rushing past, the Teidai 
students surrounded Ashika and began to sing the communist anthem ‘The Red Flag’ in chorus to 
stoke his enthusiasm as they bid him farewell. To their horror, a policeman on patrol who had been 
stealthily lurking in the shadows of the dim station suddenly ran to them snapping, “You! You! Don’t 
you dare sing that song!” Nearly five decades later, the former student activists still wistfully recalled 
the experience ‘as if it were a dream’. The song had been strictly forbidden by the police with even 
hand-written lyrics confiscated for investigation and leftist radicals of the time had carefully guarded 
the lyrics in their rice chests. To their great relief, Ashika Kaku was allowed to board his train to Totto-
ri where he would come to prominence as a labor leader and ultimately be elected to the Diet in both 
houses for eight terms in the postwar period as a member of the Socialist Party. During his election 
campaign, Ashika proudly listed the Tokyo University Settlement Labor School as his educational 
credentials (Hirano et. all 1971: 120).  
The environment of Tokyo’s poverty-stricken Honjo industrial district where the Teidai Settlement 
operated represented in many ways a microcosm of the most severe challenges confronting Japanese 
society immediately following the upheaval of the Great War. According to surveys undertaken by the 
settlement, unemployed rural youth had flooded to the neighborhood from every region of Japan to 
a poorly developed urban space with factory buildings and decrepit housing built in a deep mud with 
stagnant water collecting after every rain to give off a powerful smell. Residents had limited access 
to electric light and typically shared a single water faucet with 10-20 households. Recurrent hygiene 
problems stemmed from waste collected in outhouses and indoor latrines. The working poor of the 
district were also deprived to an appalling degree of the opportunity to receive the most basic educa-
tion with many not even finishing elementary school. (Tokyo University Settlement Survey Section 
1925: 4-6,18). The war-time economic boom had led to a painful post-war correction and brewing 
social tensions spurred a sense of urgency from a range of policy makers and social activists to ame-
liorate conditions with some commentators judging that ‘time was running out’ to make meaningful 
national reforms to confront deteriorating conditions.  
In response to these challenges and inspired by the influx of new social concepts from abroad, 
there appeared small-scale yet important efforts to organize independent, grass-roots social move-
ments to address these intractable socio-economic problems. These efforts formed what could be 
viewed as the semblance of an emerging civil society movement. The Teidai Settlement, which was 
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a physical building constructed to house the social work activities of the university students, was an 
important representative of this confluence of elite and citizen action. University students such as 
those volunteering at the Teidai Settlement, were among the most eager to analyze and test concrete 
solutions from the influx of new, foreign ideological and institutional approaches. Student members 
of the Gakuren, a national association of university students which organized student activists, sent 
student tutors to various labor school in order to contribute (Kikukawa 1931, ch.5). Thus, despite 
some historians’ dismissal of students as a genuine social force for the creation of a popular grassroots 
movement (Smith 1971), it is clear there was in fact considerable energy committed to the support of 
the labor education movement from the student movement. 
Nevertheless, the settlement is also emblematic of the severe challenges which faced activists at the 
time. Tragically, the vicious enforcement of the Peace Preservation Law led to the arrest of Toyohara 
Gorō, a factory worker who became a student at the Teidai settlement labor school and who had been 
an eager student, but died in prison (Hirano et. all :118). Larger-scale arrests of settlers and other la-
bor activists followed in the late 20’s. The settlement’s closure in 1937 and the demise of the left-wing 
labor education ultimately revealed the limits of efforts to challenge the social order during a period 
wracked with violent nationalism and imperialism.
In many regards the Tōdai Settlement was wholly unique. While many Tōdai settlers were clan-
destinely exploring and promoting Marxism, the settlement was publicly receiving funding from the 
Imperial Household, the Home Ministry and the Tokyo city government, (Tōdai Settlement 1926). 
Yet, despite the fact that the Tōdai Settlement Labor School was the most well-connected and finan-
cially secure of all the labor schools and settlements allowing it to maintain operations when others 
struggled to operate, it was merely one highly publicized representative of a broader effort to develop 
a movement to extend educational opportunity, and with it, a more equal and just society for the 
working class. 
The origins of the labor school movement in Japan is thought to be found in the Japan Labor 
School (Nihon Rōdō Gakkō) which opened in 1921 and enjoyed the greatest longevity of all schools 
during this period. The Japan Labor School grew out of the early educational activities of Suzuki 
Bunji and the Yūaikai established in 1912 to promote “workers’ mutual support,” and improvement of 
status as well as “the development of good judgement, moral cultivation and progress in skills”(Ono 
1989: 72). The Yūaikai would ultimately morph into the Nihon Sōdōmei labor union and in 1919, 
organized lecture series in Tokyo, Osaka and Kobe. Drawing on this experience, Suzuki launched the 
Labor Education Association under the auspices of the Sōdōmei and set up the Japan Labor School 
in its headquarters (72). Following the Japan Labor School’s lead, over 40 schools devoted to workers’ 
education were founded across the country.
What became a movement which can be described as ‘independent labor education’ was a 
non-centralized convergence of a discernable set of institutions and social thought. Institutions were 
organized in often overlapping networks which worked in tandem or in parallel, and included labor 
schools, settlement houses which provided educational services and ‘free universities’ which began 
to spread throughout Japan under the influence of Kyoto-educated philosopher Tsuchida Kyōson. 
These institutions were informed not only by trends in liberalism, socialism, and Idealist philosophy 
popular among Western intellectuals but also new western ideals of education which sought to serve 
as vehicles to concretely implement social ideals of overcoming inequality in status and opportunity, 
and empowering the exploited underclasses. 
Japan had a long history of mutual aid societies reaching back well before the Meiji period. The 
Hōtokusha led by the example of Ninomiya Sontoku which promoted thrift and diligence, education 
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and the revitalization of villages is a classic example of active participation of the non-elite to maintain 
and improve the social order. Like the governments of other industrializing nations facing conflict, 
the Japanese state through the Home Ministry sought to harness and control social action during the 
Meiji period, providing resources to organizations yet restricting the acceptable scope of their activity 
and ideology. Conservative endeavors ultimately sought to ameliorate social unrest and offset chal-
lenges to the status quo.
Given the severity and urgency of the problems emerging from the post-WWI capitalist system 
however, there was a growing concern among some social reformers that collaborating with state or 
industry-funded programs which, although sought the improvements in material conditions pro-
moted cooperative harmony between state and society and capital and labor would only reinforce a 
social system which primarily benefitted the interests of the capitalist class. Thus, it was felt that only 
movements which were independent of the control of the exploitative paternalism of capitalists and 
bureaucrats could provide services that were suited for the advancement of both urban and agricul-
tural laborers. 
However, the independent labor education movement ultimately sought more than pragmatic 
concerns of educational opportunity and improved material standard of living. The discourse of labor 
education activists also reveals a concern for social reforms which considered both the structure of 
communal interconnectedness and ethics, as well as the internal psychological aspect of self-aware-
ness as a person and an independent person’s full development within society. Among those in-
fluenced by German Idealism, which had a seminal impact on Japanese social thought during this 
period, the personal aspect took the form of the development of jinkaku, personal self-realization 
and moral self-cultivation. This self-realization was often articulated through a belief in the need 
for ‘spiritual uplifting.’ And among materialists influenced by Marxism, this took the form of class 
consciousness, awareness of collective belonging to a class exploited by and in conflict with the bour-
geoisie. This concern for a holistic ideal of society saw expression in the belief among activists of all 
stripes including Christian Socialists and Marxist-influenced radicals in the need for the proletariat 
to free itself from the culture dominated by the bourgeois state and develop a culture conducive to the 
flourishing of the working class. The creation of a new culture, in fact, became a central aspiration for 
activists and social thinkers. One of the most important of the labor schools, the Osaka Labor School, 
idealistically declared in a pamphlet celebrating its ten-year anniversary that, “The labor movement 
must at the same time be a culture movement… As long as workers, who form the majority of the 
world’s population is left in darkness, world culture cannot progress. Just as we promote the freedom 
of the workers’ industry, we must also advance world culture through labor education” (Osaka Labor 
School 1931: 11). 
However, despite the promising beginnings of the labor education movement which appeared 
to show a firm commitment to autonomy for the working class outside the state, many central 
figures in the movement, although by no means all of them, stunningly appeared to reverse course 
and not only embrace state power in social policy but also actively collaborate with the war-time 
militarist state in the 1930s and 40s as elite policy makers. This seismic shift in attitudes to state 
power as well as to society and nation may provide insights into the contours of what is seen as 
Japan’s cooperative, overlapping boundaries between state and society, and the developmentalist 
interventionism which has historically characterized its effort to shape social thought and political 
action through policy.  
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Previous scholarship on state-society relations in Japan and theory on civil society
Pre-war Japanese society has often been perceived as having been thoroughly suppressed by a rig-
idly hierarchal and interventionist state. Following the Peace Preservation Law in 1925, in particular, 
which sought to crack down on extremist political thought, the state severely limited the scope of ac-
ceptable political beliefs. External pressure from a reactionary state in tandem with the rise of nation-
alist fervor in the 1930s crushed the fledgling communist movement and coercing many Communist 
Party members recant. This top-down statist pressure, according to this narrative, also forced the 
acquiescence of moderates who could have served as a counterbalance to the rise of blind militarism. 
However, historical work on the pre-war labor movement most notably by Sheldon Garon has 
effectively shown that although the state did aggressively seek to mold the minds of its subjects, there 
was a high degree in which society actively participated in the state’s agenda during this period and 
the way in which calls to limit freedom often came from within society itself (for a synopsis of his 
work, see: Garon 2003). Future research into state-society relations should further explore the fluid-
ity of the boundary between society and state, as well as the contentious diversity of thought within 
society and the sensitivity of attitudes to state power based on changing socio-political conditions.
In terms of recent literature on the general theoretical concept of civil society which has steadily 
grown since the concept experienced a resurgence in Eastern Europe and Latin America since the 
1980s, attention has often tended to focus on select politicized elements of organized civil society; 
namely, advocacy for improved state policy and citizen protest to check state power. This view has 
been reinforced by the broad influence of Habermas’ theory of the ‘public sphere.’ In his work, The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere Habermas describes the public sphere as “a realm of 
social life” which “mediates between society and state, in which the public organizes itself as the 
bearer of public opinion.” The formation of opinion concerning public issues in private settings such 
as coffee houses and salons and energized through the emergence of print media in the 18th century, 
Habermas argues that public opinion served to engage in “the tasks of criticism and control which a 
public body of citizens informally- and in periodic elections, formally as well- practices vis-à-vis the 
ruling structure organized in the form of a state (Habermas 1989: 136-137).”
The emphasis on advocacy and protest as the primary function of civil society, however, loses sight 
of other crucial aspects of civil society which impact overall national and cultural trends. Michael 
Walzer’s thought on civil society, on the other hand, provides an often overlooked but crucial insight 
into the historical roots and the essential underpinnings of a sustainable civil society. Walzer has 
argued for a more comprehensive view of civil society, defining it as “the space of uncoerced human 
association and also the set of relational networks-formed for the sake of family, faith, interest, and 
ideology – that fill this space” (Walzer, 1). Walzer accurately places the concept of civil society within 
its classical liberal origins and points out that the concept promoted initially by John Locke was the 
historical product of the acute recognition of the need for tolerance in the face of destabilizing reli-
gious conflict in the 17th century. Walzer stresses it is the “non-ideological” aspect of classical liberal-
ism which allows for pluralistic social relations outside of the state. In this view, civil society is a space 
for socialization and a testing ground where visions of the good are tested and proven, but of course 
never perfectly satisfactorily settled among competing visions. Thus, given the inherent diversity of 
values in any society, civil society is “the realm of fragmentation and struggle, but also of concrete 
and authentic solidarities” (10). Walzer particularly stresses the fundamental role of the mundane and 
non-political aspects of communal interaction, yet worries that this concept of social betterment is 
not as compelling and inspiring as other more radical ideologies of social change.
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Building on these insights, it also necessarily follows that the maintenance of civil society also calls 
for the development of skills among citizens to peacefully negotiate differences of values. There is a 
natural tendency to seek to present subjective values convenient to one’s own agenda as objective or 
universal truth and to justify the use of state power to impose these values on others. This tendency 
becomes acute and destabilizing during crisis. A pluralistic civil society which can integrate differing 
worldviews and conceptions of the public good requires groups of differing values and worldviews to 
accept the legitimacy of others’ views and develop strategies within civil society to negotiate subjec-
tive differences to peacefully coexist. It is in the interests of social stability, ultimately, for individuals 
and groups confronted with perceived conflicting interests to respect differences and to refrain from 
intervening in or coercing the views and social practices of others. 
Intellectual undercurrents behind the independent labor education movement
Crucially, this nascent civil society movement which sought to empower the working class by ex-
panding educational opportunity was explicitly opposed to the self-serving paternalism of the bour-
geois-controlled state. The starting point for many intellectuals who established educational facilities 
for the working class was a belief that the entrenched low status of workers excluded them from 
education and other opportunities.} The emphasis on need for liberation from the “monopoly” of 
bourgeois control through the spread of knowledge and the extension of education became a central 
leitmotif among many of these independently established institutions. In the founding statement of 
purpose Suehiro Izutarō, Tōdai law professor and the pivotal figure of the Tokyo Imperial University 
Settlement, expounds on the two principles which formed basis of his involvement the Tōdai settle-
ment and his academic legal work: spreading knowledge and informing the creation of new social 
policy through detailed research of actual conditions on the ground. In the statement, Suehiro asserts 
that the most tragic flaw in modern society was the complete division of knowledge and labor. Edu-
cational opportunity beyond a rudimentary level had not been fully extended to the working class. 
Though many among the proletariat may have great potential, without education that potential would 
go to waste. This was in fact a loss for all society. The educated elite, who in fact represent a near mo-
nopoly of education, should feel obligated to spread knowledge and work for the benefit of society 
(Suehiro 1924: 120).
In a later 1932 article, Suehiro projects a more radical tone as his thought on the settlement move-
ment matured. Suehiro argued that public social work was impossible and that social work with any 
chance of success must be private (Suehiro 1932: 17). Because relief work derived through state initia-
tives were designed to protect capitalism, no amount of funding thrown at the problem could keep up 
with poverty (5). Settlement work and the broader education extension movement held the promise 
to attack the social distortions plaguing the country. Yet, the movement could not be mere charity or 
simple relief(7). What must distinguish it was the recognition and promotion of the human character 
of the workers and their self-awareness. Self-awareness of their jinkaku would rise up through access 
to knowledge in a pedagogic system where worker pupils would be treated as peers and friends. 
Echoing the ethos of many activists during the period, he argued that the labor education movement 
should be an enlightenment movement, yet one that did not instill bourgeois values. Rather, it should 
facilitate the spread of the necessary knowledge fight exploitation independently. Suehiro ultimately 
argued for the creation of a movement which sought to eliminate social flaws through self-initiative. 
The settlement educational extension movement would provide the proletariat with the knowledge to 
fight exploitation from the propertied classes themselves (17). 
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The founding statement of purpose of the Osaka labor school led by Christian socialist Kagawa 
Toyohiko and which saw participation from members of the Tōdai settlement stated this aspiration 
for independence more forcefully:
We seek to liberate education from the monopoly of the propertied classes, learning that belongs to the 
propertied classes is like a castrated horse. Consequently, this is an insult to the god of learning Minerva. We 
have a right to study. We must take back the universities that the propertied classes have denied us. … In our 
labour school we have no red gate like the Tokyo Imperial University, nor do we have a grand lecture hall 
or men with a special high status. But in this, there is a truth which is like an unsullied pearl: That there are 
free, unrestrained youthful scholars. Those teaching and learning have impetus and power. Even if the place 
of learning may not have a deep theoretical underpinning, if we were to ruminate, we know that all of these 
truths must become our blood and flesh (Osaka Labor School 1922: 7).
Likewise, for philosopher Tsuchida Kyōson whose ideas sparked the ‘free university’ movement 
largely targeting rural villages, the cause of “the monopolization of society” by the bourgeois state was 
“the monopolization of education.” To eliminate this monopoly and work towards the ‘autonomous 
control of education,’ there needed to be an effort to break down the tendency towards centralized 
authority in education. As local people become involved in education, Tsuchida envisioned a citi-
zen-run program to give the opportunity to freely receive a university education by opening classes 
primarily during the winter. He hoped that this would promote self-education and, ultimately, a more 
egalitarian system conducive to the full development of all members of society. In 1924, Tsuchida who 
believed that Labor education as part of Taisho democracy wrote that: “The Free University is a space 
where laboring members of society can, in order to individually participate in the cooperative forma-
tion of society, independently engage in learning which they can use for the rest of their lives. It is a 
social education facility where they can engage in social and autonomous learning.” Thus, for Tsuchi-
da education for the basis of democracy and of society. Yet, this demanded that education must “cre-
ate independent jinkaku (Ogawa 1989:85).” A reform of culture itself, for likeminded social theorists, 
aimed beyond assuaging the material conditions of the working class. They sought a systemic change 
which would fully meet the complex range of human needs. It was clearly prompted by economic and 
cultural dislocation, the tearing of the traditional social fabric of interpersonal relationships.
As suggested by these writings, activists strongly felt that independence from a social structure 
designed to suit the interests of the bourgeois required more than mere improved policy and insti-
tutions, or the development of workers’ job skills to ensure a higher material living standards. There 
was a need to cultivate to their internal development. This holistic view of social independence from 
capitalist exploitation led to calls for the proletariat to conceive of its own society and culture to tran-
scend the restrictive paternalism and outright exploitation of the uneducated laboring masses. This 
sentiment is articulated clearly in the writings of Ōbayashi Munetsugu, the head of social bureau of 
the Ōhara Social Problems Research Institute which influenced the students of the Tōdai settlement. 
Ōbayashi forcefully rejected the paternalistic efforts to assimilate urban working class or rural villag-
ers into bourgeois society in his work on settlement theory. Articulating his thoughts on centrality of 
culture for the settlement movement, Ōbayashi wrote in his 1926 Settlement Research that, “Culture 
is not something handed down, but must be created. It cannot be instilled, but must be invented” 
(Ōbayashi 1926: 7). One expression of this need to create a culture for the exploited masses, was the 
concept of Prolekult. Prolekult, short for proletarian culture, had a profound impact on various social 
educators including many in the labor school movement and Tsuchida Kyōson. Proletkult emerged 
immediately after the Russian revolution and was envisioned as a worker’s education movement to 
replace antiquated bourgeois culture with a liberated socialist culture designed for a new age. Led by 
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Alexandr Bodganov and Education Minister Lunacharsky, it sought to return to the ‘warm stream’ of 
humanistic Marxism as a corrective to the distortions in what was seen as the ‘cold stream’ of Engels’ 
rigid rationalism. In soviet Russia, the movement largely became known as an avant-garde artistic 
movement which saw the participation of influential cultural figures such as the filmmaker Sergei 
Eisenstein whose later classic films are said to have been indebted to his early experiences with the 
Proletkult movement (see Mally 1990). However, Japanese exposure to the concepts pursued by Pro-
letkult came through the influence of the available British literature on Proletkult: namely, the work 
titled Proletkult by Cedar and Eden Paul who worked in connection with the British Plebs’ League 
which was absorbed into the National Council of British Labour Schools. Soviet Proletkult saw con-
siderable reinterpretation as it was received by thinkers outside of Russia and radical students influ-
enced by eclectic schools of Marxism in Japan saw Proletkult as a method of realizing Leninism, even 
though the movement was initially conceived by ideological opponents of Lenin. Communist leader 
Yamakawa Hitoshi further reflected these sentiments in his response to requests from radical students 
in Kyoto. In his introduction to a work on Proletcult for the Kyoto Federation of Students (Gakuren), 
Yamakawa explained that the promise of Proletcult as an educational method was “mental liberation 
from the bourgeois exploitation” through independent education (Yamakawa 1976: 172-173). 
On the point of culture, Ōbayashi makes a point that others in the movement saw as paramount. 
Settlements and other efforts to create a new egalitarian society and culture, he argued, should pro-
vide opportunity, not inculcate a set ideology or customs. The ultimate purpose of the social educa-
tion through settlements was to provide the opportunity to create a culture suitable for the people’s 
own rhythms and needs of life (Ōbayashi 1926: 9). Suehiro endorses this concept and argued that 
the settlement is a family which should not coerce the values of other members (Suehiro 1932: 15). 
Tsuchida Kyōson eloquently makes this argument and in fact makes it a center piece of his education-
al philosophy. A free university should aim to provide education from the perspective of ‘laboring 
members of society.’ The goal of this education was the creation of Proletkult, a proletarian culture. 
Yet, this proletarian culture should be distinguished from Marxian Proletkult. When choosing what 
kind of culture to accept and what view of life and society to create, the youth should observe which 
thought system provides spiritual sustenance. Only then, Tsuchida argued, could they could they 
grasp the truth of Proletkult. Importantly, Tsuchida Kyoson recognized the importance of not only 
vague notions of culture but also of traditional religion and incorporated this into his distinctive in-
terpretation of Proletkult into his Free University movement. Tsuchida argued that Soviet Proletkult 
was a mirror image of a bourgeois culture whose values were molded by coercive propaganda. In his 
Theory on Proletkult, he argued, true Proletkult would not inculcate specific values or encourage the 
adoption of any particular worldview. The purpose of Proletkult would be to instill in all segments 
of society the critical faculty to choose one’s own values whether they be socialist or bourgeois. This 
critical faculty would ultimately also provide the ability to critique power (Tsuchida 1924).
Furthermore, Tsuchida sought to identify a universal culture which transcended class conflict 
through the cultivation of jinkaku and he was eloquent in his emphasis of the need to develop the full 
spiritual potential of those members of society who had no control over the culture that they lived 
in and were deeply impacted by. In his writings, Tsuchida imagined a movement built through the 
expansion of free universities and the grassroots emergence of a new inclusive culture through reli-
gion; namely, an idealized social Buddhism. Deeply influenced by German Idealist thought, Tsuchida 
viewed a kind of modernized religion as the ideal instrument of integrating the needs both individual 
and community. He argued that any religion would suffice, but the Buddhism was the most culturally 
compatible with Japan (Miyazaka 1968: 471;Ōki 2013:53-53).
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This non-ideological legitimization of differing subjective worldviews and the importance of their 
peaceful co-existence through voluntary cooperation and negotiation of differences is parallel to Wal-
zer’s liberal concern for civil society to act as a testing ground for a range of worldviews and percep-
tions of public and private good. The pitfalls of divisive and intolerant factionalism for the long-term 
sustainability of a movement can be gleaned from the experience of free university movement as it 
began to spread and be adopted by different groups. For example, in the case of the Ina Free Univer-
sity in southern Nagano Prefecture, student radicals who formed a splinter group from the organiza-
tion which had established the free university, perceived Proletkult and worker’s education as strictly 
Leninist. This group was highly critical of the free university’s stance on the separation of education 
and political agitation and ultimately become an oppositional force contributing to the stagnation of 
the institution (Nakano 1990: 179; Miyazaka: 470-475). 
Role of empirical surveys in social action
Autonomy for the working class was the theoretical ideal, yet simultaneously there was a growing 
influence from important new ideas about the necessary process of undertaking successful social 
work and about how social ideals could best be concretely implemented. Social education as an au-
tonomous social and even cultural movement, was made possible by crucial new intellectual trends 
in which those studying society felt compelled to move beyond an older emphasis among professors 
and intellectuals on armchair abstractions towards a new engagement with systematically discovering 
the actual conditions of society on the ground. Labor education activists and thinkers had begun to 
integrate the insights of social science and its emphasis on empirical analysis of actual social condi-
tions as well as the greater socio-economic and historical trends producing them through systematic 
surveys of living conditions in order to accurately develop a response in both state policy and civilian 
social work. In Suehiro’s statement of purpose for the Tōdai Settlement, he argues that Japanese aca-
demia was too often in the thrall of foreign armchair theory. Therefore, an analysis of the actual state 
of the society was necessary to carry out effective social work. Suehiro’s denunciation of armchair 
theory was a reflection of an important intellectual current at the time. Tokyo Imperial assistant law 
professor Hirano Yoshitarō, who was central to the Teidai settlement’s labor school in its initial years 
described this ethos of which he imbued as a student himself:
…the young students exclusively strived to find universal principles, and justice and righteousness. These 
young students recognized that the world was changing and they wanted to grasp the fundamentals of this 
change… As a student and part of the ‘Science and Democracy Movement’ we who sought principle and 
justice and progress, knew that we must devote ourselves to discovering the fundamental laws of social 
development and the research of the creation of a new future society, and we needed to find a specific field 
of study to achieve this, we chose the construction of a new law, especially to begin by surveying the actual 
conditions of the workers and agricultural laborers’ intense, close struggles in order to grasp the true reality 
of it.(Hirano 1977, 74).
The power of both survey analysis to customize social policy and of civil society to act as an aux-
iliary to the state to accomplish tasks which the state struggled to implement was not lost on many 
policy makers. Surveys also provided opportunities to engage the proletariat and undertake educa-
tional activities. Home Minister Tokonami Takejirō of the Hara cabinet appointed Takano Iwasaburō 
an economics researcher at Tokyo University to carry out a survey of conditions in a working class of 
Tokyo. He received help from a number of Shinjinkai members who seized the opportunity to form 
the Tsukishima Labor Discussion Association and a consumer cooperative, both of which served as 
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crucial precedents for the Tōdai Settlement. Weekly gatherings led by the student activists providing 
learning groups on Marxist thought. As Andrew Gordon shows, this interaction between intellectual 
activists and workers who attended these meetings encouraged workers with interest in the labor 
movement to devote themselves fully to the movement for social betterment. One example is Saitō 
Tadatoshi who became leader of the Ishikawajima Shipyard Union (Gordon 1991: 152-3). Further-
more, Takano Iwasaburō was later to be member of the board of the Japan Labor School and a leading 
researcher at the Ōhara Social Problems Research Institute showing not only the interwoven nature 
of these endeavors but how the importance of empirical analysis. The liberal Hamaguchi Osachi was 
even more eager to rely on civil society groups to cooperate in solving housing and other social prob-
lems plaguing urban areas. Not surprisingly, Suehiro Izutarō sat on an advisory board to Hamaguchi 
on social work and which prioritized the application of empirical analysis through surveys. (Jiji Shin-
po 1926.7.17) 
This attitude toward a greater need for an empirical, research-based understanding of the root 
cause of social problems coincided with and was reinforced by the pressing importance of recognizing 
on the Left of the actual needs and aspirations of the people. Activists came to fully grasp that the 
efficacy and sustainability of social reform efforts had to be tapered to actual demands rooted in the 
conditions of the target populations. One of the most influential proponents of this idea of speaking 
to the needs of the people as they saw them, was Yamakawa Hitoshi, the theoretical force behind the 
Rōnō-ha of the Communist movement in the pre-war period, and one of the leading intellectual 
lights of the Tōdai Settlement. In contrast to other vanguardist factions among leftists who primarily 
argued for the creation of a Communist Party founded on a thorough theoretical basis, Yamakawa 
stressed the importance of ‘entering into the people’ and understanding what they wanted to make 
practical, incremental gains towards a more just society. (Yamakawa 1922).
Moderate reformers also saw that the lack of direct contact with and mutual understanding of 
the true needs of the working masses was a blindspot for intellectual elites. Tsuchida Kyōson became 
increasingly disillusioned with philosophers who showed no interest or capability in integrating the 
nature of actual society into their worldviews in order realize ideals of progress, lamenting that as long 
as “academic philosophers fail to take an interest in the concrete and social problems or fail to have 
any notion of the new demands among the people, they cannot hope to be philosophers for today 
and tomorrow even with their fine and strictly logical constructions of thought.” (Soviak 1990,92). 
Tsuchida, who frequently traveled to various regions to lecture, also hoped that “politicians and other 
notables would try harder to grasp the actual wants of the people.” (Tsuchida 1935:168). 
Implementation through institutions
In an effort to implement these ambitious, (even quixotic) goals, left-leaning labor schools, set-
tlements and free universities pursued different strategies. Whereas labor schools sought to inde-
pendently provide educational empowerment primarily through night classes by educated local vol-
unteers, albeit with an effort to equalize relations between students and teachers, settlement houses 
provided a more complete, holistic effort at socialization and provision of services. The movement in 
Britain and America had been initiated by Christian socialists who had sought to provide the oppor-
tunity for the socially isolated poor and the middle class to meaningfully interact, and for the poor to 
be inculcated in middle class values. Between 1917 and 1926, Japan saw the establishment of 43 new 
settlements founded with a range of affiliations including Christian and Buddhist missions, nation-
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al and local bureaucracies, big business, semi-governmental organizations and universities (Kinzley 
1991: 89).
The Tōdai Settlement grew out of a response by Tōdai law professor Suehiro Izutarō and his stu-
dents to the humanitarian crisis following devastating earthquake in 1923. Suehiro cooperated with 
other activists, notably the Christian socialist reformer Kagawa Toyohiko to help provide basic relief 
services, yet as the winter drew near leaving many poor residents in Tokyo vulnerable Kagawa urged 
Suehiro to establish a permanent organization to help the poor. Suehiro and a core group of student 
volunteers decided to found a settlement house along the lines of Toynbee Hall in Oxford as a base 
for “university extension” and student social work. Subjects included sciences and humanities and 
were carried through classroom lectures with follow up sessions with tutors (Hirano 1973: 118-120). 
This pedagogical approach was common on labor schools at the time and was influenced by the case 
method system of the Dalton Plan popular among Taisho-period self-learning enthusiasts as well as 
Prolekult through the work by Eden and Cedar Paul. 
Although classes at the Tōdai Labor School were given at night after exhaustive working days 
which resulted in flagging attendance numbers, student lecturers and tutors claimed that they were 
pleasantly surprised to find that the factory workers studying at the labor school absorbed complex 
Marxist theoretical concepts of surplus value and exploitation from their own experience far more 
rapidly than the Teidai students who struggled to comprehend Marxism from academic texts (Eday-
oshi Isamu in Hirano:118). The Tōdai Settlement Labor School ultimately came to be considered 
during this time to have been the largest and most successful of the left-wing labor schools in Tokyo 
(Smith: 143).
Beyond workers’ education through its labor school, the settlement’s central activities included a 
consumer cooperative, a continuing education program for adults which became open to male and 
female students, child care and education for the children of local factory workers, a medical clinic 
and, alone among settlements in Japan, a legal consultation section for workers which benefitted from 
the direct participation of Tōdai legal scholars (Tōdai Setsurumento Nenpou 1926). The proletarian 
orientation of student activity was clear. Members of the settlement, called settlers, included one char-
ismatic and radical leftist student leader of the Shinjinkai, Kikuchi Tadao, and Kinoshita Hanji, who 
was one leader of a faction of students who seceded from the Shinjinkai with the belief that the pro-
letariat movement should be led by workers themselves and not directed by intellectual elites (Smith 
1971, 103). The settlement also provided rooms for Teidai students to live among the working poor of 
the Honjo ward (Tōdai Settlement 1926). 
Like its British counterparts, the Tōdai Settlement and other settlement houses settlements estab-
lished in connection with the Christian socialist reformer Kagawa Toyohiko in Kobe, Osaka and To-
kyo boasted cooperatives, labor union offices, credit unions, schools, and medical clinics. According 
to Mark Mullins, “In 1928. . . the Shikanjima Settlement Building in the factory district of Osaka was 
sponsoring the meeting of the Nurses Mission of the Friends of Jesus, Toyo Spinning Company Trade 
Union meetings, Metal Workers Union, a Day Nursery for children, a weekend program for adoles-
cent boys, and a trade union meeting for Koreans in the neighborhood”(Mullins 2004: 17).  
According to Hirano, who soon took the reins of the labor school from Suehiro, the location in 
Yanagishima district of the Honjo ward was targeted for its specific demographic profile. Not only was 
the area among the poorest sections of Tokyo, its population was predominately young and unaffili-
ated with labor unions. Many of the larger firms at the time had begun to unionize or had developed 
means to represent workers. Workers of smaller factories, however, were often left with limited op-
portunities to organize. The Yanagishima district had hosted primarily small to mid-sized companies 
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which could be organized into mixed industry unions. Hirano relates that some employees of small 
scale companies had already entered the ‘Tokyo Gōdō’ a mixed industry union associated with the 
Hyōgikai, a militant Leninist union supported by Teidei settlers and the Shinjinkai. According to Hi-
rano, it was necessary for the these workers who were “searching for guidelines for the fight” to come 
to the settlement labor school “because it was a time when they needed to know what kind of union to 
create, how to collectively negotiate, under what circumstances should they strike, how to resist and 
take precautions against the police when constantly being shadowed by officers while still advancing 
the labor union movement (Hirano, et all. p.115).” During this early period of the settlement labor 
school, the Hyogikai enjoyed considerable success doubling its membership to nearly rival its more 
moderate competitor, the Sōdōmei. However, the Hyōgikai’s aggressive striking ultimately proved 
self-destructive. In 1926 alone, 5,000 of its members were detained and by the late 20s the organiza-
tion was thoroughly marginalized (Garon 1986: 114-118).  
The Teidai Settlement’s efforts to encourage this radical labor movement faced debilitating obsta-
cles from increasingly repressive labor laws which restricted the framework in which the settlement 
could openly operate. Labor laws allowed the formation of unions but gave businesses the right to 
sue unions for damages incurred during strikes. In 1925, the Peace Preservation Law, the “blatant 
execution of militarism,” which forbid the creation or facilitation of organizations designed to change 
the national polity or challenge the system of private property and placed the settlement in a perma-
nently precarious position. Living under perpetual fear of a police raid one settler claimed to have 
burned enough secret documents to have “boiled his bathwater a couple of times (Edayoshi Isamu in 
Hirano:116).”  
Another key area of the settlement’s aim to extend knowledge for the benefit of the working class 
was the human relations legal consultation department. Although assisted by student settlers, the 
free legal service was predominantly provided by professors Suehiro and Hozumi who alternated 
eight hour shifts on Tuesdays and Thursdays each week consulted on labor contract disputes. Hirano 
explains that the emphasis on the term「人事」was intended to reflect the reality that providing 
effective counseling required an attempt to look beyond the mere legal code to the fundamentals of 
the experienced conflict. Suehiro believed that the written laws of the period did not recognize the 
needs of the proletariat and could not regulate the kinds of problems that the underprivileged actually 
faced. Thus, current law could not benefit workers even if legal knowledge was spread to them. Suehi-
ro viewed the settlement as an opportunity to be exposed to real social conditions and grasp the true 
underlying laws guiding society in order to modify law to better fit the needs of the working class. In 
the words of Hirano, Suehiro believed “that new laws which ignore the demands and hopes arising 
from everyday life are totally unacceptable” (Hirano: 118).  
 Tsuchida Kyōson’s movement on the other hand, the free university movement, was by design fo-
cused on more rural communities than the Teidai Settlement and grew out of Tsuchida’s interactions 
with locals in an effort to have more interaction with the grassroots. The first free university grew out 
of an invitation by local and teachers in Ueda, Nagano Prefecture to give lectures on philosophy in 
1920. During his lectures, Tsuchida lamented the lack of opportunities for adult education. Tsuchida 
criticized the state of government controlled education for primarily seeking to weave youths into an 
ideological system meant to form the young as national citizens where they are told that the highest 
good achieved as an individual is as a national subject and not the development of their own subjec-
tive ideals and aspirations. Apparently deeply moved by Tsuchida’s vision for independent education, 
local education activists sought to realize Tsuchida’s plan and establish a school. The first class was 
held in November of 1921 in an old building owned by a temple. The blackboard was borrowed from a 
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local company and the desks from a local farmer. Tsuchida invited his academic friends from the Uni-
versity of Kyoto to teach classes on a range of subjects and philosophy classes were even once held by 
the famous philosopher Miki Kiyoshi. Taught subjects included psychology and natural science, but it 
appears that literature was consistently the most popular choice with roughly 50 local attending each 
year. In 1922, two more free universities opened Niigata, and over the course of the next few years 
began to expand across the country. A central organization to provide structure to the movement, as 
well as a publication, were established (Miyzaka 1968: 460-463; Ogawa 1989: 85-87). 
  Tsuchida’s free university movement was taken up by local activists who reveal the way that the 
efforts of social activists such as Tsuchida, Kagawa, and Suehiro themselves were not purely elitist 
but did in fact deeply reverberate throughout society. One important example of this convergence 
of reformist aspiration among both the educated classes and the non-elite was Shimonaka Yosaburō. 
Shimonaka grew up in poverty and was forced to work as he studied. Although he was unable to finish 
primary school, he was able to become a school teacher and formed Japan’s first teacher’s union the 
Keimeikai. Shimonaka is perhaps most remembered as the founder of the publishing firm Heibonsha, 
but he also established a free university during this period as well as after the war showing the resil-
ience of the free university concept (Lincicome 1999: 349-350).  
In describing the founding spirit of the Keimeikai which operated his free university, Shimonaka 
reveals many elements common to the independent labor education movement: “We hold as our ideal 
the realization of social life based on true human life. Therefore, we affirm all publicly just needs, and 
respect all social existences. This association is the called the Keimeikai and, through the students 
engaged in the extensive work of enlightenment, our enlightenment movement will serve as a catalyst 
of for the pioneering of a new civilization.” (Miyazaka :488).
The issue of ideological conversion and its significance  
for understanding Japan’s cooperative state-society relations
Following the Manchurian Incident in 1931, and the nationalist fervor that it triggered, there was 
a sea-change even among the far left in attitudes towards state power and the most appropriate meth-
od of bettering the lives of vulnerable underclass. Although not all left-wing activists were uniform 
in the trajectory of their thought in the 30s, many former progressives were in fact swept away in the 
tide of history and enthusiastically embraced state power and even ethnic nationalism. One example 
which may provide insights into this at time halting and ambiguous shift is the Marxist influenced 
writer Murobuse Kōshin. Like other leftist activists and intellectuals in the 1930s who sought real 
gains for the working class such as Asō Hisashi, Murobuse was struck by the social potential of the 
military’s 1934 pamphlet detailing its ideas for war preparation titled, The Fundamentals of National 
Defense. Produced by the Newspaper Section of the Army and sent out to be printed in newspapers 
across the country and Manchukuo, the plan advocated for the securing of the livelihoods of the 
people in order strengthen army and nation. It in part helped change the perception of the military’s 
role in society among some social activists who succumbed to the allure of state power and ethnic na-
tionalism. Murobuse Koshin, who felt himself close intellectual kin to Tsuchida Kyōson with similar 
philosophical leanings, began a conversion to the right during the time of the ‘34 publication of the 
military reform plans. Murobuse noted the plan contained elements of fascism but also promoted a 
just economic system built on moral principles which could transcend the profiteering and rent-seek-
 30 CIVIL SOCIETY IN EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES: CONTRIBUTIONS TO DEMOCRACY, PEACE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT. 2018
ing inherent in capitalism. The “time of the political parties had ended, and the era of the military has 
begun” he ominously concluded (Murobuse 1934.10.10). 
Law professor Suehiro was also impacted by these social trends and his students noted with disap-
pointment that he seemed to grow silent on leftist issues following the Manchurian Incident, though 
it is unclear whether his views changed or he felt it wiser to be more guarded in a more jingoistic 
atmosphere. Nevertheless, following the outbreak of the war with China in 1937, Suehiro began to 
show clear changes in his legal and social thought. Although initially concerned that wartime eco-
nomic mobilization would lead to a decrease in the standard of living for workers, by 1938 Suehiro 
was convinced of the need for the state to engage in planning the economy. Suehiro wrote that: “As 
liberal economics has been proven to be unreasonable in the real conditions of our time, only a proper 
planned economy can conceivable provide proper economic management without obstacles to the 
social economy. Not only that, but we must abandon the principle of liberty and construct the econ-
omy on the principle of stability”(Suehiro in Ishii 2015:121).1
It is important to note that what brought about Suehiro’s change of heart concerning the role of 
state power and its benefits for social policy was not only the necessities of war mobilization and its 
consequences. Suehiro was also reacting to the widespread perception of a ‘deadlock in liberal eco-
nomics’ [自由経済の行き詰まり] stemming from the worldwide depression. As his 1932 article 
explicitly shows, Suehiro had been highly critical of the unjust capitalist economic order of the time 
and argued that it was natural for workers to demand a better system. Yet, Suehiro had advocated 
autonomy from the culture of the propertied classes and the state that acted in their interests, and he 
presented the settlement movement as a way of achieving this through the development of an indi-
vidual worker’s independent sense of jinkaku. Suehiro’s embrace of an interventionist role for state 
power in the late 30s then was a fundamental shift to the belief in the powerlessness of social actors 
to independently work to improve society. The phenomenal success of Nazi Germany and the influ-
ence of their economic and social ideology surely played a role, although Suehiro was critical of the 
muddy thinking of their legal philosophy and what he saw as the opaque nature of their worldview 
(Ishii 2015: 118). 
Other left-wing activists can to a similar position, yet through different routes. Suehiro’s shift in 
economic thought was mirrored by former student activists such as Masaki Chifuyu, a Tokyo Uni-
versity student and member of the Shinjinkai who volunteered as a tutor at the Tokyo University 
settlement labor school but later became a ‘reform bureaucrat’ in the Cabinet Planning Board. Like 
many economic reformers at the time who had studied progressive economics, Masaki sought to 
reformulate German corporatist economic thought in an effort to overcome the individualist self-in-
terest of capitalism and build a new system for the sake of the collective public good. As the mayor 
of Kamakura in the late 1960s, reflected back on his motives for collaborating with the wartime state:
“If this bottom-less war continued, we had sense of anxiety about the lives of the people. So we researched 
the Nazi social economic structure and called for reforms along the lines of strengthening the control econ-
omy. But looking back now, it isn’t really clear to me whether we maintained a leftist critique of war or rather 
merely felt that a luke-warm capitalism wasn’t good enough [to maintain the living standards of the people] 
and needed to strengthen war-time controls” (Masaki 1971:18). 
Yet, perhaps to a degree that Masaki was not fully conscious of, Masaki’s economic thought 
ultimately converged closely with the ideals of reformist military and bureaucracy which enabled 
cooperation.
1  I thank professor Hans Martin Krämer of Heidelberg University for introducing me to this source.
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Many former settlers and other former labor activists not only sought to harness the powers of 
the state but fully absorbed the romantic nationalism touted by the military. Asano Akira, once an 
important student leader of the settlement labor school and a Communist party theorist, became a 
military propagandist in Indonesia under the influence of the Pan-Asianism of Okakura Tenshin. 
Furthermore, Finance Ministry ‘reform bureaucrat’ Mōri Hideoto played a pivotal role in establishing 
the settlement’s legal advice department, became one of the leading pan-Asianist technocrats fol-
lowing the outbreak of war with China (Mimura 2011:134). Mōri promoted the idea that hostilities 
with China were an opportunity to reconstitute the Japanese empire’s socio-economic system and 
reorient it from a profit and conflict-based individualism to an organic communalism. As opposed 
to liberalism, which Mōri viewed as based on abstract, supposedly universal principles, Japan’s new, 
more concrete conception of the economy would be formed with people as the center, or as the sub-
ject of economic activity (134-137). In using the term ‘people’s economy,’ [国民経済] Mōri fit a pat-
tern among other reform bureaucrats like Masaki Chifuyu, progressive economists such as Arisawa 
Hiromi and even military ideologues who sought to develop a socio-economic blueprint based on 
the public good rather than private interest. The concept of a ‘people’s economy’ emerging from the 
protectionist thought of 19th century thinker Friedrich List, and recalibrated from the contemporary 
corporatist and organicist thought of Othmar Spann and Friedrich von Gottl-Ottlilienfeld appears to 
have further served as a bridge between the Marxism in which they were deeply steeped in as young 
intellectuals, and a control economy required to maintain a total war system as the conflict with China 
descended deeper into quagmire.
During the time he spent as a student settler who lived in a room on the second floor of the settle-
ment house to be closer to the factory-district workers, Mōri had given a speech along with professor 
Suehiro and others to promote the settlement and recruit for new members at Tokyo Imperial Uni-
versity. Mōri spoke of his experiences teaching at the labor school and the speeches were presented 
under the banner of not only extending freedom and equality for those that could not enjoy it but 
also ‘entering into the masses’ and ‘grasping what the masses want.’ These slogans had been popular-
ized by Yamakawa Hitoshi and his 1922 treatise A Change of Course and had been one of the guiding 
principles of the early Tōdai Settlement. (Teikokudaigaku Shinbun: 1924.01.03.). The emphasis put on 
understanding the actual needs of the working masses implies that their immediate needs as well as 
their personal aspirations were not self-evident. There was a potential range of different possibilities 
necessitating not only effort to discover these needs, but also respect for their diversity.
Nonetheless, by the 1930s Mōri’s nationalist turn led him to completely reject any sense of plu-
ralism. What can be interpreted as the realist views of Yamakawa Hitoshi who had urged the labor 
movement in his 1922 treatise to target concrete, partial successes to work towards a socialist society 
may help explain a degree of continuity in thought on reform from the time of Mōri’s youth. What-
ever the case, it is clear that by the late 1930s Mōri imagined a totalism which “embraces all aspects 
of the people’s livelihood and can be used as the principle of action in one’s life” (Mōri, in Mimura: 
134). This totalist blueprint for action would weave together all dimensions of national life including 
economy, thought and society. (134). Mōri further elaborated that, “Division and conflict within an 
organization inevitably disrupts and fragments a single policy and consequently makes it unscientific 
and unable to display the total, scientific, planning character of totalism” (Mōri, quoted in Mimura 
200). Thus, it was clear that there was no space for pluralistic civil society.  
Even Ōbayashi Munetugu, the settlement theorist who had, along with Tsuchida Kyōson, so ener-
getically promoted the separation of education and political propaganda to facilitate subjective differ-
ence of values in a pluralistic society, came to reject a degree of pluralist autonomy for ethnic cultural 
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unity bound by the state for security and stability. And like Suehiro and Mōri, this process was moti-
vated by a search for a guarantee of the people’s welfare which led to the adoption of state economic 
and social planning as well as imperialism.
In his writings on social policy in the war years, Ōbayashi shows important continuity in thought 
from the Taishō idealism his emphasis on autonomous self-governance and advancement of welfare 
through education, as well as his rejection of the fractured self-interest of liberalism. Yet, he now ar-
gued liberation and development in terms of ethnic nations instead of class. The welfare of the people 
can only have meaning when connected to the totality of society. For Ōbayashi, this ultimately meant 
that concrete realization of public welfare for any ethnic nation, its happiness and security, must be 
seen as ethnic welfare which depends on their nation’s tenaciousness and independence (Ōbayashi 
1944: 197). According to Ōbayashi, the ethnic nation gives an individual a base, it is a unified spiri-
tual body. Yet, this he believed did not entirely eliminate individuality. For him, “the individual was 
within the ethnic total, as the ethnic nation preserves internal values, autonomous life, and moral 
independence, it renews and develops the spiritual life of the ethnic total” (197). Nonetheless, despite 
nominally accepting individual values the spiritual unity promised by ethnic nationalism necessitated 
a high degree of uniformity, thus largely negating civil society. 
The ideological conversion of Shimonaka Yosaburō in the 1930s from international progressivism 
to ethnic nationalism and pan-Asianism showed a similar consistency in concern for the downtrod-
den and in his anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism. Yet, his worldview was now articulated in the ex-
clusivist rhetoric of an essentialized ethnic culture. Despite his earlier advocacy of an anarchist vision 
reform for the working class, Shimonaka came to view the military and agrarian nationalism as the 
central buttress for a new society which could supersede capitalism. The military and agrarian nation-
alism could also, in his view, ‘overcome modernity,’ or develop a modern system beyond an Western 
dominated culture of liberal capitalist social relations. In this strategic shift, Shimonaka reformulated 
his reformist thought on rural self-government and independence in tandem with current intellectual 
trends. Yet, after 1935, he went farther and appears to have converted to full blown Emperor worship 
(Usami69). Shimonaka ultimately utilized his accumulated experience in education to develop total 
war education policy to assist war mobilization in the late 1930s. He became a member of the Imperial 
Assistance Association and the Koa Dōmei led by general Hayashi Senjūro, who had been War Min-
ister during the army’s publication of the Fundamental of Our National Defense.
These examples of former progressive activists turning their backs on the cornerstones of civil 
society serve as cautionary tales for the abandonment of pluralism and independence from elites. 
The allure of ethnic nationalism appears the be way it effectively essentializes the nature of members 
of national groups and expands the realm of what is universal, or general, among the nation allow-
ing greater justification for state power to enforce these values as if they objective, universal truth. 
Undoubtedly, wartime nationalism was also driven by a visceral egoism. Ōbayashi insisted that the 
Greater East Asian War not only represented an opportunity for other east Asian ethnic nations to 
militarily, politically and culturally to form the nucleus of their ethnic welfare and wellbeing, the war 
“was evidence of the Japanese ethnic nation’s invincible strength” (Ōbayashi 1944: 197). 
The attractiveness of exclusionary nationalism often tainting more radical reformist ideologies but 
which provides identity and clarity during crisis recalls the observation by Walzer that, “There was 
a kind of heroism in these projects-a concentration of energy, a clear sense of direction and an un-
blinking recognition of friends and enemies (Walzer 10). But that this mentality leads to the demise of 
civil society and with it, a mechanism for pluralistic integration of a diverse society through voluntary 
negotiation rather than state coercion. 
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In the end it was Tsuchida who perhaps was the most consistent in his commitment to the ide-
als of civil society. Whereas many of his colleagues began to look to the military, or bureaucracy, 
Tsuchida continued to critique language from the military he thought was dangerously divorced from 
reality. Singling out War Minister general Araki Sadao known for his militant romanticism, Tsuchida 
attacked what he saw was the invented mythology of the far-right which would ultimately heighten 
conflict with other powers (Tsuchida 1933: 200-208). Tragically, Tsuchida Kyōson, who had always 
been sickly, passed away in 1934. With his death Japan lost an important intellectual and moral com-
pass which could have served a beacon for an alternative solution to the crisis of the 1930s.  
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The Other Labour Movement 
COMMUNITY UNIONS AS STRATEGIC FIELD CHALLENGERS  
IN JAPANESE LABOUR ACTIVISM
Abstract: Organised labour in Japan is characterised by a dominance of corporatist enterprise unions. Despite a growing casual-
isation and precariousness of work as well as signs of a legitimacy crisis due to a decreasing unionisation rate, most mainstream 
trade unions remain hesitant to expand their scope of representation beyond their core constituency of regularly-employed 
workers. In comparison, locally-based or social group-constituted community unions strategically target these niches in fo-
cusing on the organisation of the growing group of irregularly-employed, as the most vulnerable workforce. Often inspired by 
examples from abroad and with a strong rooting in civil society, these grassroots-level organisations of labour activism develop 
innovative and much more flexible forms of workers’ representation. This research paper elucidates transformations within the 
broader Japanese labour movement along examples of diverse forms of community unionism. It aims to find out, how factors of 
decision-making about organisational structures, approached agendas as well as applied tactics vary among different examples 
of community unions. The strategic role of community unions as challengers vis-à-vis mainstream trade unions as incumbents 
within the organisational field of the Japanese labour movement is analysed through the application of the theoretical model 
of Strategic Action Fields by Fligstein and McAdam (2012), which intersects between social movement- and organisation-the-
ory. This research paper argues that Japanese community unionism is not a coherent phenomenon but shows up variation in 
strategic decision-making and field positionality. As field challengers, they point out imitable alternatives to the established 
corporatist trade union system and thus can eventually initiate revitalising field transformation of Japanese labour. This paper’s 
analysis is based on in-field research conducted in Japan, including interviews with organisers and members of trade unions and 
several different community union organisations as well as participant observation within group activism.
Keywords: Labour revitalisation, community unionism, Strategic Action Fields, Japan
Kitas darbo judėjimas: bendruomenių sąjungos kaip strateginiai varžovai Japonijos darbuotojų judėjime
Santrauka: Korporatyvinių įmonių asociacijų dominavimas – būdingas organizuotos Japonijos darbo jėgos bruožas. Mažė-
jant profesinių sąjungų narių skaičiui, dauguma pagrindinių profesinių sąjungų nesiruošia plėsti savo atstovaujamų sričių rato 
plačiau nei jų reguliuojamos pagrindinės nuolatinių darbuotojų rinkėjų apygardos. Tai vyksta nepaisant augančios atskirties ir 
darbo nestabilumo bei legitimumo krizės požymių. Palyginimui – vietinės arba iš socialinių grupių sudarytos bendruomenės 
yra strategiškai nuk   reiptos į šias nišas ir susitelkia į pažeidžiamiausias, nuolatinio darbo neturinčias grupes. Dažnai, įkvėptos 
užsienio pavyzdžių ir tvirtai įsitraukusios į pilietinę visuomenę, šios organizacijos plėtoja novatoriškas ir daug lankstesnes dar-
buotojų atstovavimo formas. Atliekant šį tyrimą nustatomos platesnio Japonijos darbo jėgos judėjimo transformacijos, pateiki-
ami įvairūs bendruomeniškumo formų pavyzdžiai. Siekiama išsiaiškinti, kaip sprendimų priėmimo procesas skiriasi tarp įvairių 
bendruomenės sąjungų ir kokios yra jų sąsajos su organizacinėmis struktūromis, darbotvarke ir taktiniais sprendimais. Strate-
ginis bendruomenių sąjungų kaip pagrindinių profesinių sąjungų varžovų vaidmuo analizuojamas taikant Fligstein ir McAdam 
(2012) strateginių veiksmų lauko teorinį modelį. Jis žymi susikirtimą tarp socialinio judėjimo ir organizacijos teorijų. Šiame ty-
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rime teigiama, kad Japonijos bendruomenės nėra nuoseklus fenomenas, tačiau atskleidžiama strateginių sprendimo priėmimų 
ir pozicijų įvairovė. Kaip jau esamos profesinių sąjungų sistemos varžovai, šie judėjimai gali inicijuoti Japonijos darbo rinkos 
organizavimo pokyčius. Šio tyrimo analizė grindžiama atliktu tyrimu Japonijoje, įskaitant interviu su profesinių sąjungų organi-
zatoriais ir nariais bei keliomis skirtingomis bendruomenių organizacijomis, taip pat remtasi dalyvių stebėjimu grupių veiklose. 
Reikšminiai žodžiai: darbo atgaivinimas, bendruomenių sąjunga, strateginiai veiksmai, Japonija.
Introduction
In recent years, enterprise-based trade unions, as the most common form of organised labour in 
Japan, experience a situation of crisis. As elsewhere in the world, the globalisation of goods, markets 
and workforces creates new challenges for the established patterns of industrial relations in Japan. 
Since peaking in size in the 1970s, the unionisation rate of the Japanese workforce has been steadily 
decreasing and collective bargaining has become surprisingly institutionalised1. At the same time, 
there are important transformations on the labour market. The traditional “Japanese model” of stable, 
life-time employment becomes less relevant even inside larger companies. A steadily rising share of 
workers find themselves in “irregular”, i.e. temporary and often precarious forms of employment2. 
Terms such as burakku kigyō (“black enterprises”) and wākingu pua (“working poor”) have become 
signifiers of worsening working conditions and a growing precariousness, especially among the most 
vulnerable parts of the workforce in recent years. Cases of severe employment contract violations, 
workers’ mistreatment and unjust workplace discrimination have found their way in the mass media 
and reached a shocking climax in several widely-reported cases of death and suicide from overwork 
(karōshi, karō jisatsu).
Japan’s mainstream, enterprise-based trade unions are aware of these pressuring issues. Never-
theless, they appear to mostly shy away from taking a strong stance towards tackling these urgencies. 
Instead, as highly institutionalised entities, they mostly resort to strategically protecting their own 
constituencies, i.e. “regular” employees’ (seishain) interests, while refusing or hesitating to engage in 
a more inclusive representation of the constantly growing share of “irregular” employees (hiseishain). 
These insufficient efforts to change and revitalise make mainstream trade unions’ legitimacy as an 
adequate representative of the Japanese labour movement questionable. Contrary and in reaction to 
these inadequacies and the hesitance or inability of mainstream unions to revitalise, Japan experi-
ences vivid developments of alternative forms of labour activism on the grassroots-level. Locally or 
regionally based so-called “community unions” flexibly embrace a broader, social movement-type 
agenda, experiment with new forms of organisation and action repertoires. 
The development of Japanese community unions has been the object of several studies in the 
Japanese and English language literature (Oh, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c). Oftentimes, the focus of enqui-
ry has been put on comparative investigations of Japanese grassroots-level forms of labour activism 
with similar developments in other regional contexts (Suzuki, 2008, 2012; Takasu, 2012) or on the 
specificities of particular community unions in Japan (Royle & Urano, 2012; Urano & Stewart, 2009). 
Community unions’ role in the wider context of social movement activism have been analysed for ex-
ample by Nakajima (2010) and Weathers (2010). The relevance of community unions in the context of 
labour revitalisation is however still largely unclear. Previous research on Japanese community union-
1  The unionisation rate reached a record-low of 17.4% in 2014, whereas numbers are considerably higher in larger enterpris-
es and lower than the average in small and medium enterprises. After a peak of strike activity in the mid-1970s (more than 
10.000 strikes in 1974), in recent years, strike action is nearly untraceable (425 strikes in 2014) (Oh, 2012b)
2  In 2014 record-high of 37.4% of all employees were considered as so-called “irregular employees” (JILPT, 2016)
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ism did for example not yet address the question, if these peripheral forms of labour activism provide 
feasible alternatives to Japan’s cathartic mainstream union system and thus challenge the status quo 
or if through specialisation and niche-filling they serve a mere complementary function in the labour 
movement. Based on a comparative analysis of three examples of grassroots-level union groups, I 
argue that Japanese community unionism is not a coherent phenomenon but shows up variation in 
strategic decision-making and the ways of how the field of Japanese labour activism is challenged. As 
the first step of a larger analysis on field behaviour and transformation of Japanese labour activism, 
this article conceptualises community unions as organisational entities and focuses on their strategic 
decision-making about their initial approach and positionality in the field.
The article is structured in three parts: After a brief contextualisation of the research through a 
reflection of labour as a social movement, the theoretical framework of Strategic Action Fields, which 
helps to conceptualise trade unions as strategically acting organisational entities, is reviewed and the 
research’s methods are discussed. The second part provides necessary background information about 
the enterprise unionism’s maintained field dominance, despite an experienced crisis of legitimacy. In 
the third part, the strategic behaviour of different community union organisations as challengers in 
the field of Japanese labour activism will be analysed and compared along a range of tactical catego-
ries before arriving at an evaluative summary and outlook of their impact on the field.
Labour as a social movement
Theoretical perspectives of industrial relations conceptualise trade unions primarily as economic 
entities with the inert purpose to streamline collective bargaining and to contain most forms of dis-
ruptive industrial conflict. It is however striking that historically-speaking, labour represented one of 
the most visible and influential parts of progressive social movement activism, also in Japan. More-
over, earliest approaches in social movement and particularly collective action theory3 were strongly 
stimulated and influenced by observations of industrial conflict. Through the institutionalisation of 
organised labour in most national contexts, the research focus however shifted towards so-called 
New Social Movements (see (Habermas, 1981) and Melucci (1989)), which attempt to re-appropriate 
the lifeworld from colonising systemic and technocratic pressures, including institutionalised “old 
labour”, as Munck (1999) remarks. 
However, according to Munck (1999), the “crisis” experienced in trade unionism should be con-
sidered as a crisis only in its specific, narrowly-based form of self-interested “mainstream unions”. 
The labour movement itself is far from redundant or obsolete in today’s neo-liberal politico-economic 
environment, entailing increasingly irregular and exploitative employment conditions. Although the 
neo-liberal restructuring of economies intensified the hostility towards trade unions and led to seri-
ous bargaining asymmetries in line with a rising precariousness of work, unionisation remains as a 
historic and direct response to labour conditions. As Waterman (1999) remarks, while the structure 
and organisation of capital have changed considerably, trade unions tend to retain their past-deter-
mined forms and characters, resulting in a weakened connection and mismatch between employment 
relations and worker representation. For labour revitalisation, it is necessary to overcome these es-
tablished organisational patterns of trade unions and to re-integrate the social movement-aspect of 
organised labour. With the emergence of other civil society organisations in the peripheral field of 
3  Snow, Soule, and Kriesi (2004) define collective action as “any goal-directed activity engaged in jointly by two or more 
individuals (…) [entailing] the pursuit of a common objective through joint action – that is, people working together in some 
fashion for a variety of reasons, often including the belief that doing so enhances the prospect of achieving the objective”
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labour activism, it thus becomes mandatory to re-engage in the debate about perceiving labour as a 
social movement. This resonates with a broader conceptualisation by Fantasia and Voss (2007), who 
understand the labour movement to
comprise both legally recognized and formally sanctioned institutions (like trade unions, political parties, 
and works councils) as well as less formal groupings of workers and their allies (industrial actions, organiza-
tions of strike supporters, dissident movements within unions, cultural forms, etc. (2007, p.2518)
Waterman (1999) terms the concept of Social Movement Unionism (SMU) as a new, much more 
inclusive form of trade union organisation which, within a time of crisis for traditional trade unions, 
engages in struggles around multiple facets of “labour”. In his definition, SMU furthermore align with 
political partners or other civil society movements, reject hierarchical and technocratic methods of 
operation and pursue a democratic and pluralistic transformation of society under a framework of 
global solidarity. While bringing back the focus on the political aspect of social activism within or-
ganised labour, Waterman’s concept of SMU thus provides a useful base to analyse the phenomenon 
of Japanese community unionism.
Reconstructing theory: Strategic Action Fields
Numerous endeavours of fruitful cross-discipline fertilisation between organisation and social 
movement studies have made it clear that both fields can not only speak towards, but also learn from 
each other (see for example Campbell (2005)). Whereas the field of organisation studies, through 
a thorough scrutinisation of the behaviour, mechanisms and organisational repertoires of the in-
volved collective actors, bears important answers to the how of movements, approaches from social 
movement studies allow to gain insights about aspects of strategic agency and the transformation of 
organisations. pReflecting on this theoretical synthesis, Clemens and Minkoff (2004) describe the 
either suppressing or facilitating function of “organisation” in social movement activism, while at 
the same time acknowledging that the extent of this function differs according to a wide diversity 
for organisational forms. While institutional environments determine opportunity structures for the 
involved organisations, they themselves can induce change. Logics of appropriateness can be broken 
up through strategic framing, diffusion and recombination processes by organisational entities. Par-
allel to their structural or normative embeddedness, the involved organisations deliberately cultivate 
networks and develop strategic leadership. Thus, both theoretical fields have in common an aim to 
inquire about collective strategic action in the form of actors jockeying about strategic advantages in 
a meso-level social order.
Building on Bourdieu’s Field Theory (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), Fligstein and McAdam (2011, 
2012) propose the idea of Strategic Action Fields (SAFs), which in comparison to other meso-level 
conceptsaccounts a greater role of strategic agency of the involved actors in the building of new insti-
tutions4. SAFs are defined as
4  As a critique towards the overly structural focus and neglect of the role of actor mobilisation in previously dominant 
political process models, McCarthy and Zald (1977) develop an earliest meso-level approach of Social Movement Industries, 
to describe a population of social movement organisations, which address a common social issue and hold relatively similar 
goals, like business corporations within an industrial sector. Within neo-institutional theory, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) 
define Organisational Fields as “those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life: 
key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services 
or products” (1983, p.148). They describe organisations’ homogenising tendency through coercive or normative isomorphic 
pressures as an explanation for the reproducibility and stability of fields and thus downplay the aspect of transformative 
agency, even if organisations act in the role of “institutional entrepreneurs”.
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“[…] the fundamental units of collective action in a society. A strategic action field is a constructed meso-lev-
el social order in which actors (who can be individual or collective) are attuned to and interact with one an-
other on the base of shared (which is not to say consensual) understandings about the purposes of the field, 
relationships to others in the field (including who has power and why), and the rules of governing legitimate 
action in the field.” (Fligstein & McAdam 2012, p.9)
Thus, comparable to a Social Movement Industry, a SAF incorporates a plethora of different so-
cial movement organisations in any given issue-area, such as the labour movement. SAFs itself are 
the product of social construction processes. Field membership is based on subjective criteria, field 
boundaries can be shifted and shared understandings characterising a field, such as focal issues, 
hierarchies, rules and interpretative frames are developed by its members. As such, the theoretical 
approach targets the inter-relations between field actors, which range from competition to co-op-
eration and focus around the struggle for power, influence and legitimacy. In contrast to previous 
neo-institutional approaches, which focus on the convergence and stability of fields, the approach of 
SAFs understands them as dynamic arenas of constant change and transformation. Instead of directly 
confronting other field actors, the involved organisations and actors engage in a constant “jockeying” 
about the best positions. In accordance with the earlier theorisation on social movement stakeholders 
by Gamson (1975), Fligstein and McAdam (2011) differentiate two central actors in a SAF:
Incumbents are “actors who wield disproportionate influence within a field and whose interests 
and views tend to be heavily reflected in the dominant organization of the SAF”. Incumbents generally 
have a preference of preserving or expanding their established roles in the field, their position often 
becomes “locked-in” and the institutional environment restricts their adoption of alternative perspec-
tives. For challengers on the other hand, such a situation often means a dilemma: While they strive 
to change the status quo of the field, their peripheral position and their survival in the field in many 
cases depends on field stability. Challengers, on the other hand “occupy less privileged niches within 
the field and ordinarily wield little influence over its operation. While they recognize the nature of 
the field and the dominant logic of incumbent actors, they can usually articulate an alternative vision 
of the field and their position in it”. Changing field opportunities open niches for challengers to stra-
tegically strengthen their position and thus to transform the field. On the other hand, Walker (2012) 
emphasises that while disadvantaged social movements apply new and unfamiliar tactics and strategi-
cally frame and position their claims, at the same time “targets of social movements have considerable 
strategic capacity of their own, and utilize their disproportionate resources to their advantage” (2012, 
p.12) to maintain the status quo in a field. 
Lending from Bourdieu’s concept of habitus (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992) and the sources of stra-
tegic capacity-approach by Ganz (2000, 2009), Fligstein and McAdam (2012) describe social skills as 
the “cognitive capacity for reading people and environments, framing lines of action, and mobilizing 
people in the service of broader conceptions of the world and of themselves”5. Through the tactical 
application of social skills, field actors thus strive to either create, reproduce and maintain social sta-
bility or to initiate field transformation through the innovative development of collective identities, 
political coalitions and specific interests. The creative recombination of the existing organisational 
repertoire in a society in an attempt to optimise the mobilisation potential around material or moral 
5  The idea of social skills resonates with the evolutionary concept of organisational entrepreneurship, described by Rao, 
Morrill, and Zald (2000). Fields are thus not only aggregates of different organisations but as a constitutive framework of 
institutional opportunities and constraints provide space for emerging organisational actors who as strategic actors “[...] play 
key roles in framing new practices, mobilizing resources (including constituencies), and garnering legitimacy for new forms” 
(2000, p.274).
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solidarity as well as “grievances that represent a factual, perceived or even manipulated injustice” is 
summarised by Clemens (1996) as a process of bricolage. 
To understand the strategic behaviour of community unions as organisational entities on the 
grassroots level vis-à-vis other, more established labour organisations, the usefulness of a reflection 
on the totality of different actors in Japanese labour activism as a SAF is apparent. Corporatist en-
terprise unions and their national federations, as the main representatives and most powerful actors 
within Japanese organised labour, evolved as field incumbents. Their incumbent status is expressed 
not only in their dominant role but furthermore in their well-established position within different 
institutional structures in the economic and political system as well as their wide socio-cultural ac-
knowledgement as leading actors within Japanese industrial relations, which they attempt to defend 
and maintain. Community unions, on the other hand, question the status quo of corporatist trade 
unionism since their earliest development and act as in a challenger role from the periphery of the 
field of Japanese labour activism. Informed about power asymmetries in the SAF of Japanese labour, 
community union organisations as “socially skilled” actors can be expected to apply innovative tac-
tics of strategic framing and bricolage to make use of their marginalised position. While constantly 
reconfiguring their strategic orientation, tactical decision-making defines (a) their agenda-setting, 
(b) their operational repertoire, (c) their organisational format as well as (d) their positionality in the 
field. This article’s comparative analysis of community unions’ strategic field behaviour focuses on a 
scrutinisation of these four factors. 
Methodological approach
Three community unions, which differ in their origin, their strategies of field approach and po-
sitionality towards other field actors have been analysed and compared. While these cases have been 
selected among a larger population of grassroots-level trade union groups to account for the wide 
variation in community unionism, the limitations of generalisability on the phenomenon must be 
kept in mind. The application of a case study allowed for “an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” as Yin (2005) describes. A case study research 
design furthermore opened up the possibility to process multiple-source data. Ayoub, Wallace, and 
Zepeda-Millán (2014) emphasise the benefits of such methodological triangulation in explaining that 
“by utilizing multiple methods, data sources, theories and/or observations, scholars can better ac-
count for and overcome the limits and biases inherent in studies that employ a single method, theory, 
data source, or observer” (2014, pp.67-68). Qualitative interviews with different community union 
groups conducted in Tōkyō during 2016 and 2017, provided valuable insights about the strategic 
decision-making processes in focus. Della Porta (2014) notes, that “the qualitative interview is […] 
particularly useful when we wish to analyze the meaning individuals attribute to the external world 
and to their own participation in it, the construction of identity, and the development of emotions” 
(2014, p.230). The extensive immersion within several grassroots-level labour groups not only created 
the necessary trust with informants to also address also controversial issues and problems in grass-
roots-level labour activism. It furthermore created opportunities to conduct participant observation 
within group meetings and public events. Observed trends and findings were furthermore validated 
through several discussions with knowledgeable experts in the field of Japanese labour and through 
the qualitative content analysis of written documents, such as pamphlets and other union publica-
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tions. Through qualitative content analysis, the collected data was scrutinised along the above-intro-
duced factors of field behaviour.
Japan’s depoliticised labour movement: Enterprise unions as field incumbents
Before entering the analysis of the challenger role of community unions, it is necessary to reflect 
on the incumbent role of established forms of organised labour in Japan. The overly-developed em-
phasis on enterprise-based labour organisations has been repeatedly emphasised as one of the most 
striking characteristics of Japanese industrial relations (Carlile (2005); Gottfried (2015); Jeong and 
Aguilera (2008); Kume (1998); Sako (1997); Williamson (1994)). Throughout the pre-war era, despite 
severe government repressions, Japanese trade unionists had aimed for the organisation of stronger 
industry-based, horizontal unions. However, during military rule collective labour front actions un-
der the heading of Sanpō defined the enterprise as the unit of workers’ organisation and fostered the 
paved the way for the development of Japan’s vertical union model (kigyōbetsu kumiai). After turmoil 
and a brief upsurge of independent trade union activities in the immediate post-war era, the elites’ 
strategy of a de-politicisation of labour through the denial of a horizontal union structure marked a 
critical juncture for the Japanese labour movement. Jeong and Aguilera (2008) explain that “unlike its 
Western counterparts, the Japanese state was capable of eradicating the horizontal union movement 
at the onset of the collective bargaining era because of its late-developer advantages as well as Cold 
War politics, resulting in an enterprise union system in Japan” (2008, p.99). Although the establish-
ment of national trade union federations such as Sōhyō, Dōmei and later Rengō originally followed 
the aim of increasing the influence and leverage of centralised union organisations, the characteristic 
system of enterprise-centred unionism remained largely intact.
Enterprise unionism, based on a hierarchical internal structure, firm-wide solidarity and the strive 
for consensual over conflicting interactions is seen as one essential part of the “Japanese-style” man-
agement system, in line with lifetime employment and seniority wages, which enabled the rapid post-
war recovery and  high economic growth in the following decades. Kume (1998) describes Japan’s 
enterprise-based trade union system as the “world’s most decentralised union structure” and points 
out several of its peculiarities. On the one hand, most enterprise-based unions strive for an equal 
representation of white- and blue-collar segments of the workforce and provide effective channels 
for mediation and communication to avoid conflicts between management and employees. However, 
on the other hand, enterprise unions remain exclusive for regular employees, whereas part-timers, 
contract workers and other atypical employees are usually not represented. Furthermore, within Ja-
pan’s dually-structured economy, union activities are heavily focused on large companies in “modern 
sectors”, whereas only a small fraction of the workers employed in small or medium enterprises were 
organised in unions. Japan’s liberal trade union law allows as few as two people to organise as a trade 
union6. On the one hand, this enables numerous small unions, representing the special interests of 
particular groups of employees to form in one enterprise. On the other hand, it also opens up the 
possibility to initiate sympathetic “secondary unions” (daini kumiai) by the management itself, to 
compete with powerful left-wing unions.
Traditionally, Japanese industrial relations are characterised by a combination of confrontational 
and co-operative interactions, in which management and employees in principle share the basic goals 
of achieving a stable company growth and an improvement of employment conditions for the core 
6 The “Labor Standards Act” states that it is mandatory for employers to engage in bargaining with a union even if the union 
only represents a single worker in an enterprise (Suzuki, 2012; Takasu, 2012)
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workforce simultaneously. Sako (1997) explains that their enterprise-base makes Japanese unions 
comparatively weak in bargaining with the management. However, inside the “firm as community”, 
union members enjoy rich privileges to actively participate in firm management channels, which 
makes clear why their prior goal is to protect and preserve the existing employment principles (see 
also Nakajima (2010)). Through so-called “productivity coalitions”, unionised workers associate their 
personal interests and wellbeing with the firm’s survival and growth. In a facilitative role as firm-in-
ternal economic actors, enterprise union groups thus co-operate with the management and have in-
fluence on decision-making about operational and production issues. The 1955-established “Japan 
Productivity Center” serves as a labour-management consultation system parallel to the regular chan-
nels of collective bargaining. Developed out of an agreement between management and employees, 
it specifies terms of firm-internal consultations about managerial issues between the two parties and 
is aimed to ensure fairness in the distribution of productivity gains while at the same time facilitating 
industry-wide technological exchange.
Another specificity of Japanese industrial relations which has been introduced in 1955 is the cen-
tralised framework of springtime wage offensive (shuntō). In these ritualised rounds of bargaining, 
enterprise unions and firm management engage in negotiations, which are guide-lined by centralised 
demands made by the trade union federations. Through near simultaneous collective bargaining, en-
terprise unions’ negotiation power is strengthened. While first bargaining rounds are settled in large 
companies, the achieved results serve as benchmarks for consequent negotiations about wage levels 
and working conditions within small and medium enterprises. The streamlined system of collective 
bargaining in Japan is an effective tool to render unnecessary almost any confrontational industrial 
action, such as in the form of strikes. It ensures close collaboration between trade unions and firms’ 
management through establishment of both-sided dependencies and through the constant exchange 
of information.
Considering the increasing workforce casualisation, enterprise unions are not only pressured to 
tackle a deteriorating power base within their companies, as a growing share of employees is not 
represented in these structures and union groups thus often don’t hold a necessary majority in the 
workforce to support their bargaining claims. Furthermore, the role of enterprise unionism as a legit-
imate representative of basic labour rights and as a stakeholder of working class interests in society in 
general becomes increasingly questioned.
Labour revitalisation at the grassroots level: Community unions as field challengers
Apart from the highly-institutionalised structures of enterprise unionism, community unions 
developed on the grassroots-level in the periphery of the field of Japanese labour. Despite their rela-
tively small organisational strength7, community unions have established a prominent profile in the 
mass media, as their activism is often associated with headline-making court cases over employment 
disputes and their representatives are frequently cited as knowledgeable experts in labour issues, as 
Weathers (2010) describes. In comparison to enterprise union organisations and their industrial and 
national federations, community unions put a strong emphasis on the tackling of urgent labour issues 
including the unfair treatment of workers based on employment status, but also numerous other is-
sues of work-related and social justice advocacy. Though legally registered as trade unions, Japanese 
7  Community unions mobile around 30,000 members, which equals to roughly one per cent of the total trade union mem-
bership in Japan (Weathers (2010)).
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community unions can be best compared to North American workers’ centers, as Royle and Urano 
(2012) explain.
A uniform opinion on how to determine the phenomenon of community unionism in Japan is 
so far lacking. The actual English-language terminology of komyuniti yunion (“community union”) 
has first been used by Japanese trade union organisations which developed on the grassroots level 
in the 1980s to emphasise the novelty of their approach to organise workers in contrast to the domi-
nant enterprise-based trade unions (kigyōbetsu rōdō kumiai). However, the phenomenon of organised 
labour groups apart from Japan’s characteristic corporatist enterprise unions encompasses a wider 
range of organisations, several of which originated even in the 1960s. In spite of the early focus on 
mobilising employees in trade union groups on the enterprise level, tendencies to organise workers 
on a regional or industrial base have already existed in the post-war consolidation phase of Japanese 
industrial relations. Oh (2012a) describes that as part of a strategy to overcome the dominant role 
of enterprise unions and to increase the relevance of centralised union structures, the left-leaning 
national union federation Sōhyō started to engage in the establishment of so-called “general unions” 
(gōdō rōso) in the 1960s. Through the setup of regional labour councils (chikurō), and a large-scale 
dispatch of professional union recruiters on the local level, Sōhyō strived to organise employees of dif-
ferent enterprises within specific industries or regions. At the beginning of the 1980s, the nationwide 
number of general unions had reached about 1,300 (Suzuki, 2008). The admission of already existing 
enterprise-based union entities into “general unions” was not restricted in general, as Takasu (2012) 
emphasises. Endeavours of the chikurō movement in the first place however targeted the mobilisa-
tion of previously unorganised workers in small and medium enterprises and specifically in irregular 
forms of employment. Although Sōhyō played an important role in the initiation and professional as 
well as financial support of the development of a local union infrastructure, the union groups them-
selves acted as relatively autonomous organisations, employing their own staff (Suzuki, 2008). With 
the unification of Sōhyō’s trade union activities under the framework of the newly-founded national 
federation Rengō in 1989 however, the development of regionally-based trade unions experienced a 
strong backlash. Rengō prioritised the strengthening of an industry-based system of labour organisa-
tion. In effect, most of Sōhyō’s regional labour councils were dissolved or transformed into new types 
of regional organisations, which were however much smaller in size and did not enjoy the same de-
gree of autonomy as under Sōhyō. Neither the personnel nor the financial situation of regional union 
structures could be sustained and eventually the support from the national level for the regional 
labour councils was disbanded. This imposed the existing union structures on the regional level with 
the necessary decision about their future status. Whereas several general unions decided to continue 
their activities independently in an altered format, others strived for a stronger affiliation with the 
new regional union infrastructure in the Rengō network.
The history of “community unions” in the actual, narrower sense can be traced back to the 1980s, 
when apart from enterprise-based union groups, trade union organisations with individual mem-
bership (kojin kamei)8, irrespective of the employees’ home-company, emerged in several localities 
throughout Japan. The grassroots-level organisation model gained popularity especially since the for-
mation of Rengō in 1989. Whereas the earliest community unions of this kind developed out of the 
legacy of previous Sōhyō-initiated regional labour councils (chikurō), many of the later followers of 
this organisational pattern were built on strong coalitions with civil society organisations. In 1990, 
Komyuniti Yunion Zenkoku Nettowaku (“Community Union National Network”, CUNN) evolved as 
8  On their website CUNN defines the concept of community unions as “trade unions, rooted in regional society, in which 
part-time workers, contract workers, foreigners, anyone as an individual can become a member”.
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an umbrella structure on the national level representing 74 independent community unions with 
about 15,000 affiliated members and serving as a platform to communicate and coordinate the actions 
of the often very small union groups. Many of the remaining chikurō-organised union groups also 
gathered under the framework of CUNN and thus, in name transformed into community unions.
Mapping the field of community unionism in Japan
After an exemplary portrayal of three cases of Japanese community unions, empirical findings 
out of a comparative enquiry along the different, above-introduced aspects of strategic behaviour 
(agenda-setting, action repertoires, organisational structures and field positionality) are presented 
and discussed. This leads way to an evaluation of community unions’ role as challengers in the field of 
Japanese labour activism and an outlook towards further research.
The Tōkyō-based Shitamachi Yunion (“Downtown Union”) does not refer to a single union group 
but is the name of a network of three independent community unions (Edogawa Yunion, Kōtō Yunion 
and Sumida Yunion). Founded in 1984, Edogawa Yunion attempted to continue the regional organ-
ising patterns which were pursued in the chikurō (regional union council) movement and developed 
a new model of labour organisation based on individual instead of enterprise-based union affiliation 
of union members. Perceived as a wayfarer of grassroots-level labour organisation and as a positive 
example of successfully bridging civil society and labour activism, Edogawa Yunion‘s novel commu-
nity organising model was adopted by more and more local organisations throughout Japan in the 
following years. While rejecting any affiliations to mainstream trade union national centres, Shitama-
chi Yunion acts as one of the initiators of CUNN and through these channels engages in frequent ex-
change with other community unions. Locally based trade union groups like Shitamachi Yunion have 
not only been able to achieve local recognition as both labour advocates and community activists, but 
in coordination with other community union groups furthermore developed a system of different 
specialisations. For example, as one organisation within the Shitamachi Yunion network, Kōtō Yunion 
for example emerged out of advocacy initiatives for Chinese Nikkeijin returnee workers and still fo-
cuses on activism in this area.
Shutoken Seinen Yunion (“Metropolitan Youth Union”, hereafter Seinen Yunion) has been formed 
in 2000 in the attempt to mobilise young precarious worjers in the Tōkyō area. Seinen Yunion origi-
nates as a subsidiary union group of Tōkyō Jichirōren (“Tōkyō Federation of Prefectural and Munici-
pal Workers’ Union“), a trade union organisation focusing on irregular employees in the public sector, 
which is affiliated with the left-leaning national trade union federation Zenrōren. Nevertheless, most 
union members of Seinen Yunion are employed in the private sector, among others in fields such as 
fast food, small retail, service and publishing business. The union group received media attention 
through their successful engagement in several unfair dismissal cases against major fast food chains 
in Japan. Due to the large share of contingent workers among the union members, who often are not 
able to regularly pay their membership fees, Seinen Yunion faces constant financial struggle. To secure 
its operation, the union set up a network of external supporters as fund-raisers. 
The Tokyo-based Purekariāto Yunion (“Precariat Union”) has been formed as an independent 
organisation in 2012 and engages in the mobilisation of young and part-time workers. Nevertheless, 
their definition of “precariat” is not exclusive to certain income groups but encompasses all forms of 
insecure and instable work relations in contrast to “traditional” employment forms. In comparison to 
other community unions, Purekariāto Yunion puts an emphasis on engaging not only in counselling 
activities of individual labour disputes but furthermore strives to achieve the active organisation of a 
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functional union structure of precarious workers as long-term members to increase the group’s po-
litical leverage. Recently, Purekariāto Yunion raised attention with their successful support in one ex-
treme case of workers’ mistreatment (Arisan Māku Hikkoshisha). Apart from the union’s engagement 
in traditional labour issues, the group also advocates several more specific issues and for example 
puts a lot of effort in awareness-raising about workplace discrimination of LGBT / sexual minority 
workers.
Strategic agenda-setting: Targeting niche issues
Whereas Japanese enterprise unions act as core employees’ delegates in institutionalised collective 
wage bargaining processes with the company’s management, they usually don’t address individual 
wage-related struggles or other forms of employment disputes. Community unions, in contrast, ex-
plicitly target the resolution of individual labour disputes, such as violations of employment contracts, 
unpaid overwork hours, severe working conditions, unjustified layoffs and harassment at the work-
place. It is in these predominantly small-scale counselling activities where community unionism’s par-
ticular strength lies, as Oh (2012b) argues. Community union organisations however don’t want to be 
perceived as simple “service providers” or a kakekomi dera (“temple refuge”) for struggling employees. 
In their attempt to not only resolve individual disputes but at the same time to raise societal awareness 
of these issues and to improve precarious workers’ perspectives in the long term, Purekariāto Yunion 
for example applies the catchphrase kakekomi dera kara toride e (“from temple refuge to fortress”). 
This highlights their focused efforts in workers’ empowerment “to avoid a whack-a-mole game situa-
tion” of prolonged precarity through the mobilisation of larger numbers of affiliated workers and the 
achievement of organisational strength. Many of the community unions under observation do not 
perceive of their activism as a struggle which is confined solely to the field of labour, but strategically 
link their claim-making around employment problems to a wider range of societal issues. While tak-
ing a general sympathetic stance towards “progressive” topics of gender equality, anti-discrimination, 
environmentalism, pacifism and human rights, it is interesting to note that several community unions 
appear to develop a specific thematic emphasis on a single issue. Through frequent exchange and in 
many cases also personnel overlaps with social movement or NPO advocacy groups, community 
union activists thus often act as experts on work-related issues such as gender wage equality, precarity 
of youth employment or migrant workers’ rights. This specialisation on single issues can on the one 
hand be explained by community unions’ limited resources and personnel, which make a focused 
target of key struggles more feasible than setting up a broad agenda on a wider range of topics. On the 
other hand, it reflects a strategic decision to avoid competing responsibilities with other community 
unions as challengers in the field.
Diversified action repertoires: Professionalising labour advocacy
Community unions’ specialisation on labour counselling activities makes them professionals 
in this form of advocacy work. Many of the observed union groups develop impressively elaborate 
step-by-step guidelines of individual labour dispute resolution and through networking with other 
union groups exchange best-practice information to refine their strategies. Only after individual 
disputes were not able to be solved through dialogue with existing enterprise-union structures, 
community unions as intermediaries assist employees in claim-making to the respective labour 
councils. If even this does not solve the dispute, community unions provide encompassing legal 
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assistance and representative functions in law-filing towards labour courts. In these steps, many 
community unions consult with affiliated professional labour lawyers or maintain their own le-
gal experts as staff. Oh (2012b) describes, that the high success-rate of around eighty per cent of 
supported dispute resolutions by community unions and the oftentimes wide media coverage of 
striking cases serve as effective publicity to organise new union members and furthermore posi-
tively influence the overall working conditions. Another typical example of how community unions 
directly address the improvement of working conditions is the targeted advocacy for the enactment 
of so-called “kōkeiyaku jōrei hō” (“public contract laws”)9. These local or regional legal frameworks 
mandate public sector entities, such as municipal governments, to ensure wage levels on a certain 
level higher than the minimum wage for employees of contracted companies. This diversification 
of action repertoires shows not only their degree of high flexibility to deal with many different 
employment-related problems, it furthermore stands exemplary for the underlying aim of Japanese 
community unions to take the strong role of an effective advocate for workers’ actual needs and 
demands.
New union structures: Redefining “organised labour”
Many community union representatives regard it as a fundamental task to reshape the overall 
model of organised labour. In pointing out the inadequacy of the dominant enterprise-based union 
system to deal with today’s problems in the employment system, they advocate towards the devel-
opment of a solidarity system focusing on individual union member recruitment10. This limits the 
possibilities of organisational expansion to an average membership count of about 250 union mem-
bers. Nevertheless, different community unions’ strategies in organisational structuring show some 
degree of variation, as the comparison of two cases shows. Whereas on the one hand Purekariāto 
Yunion puts a strong focus on the organisation of members in the form of company-based union 
entities (shibu) and in this regard, re-emphasises established patterns of mobilisation, Seinen Yunion 
on the other hand rejects company-based subgroups and instead emphasises the necessity of in-
dustry-wide mobilisation. As providers of ad-hoc counselling services, community unions face the 
problem of a high membership turnover, because individual members whose dispute cases have 
been solved, often don’t remain in the union structure afterwards. Through engagement in activi-
ties to strengthen union solidarity among its members, Purekariāto Yunion tries to overcome this 
mere service-provider role and to foster as an established union entity. Key figures in the leadership 
of community unions often have a long experience in labour activism and are able to guide group 
decisions as experts in their field, as Oh (2012a) explains. Community unions however also empha-
sise the necessity to overcome hierarchies through horizontal organising and the inclusion of rank-
and-file activists in decision-making processes and through this attempt to redefine the meaning of 
“organised labour” in Japan.
9  ILO Article 94, which demands fair payment for public sector contracts is ratified only in certain communes and prefec-
tures but so far not on the national level in Japan.
10  Japanese trade union law includes several peculiarities, which to a large degree serve as beneficial conditions for the devel-
opment of community unions. Article 28 of the Japanese Constitution guarantees fundamental labour rights, such as workers’ 
right to organise and to engage in collective bargaining as well as to conduct strike actions. Building on these rights, Japan’s 
Trade Union Law (rōdō kumiai hō), enacted in 1945, makes it mandatory for employers to engage in wage negotiations if 
claimed even by a single worker and officially recognises labour unions with as little as two members as legitimate agents of 
collective bargaining in employment negotiations.
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Field positionality: Critique of enterprise unionism
In the role of challengers, community unions approach the established field of Japanese labour 
activism from its periphery and tactically take a specific position within the field. In this process, 
newly-forming community union organisations devise different strategies of claim-making and thus 
construct their collective identity as a critical “alternative” to the status quo. The analysis of different 
framing patterns of critiques, standpoints, goals and intentions reveals strategies of field positionali-
ty. Interviews with representatives and active members of different community union organisations 
showed strong ideological references to the (international) labour movement’s original standpoints of 
inclusive solidarity, equality and workers’ individual dignity. Community unions share the common 
view that generally, these issues are left open by the existing structures of mainstream unionism, 
which as a part of the established exploitative neoliberal economic framework serves in a complicit 
role to companies’ management. The degree of severity, with which the status quo of dominant cor-
poratist enterprise unions in Japan is criticised, however varies among different community union 
groups. Activists in Shitamachi Yunion for example frequently point out the inadequacy of the work-
force’s majority representation through enterprise-based trade union organisations and the necessity 
to (re-)develop alternative structures of organised labour in the near future. In comparison however, 
Purekariāto Yunion takes a less critical stance and emphasises the potentials of collaborations and 
connections with the established structures of mainstream unions. Through the formation of Japan 
Community Union Federation (JCUF) as a separate national network next to CUNN in 2003, several 
community unions decided to affiliate with the mainstream national federation Rengō. This affiliation 
is motivated by the possibility to gain access to national labour related policymaking, where only 
Rengō is recognised as a legitimate representative of organised labour. 
Conclusion
Established patterns of organised labour in Japan are facing a situation of weakened structural 
power and increasingly questioned legitimacy. As a grassroots-level form of organised labour, com-
munity unions aim to overcome the strict enterprise-base of Japanese mainstream unions’ activism. 
They specifically to represent the demands of precarious workers, such as irregular employees, freeters 
and migrants, who are usually marginalised by the Japanese mainstream unions. Community unions’ 
flexibility opens up the possibility to approach also rather “controversial” issues, which are not dealt 
with in other parts of the Japanese labour movement, such as for example, the rights of migrant 
workers, gender equality at the workplace and inside union organisations, but even less-closely re-
lated topics such as environmental protection. Their repertoires of activism focus on the resolution 
of individual labour disputes but also includes several other forms of advocacy and collective action 
to raise societal awareness about labour-related problems. In criticising the hierarchical structures 
in mainstream trade unionism, community unions’ stress on democratic membership participation 
provides an alternative to established patterns of organised labour. Through their engagement in la-
bour issues left out by the mainstream unions, they position themselves mainly in peripheral niches 
of the field. Nevertheless, despite these common features, empirical observations revealed that the 
concept of community unionism is far from coherent. Different community union organisations, 
though originally established under a similar motivation, show variation in their strategic alignment 
and positionality within the field of Japanese labour activism. Some community unions maintain 
their independent stance as a clear alternative to the delegitimised mainstream trade unions. On the 
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other hand, there are also a number of community unions which strategically choose to affiliate with 
established mainstream union structures to secure or expand their position and influence in the field. 
Building on this initial stage of analysis, in further research it becomes necessary to look at the in-
teraction between the involved organisations in the field. In this “jockeying” process, both incumbent 
and challengers engage in tactical moves to preserve or expand their position in the SAF. Through 
reciprocal processes of organisational learning and imitation, actors on both sides constantly adjust 
and incrementally transform their roles in the field, ultimately resulting in a change of the field itself, 
possibly in the form of labour revitalisation.
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HAO-TZU HO
Growing Food in a Post-colonial Chinese Metropolis 
HONG KONG’S DOWN-TO-EARTH CIVIL SOCIETY
Abstract: Since Hong Kong is stereotyped as a financial centre with high land prices and population density, the absence of 
local agriculture and dependence on food imports are seemingly taken for granted. Decades ago, agriculture was an important 
economic activity. However, after signing the Sino-British Joint Declaration which determined Hong Kong’s reversion to Chinese 
sovereignty, the British Hong Kong Government shifted attention away from local food supply to urbanisation and modernisa-
tion, opening the door to imports from mainland China and the rest of the world. Today, the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region Government continues with this policy orientation. 
Despite limited agricultural infrastructure, policy support or training opportunities, interest in local food has been rekindled in 
recent years. The enthusiasm for alternative food networks resonates with global trends towards sustainable agriculture and 
food movement. It has arisen alongside controversial events and social movements regarding food safety, land development, 
and cultural heritage conservation. Some urban dwellers, many under the age of forty, voluntarily join the ranks of farmers, 
as new farms have mushroomed all over both sides of Victoria Harbour and the New Territories. Low wages and difficulties in 
finding a sizable piece of land remain an issue, but more and more customers support farm products from farmers’ markets, 
organic food shops, or ‘wet market’ vendors specialising in locally grown vegetables. Farm activities, courses on agriculture, and 
relevant events organised by the informal sector or NGOs integrate people from diverse backgrounds, building a community of 
like-minded residents of the city.
Based on ethnographic fieldwork conducted with the community since 2016, this paper attempts to furnish some observations 
on the bottom-up resurgence of agriculture fuelled by civil society in Hong Kong.
Keywords: Food movement, urban agriculture, urban anthropology, community, civil society
Maisto produktų auginimas pokolonijiniame Kinijos didmiestyje: praktiška pilietinė Honkongo visuomenė
Santrauka: Honkongas stereotipiškai laikomas finansų centru, kuriame žemės kainos ir gyventojų tankis yra dideli, todėl 
neišplėtotas vietinis žemės ūkis ir priklausomybė nuo maisto importo yra laikomi savaime suprantamu dalyku. Mažiau žinoma, 
kad prieš kelis dešimtmečius Honkonge žemės ūkis užėmė svarbią vietą. Situacija pasikeitė Kinijai ir Didžiajai Britanijai pasir-
ašius deklaraciją, kuria remiantis Honkongas grąžintas Kinijai. Tai paskatino Honkongo Vyriausybę dėmesį perkelti nuo vietinio 
maisto tiekimo problemos į urbanizaciją ir modernizaciją, atverti kelius importui iš žemyninės Kinijos ir viso pasaulio. Šiandien 
Honkongo specialiojo administracinio regiono vyriausybė tęsia šią politiką.
Nepaisant ribotos žemdirbystės infrastruktūros, politinės paramos ar mokymo galimybių, pastaraisiais metais susidomėjimas 
vietiniais maisto produktais sustiprėjo. Alternatyvių maisto tinklų plitimas sutampa su globaliomis tvarios žemdirbystės ir mais-
to judėjimo tendencijomis. Šie dalykai iškilo kartu su prieštaringais įvykiais ir socialiniais judėjimais, susijusiais su maisto sauga, 
žemės ūkio vystymu ir kultūrinio paveldo išsaugojimu. Kai kurie miesto gyventojai, daugiausia jaunesni nei keturiasdešimties 
metų, savanoriškai tampa ūkininkais, naujoms fermoms išdygus abiejuose Viktorijos uosto ir Naujųjų teritorijų pusėse. Maži 
atlyginimai ir sunkumai rasti didelį žemės sklypą išlieka problema, tačiau vis daugiau vartotojų įsigyja žemės ūkio produktų 
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ūkininkų turguose, ekologiško maisto parduotuvėse ar iš vietinių daržovių ūkių. Ūkių veikla, žemdirbystės kursai ir su tuo susiję 
renginiai, organizuojami neformalaus sektoriaus arba nevyriausybinių organizacijų, suburia skirtingos aplinkos žmones, kuria 
panašiai mąstančių miesto gyventojų bendruomenę. 
Remiantis etnografiniu tyrimu, vykdytu su bendruomene nuo 2016 metų, šiame darbe pateikta keletas pastabų apie žemės ūkio 
gaivinimą „iš apačios į viršų“, palaikomą pilietinės Honkongo visuomenės.
Reikšminiai žodžiai: maisto judėjimas, urbanistinis žemės ūkis, urbanistinė antropologija, bendruomenė, pilietinė visuomenė. 
Introduction
This paper will address the food and agriculture movement among the younger generation in 
Hong Kong in recent decades based on ethnographic fieldwork conducted during 2016 and 2017 
with more than one hundred interlocutors. The original research plan attempted to focus either on 
a village, an organisation, or a district. However, pre-fieldwork investigations at farms in the New 
Territories as well as at farmers’ markets in the downtown manifested the arbitrariness of drawing 
lines within a movement which is connected by an organic solidarity that transcends geographical or 
administrative boundaries. Therefore, this research is designed as multi-sited: following farmers, farm 
workers, farm lovers, activists and their supporters to visit different corners of the city and attend 
various occasions. Being a non-local researcher who speaks the local language (Cantonese), people 
were interested in having conversations with me. Benefiting from this, different groups from farms, 
non-governmental organisations, schools, farmers’ markets or informal sectors spread all over the 
city became accessible. It was this mobility that enabled me to notice the existence of a public sphere 
in which like-minded strangers found each other and shared about common concerns. At the same 
time, long term stay in this city widened the scope of my exploration from agriculture movement to 
many aspects of everyday life. This holistic view reveals a structural correlation between the initiative 
of local agriculture and other aspects of this society. The social fabric that underlies the current resur-
gence of an interest in agriculture will be the aim of this paper. 
Food growing in an urban setting has become a global agenda. In countries affected by the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the risk of food shortage led to the development of local agricul-
tural production and urban farming. Urban farming in Cuba ensured its food sufficiency during the 
Special Period from 1991 during which time oil and food imports were cut off; in London and Berlin, 
farming activities have also increased to solve food insecurity (Cockrall-King, 2012). A United Na-
tions Development Programme report (Cheema et al., 1996) proposes that in many cities—including 
larger ones in China, Jakarta in Indonesia, Singapore, Kampala in Uganda, and Lusaka in Zambia—a 
considerable percentage of food consumed by city dwellers are grown within the city.  However, this 
seemingly promising solution to food supply in the city is challenged by a phenomenon that farmland, 
water, and fertiliser become profitable commodities under the neoliberal structure (Nonini, 2014). It 
has been found out that low-income groups in Mwanza, Tanzania, are unable to become urban farm-
ers because land is unaffordable (Flynn, 2005). Nevertheless, the fact that land is unaffordable, as this 
paper will point out, contributes to the emergence of food and agriculture movement in Hong Kong. 
As one of the most densely populated and expansive cities in the world (Carroll, 2007), land issue 
has always been a challenging topic. This paper will demonstrate how this issue is entangled with ur-
ban food growing, arguing that rather than making political statement or pursuing middle class life-
style, farming practitioners and supporters in the contexts of this capitalist city are reacting to prac-
tical struggles resulted from land issue. Land ownership guarantees political voice, as demonstrated 
in Wittman’s (2009) study in Brazil, where over half of the country’s arable land is controlled by 3.5 
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per cent of landlords whose access to land grants them controls over labour and natural resources. As 
a result, agricultural movements were launched as a reaction to this power relation. Such struggles 
parallel Habermas’ (1989) concept of civil society.  
Civil society is depicted by Habermas as groups of people who spontaneously organise discussions 
or even movements to react to societal problems. Habermas (1996) positions civil society at the inter-
face of public spheres and private spheres. Public sphere emerged in Europe in the eighteenth century 
as a buffer as well as a bridge between the state and society (Habermas, 1989). According to him, from 
their readings in the private spheres (households), the ‘educated classes’ among the bourgeoisie, such 
as judges, doctors, pastors and scholars, were influenced by political liberalism. From critiques on art 
and literature to reflections on the feudal state controlled by small number of individuals, a public 
sphere was created as a domain in which the educated classes rationally and critically debated public 
issues and state policies in salons, coffee houses, dining rooms, or on newspapers to contend with a 
feudalistic social order. According to Habermas’ account, the emergence of civil society and public 
sphere has two factors. One is people who are literate and more or less influenced by liberal thoughts. 
The other is a structure of power which has societal consequences. This paper will compare the case of 
Hong Kong to this framework. Although Habermas’ theory were proposed decades ago, new research 
reproduces this approach, regarding social class divisions as inherent in civil society, and affirming 
that the ‘middle class’ are the primary resource for such movements (cf. Ellis and Sumberg, 1998; Lee 
and Chan, 2008; Pilgeram, 2011; Shi et al., 2011; Zhang, 2017). This paper will illustrate that social 
elites are not the only players of the game. Thompson (1993) already points out that Habermas over-
looks the social activities of the ‘plebeian society’ who usually stand on the opposite side from the 
bourgeoisie. This paper will also argue that people who are less politically and economically privileged 
or disadvantaged might exert agency through ‘cultural resistance’(Duncombe, 2007), envisioning al-
ternative social forms and challenging the existing structure to create ‘counter-hegemonic’ cultures; 
during this process, people acquire the ability to build a community and act as citizens.
Earlier theories summarize citizenship as the membership of a state (Locke 1689, noted in Lazar 
2013; Marshall, 1950). However, citizenship has been developed to a multifaceted concept comprising 
economic, political, and cultural elements. It refers to a status that allows individuals to pursue their 
ideal life (Lazar, 2013) and claim a space where they ‘feel safe’ and enjoy a sense of identity (Flores and 
Benmayor, 1997, p.15). Citizenship is also regarded as a guarantee of social welfare and political rights 
(Solinger, 1999). Having said this, the guarantee might be at risk when it  contradicts other consider-
ations. During the planning of the Alexanderplatz in Berlin, to respond to moral consideration of an 
inclusive development project, citizens were invited to take a part in the process (Weszkalnys, 2010). 
However, Weszkalnys (p.133) quotes her interlocutors who criticised that ‘in the end, everything is 
being weighed’, and the balance will lean to economic considerations. Therefore, rather than being a 
given status, citizenship is the outcome of a processual construction through negotiation with state 
power and other forms of regulation Ong et al. (1996). This paper will further elaborate that citizen-
ship, and another closely linked notion—sense of belonging—are brewed by engaging in actions and 
discussions in the public sphere about issues that also concern other members of the society. This 
paper will focus on the public sphere created by recent campaigns for local agriculture in Hong Kong. 
Uneasy urban living and the low-income middle class
As Hong Kong is largely covered by high-rise buildings, only in the New Territories is it possible 
to farm on real land; on Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula, except for little plots of gar-
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dens between the concrete jungle, food is planted up in the air on rooftop farms. Currently, there are 
around fifty rooftop farms (Pryor, 2016) and 139 farms in the New Territories (Vegetable Marketing 
Organization, 2017), excluding farms which are not recognised by the Hong Kong SAR government. 
During the course of my fieldwork, it became evident that ‘farmer’ was becoming a chic identity for 
urban office workers. Some farmers are retired people, now amateur farmers. Some farmers are ‘hol-
iday’ farmers who engage in farming as a hobby and see it as an effective way of de-stressing, sharing 
food grown by themselves to friends and families, feeling the joy of watching things grow, or appre-
ciating the beauty of nature. They prefer to consume organic food even paying much higher prices. 
Many of them support organic food not only due to the concern of food safety but also the consid-
eration for discourses of sustainable development such as environment protection. This is a typical 
image that studies on urban farming and organic food movement have been presenting. 
As mentioned earlier, farming activities in urban settings are often associated with the ‘middle 
class’. Pilgeram (2011) studies American farmers who conduct sustainable farming and concludes 
that only people from the privileged class can afford to be sustainable farmers. Paarlberg (2009) also 
argues that the vision of people growing their own food at home or purchasing from local farmers is 
a fantasy of elite circles in the US. The interlocutors in his research are middle-aged to elderly mem-
bers of the middle class who received fairly good education and can afford to buy farmland. However, 
the demographics of sustainable farmers are actually diverse. Even between sustainable agriculture 
activists and food-security activists, there might be differences (Nonini, 2013). Nonini’s study focuses 
on local food movement also in the US, pointing out that food-security activists are from multiethnic 
backgrounds and some from the underprivileged groups. They are concerned about food accessibility 
to low-income groups and racial minorities, as well as the allocation of national wealth. They pay 
more attention to social injustice. Compared to food-security activists, ‘sustainable agriculture activ-
ists’ tend to be the ‘cosmopolitan globalizing elites committed to hybridity and consumer-oriented 
multiculturalism’ (Nonini, 2013, p. 270); they distrust the global food system and the government, but 
believe in local community and farmers. Nonini emphasises that they are usually white middle-class 
people who can afford their own farm. The case of Hong Kong, however, suggests that ‘middle class’ 
might have many variations. A casual relation between education and wealth might be true in the 
eighteenth century Europe, as implied in Habermas’ theories of civil society and public sphere, but 
not necessarily valid for the twenty-first century Hong Kong and East Asia in general. 
The emergence of low-income ‘middle class’, or the disappearance of the ‘middle class’, is concep-
tualised as downward social mobility associated with an increasing gap between the rich and the poor 
in Japan, China and the US (cf. Newman, 1988; Atsushi, 2005; Ohmae, 2006; Chan, Ku and Chu, 2009; 
Fujita, 2016). In Hong Kong, the gap has also been identified and may be traced back to colonial times 
(Goodstadt, 2005, 2014; Carroll, 2007). A depiction of pre-handover Hong Kong might be mistaken 
as a report of today’s Hong Kong:
[M]odern, high-tech, high-rise buildings juxtaposed to shanty towns, intensely developed areas adjacent to 
unused and desolate land and well-maintained estates surrounded by dilapidated neighbourhoods (Kwok, 
1993, p.111).
This comment underlines significant differences between two worlds in one city. Tension between 
the two worlds has been scrutinised by analysing the underlying political-economic structure which 
is identified as the monopoly of land and estate markets by real estate tycoons (Poon, 2011). The 
author argues that this ‘ruling class’ forms a good partnership with the government; the grassroots 
majority is subordinated to the elite minority who have control over land and thus over every aspect 
of daily life. According to a Hong Kong sociologist Lui Tai-Lok’s (2007) widely cited theory of gener-
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ations of Hongkongers, the generation born after the 1980s—those under forty years old—are now 
struggling with skyrocketing housing costs and fewer positions in the job market; higher degrees of 
education do not ensure better salaries. My interlocutors in this age bracket confirmed this diagnosis 
and expanded their view of this situation: their cohort were less interested in working for a salary 
because they would never be able to afford to buy their own places, no matter how hard they worked. 
Having a college degree is not reflected in one’s salary and property ownership. As a consequence, 
many of my interlocutors in their twenties and thirties move every two years on average because land-
lords usually raise rents after the two-year fixed price contract on their rental ends. As a result, every 
time someone mentions moving, people guess immediately that the landlord has increased the rent. A 
majority of interlocutors of my fieldwork are graduates from good universities, and some even receive 
postgraduate education. However, when being asked whether they classified themselves as middle 
class, most answers were negative. Some even described themselves as ‘extremely poor’. 
In recent years, the emergence of young farmers has drastically changed the landscape of urban 
farming of Hong Kong. In a city with high costs of living and where farmland is scarce and expensive, 
not to mention the low financial rewards, farming seems to be a counterintuitive career choice. Most 
of them are obligated to share household expenses. They often feel strong pressure from parents for 
not doing a ‘stable, financially reliable, and decent’ job. Therefore, there is another group of people 
who are enthusiastic about farming but dare not be a farmer. Young farmers are frequently asked, 
‘Why do you want to be farmer?’ They were usually quite articulate and mentioned globally circulat-
ing initiatives including environment and ecosystem protection, education, social justice, and food 
safety and security. Having said this, it is worth noting that many showed their reflections on neolib-
eralism and consumerism, and regarded farming as an experiment and campaign to figure out and 
demonstrate alternative ways of living outside the frame of the ideology of developmentalism and the 
game of free market in which daily necessities must be exchanged with cash. They wish to learn, in 
their words, ‘the art of growing food’, ‘to know the basis of everyday life’ and to reconnect with nature. 
According to them, the process saves them from living in innocence, confusion, and without control 
over their own lives. Many of them expressed their dislike of urban living and a working style that 
is shaped by neoliberal reasoning, developmental discourse, and a lack of environmental awareness. 
Habermas associates the emergence of civil society with the rise of capitalism and the bourgeoi-
sie. However, it has also been pointed out that once capitalistic forces take over the public sphere, 
its cultural hegemony will homogenize social forms, and prevent the development of alternatives 
(Chatterjee, 1993). Several young farmers expressed that they feel trapped in a multilayered vicious 
loop: cooking at home is much cheaper, but it is expensive to buy or rent an apartment with proper 
kitchen equipment. What is worse, people are too busy earning money to cook for themselves. Dining 
out seems to be an obvious alternative, but the costs of dining in restaurants are escalating due to rent 
rates, and the food served is often unhealthy. To repair their health, people spend generously on di-
etary supplements, or medical expenses. Consequently, the financial rewards for hard work are spent 
on housing and eating. More money is spent on taking on trips abroad as a popular holiday activity: 
‘we need to leave to heal ourselves’, said a young farmer who used to work in a bank. Also, people 
spend money on various de-stressing arrangements such as buying gym membership and shopping to 
recover from work pressures. These activities are all expensive, leaving people no choice but to work 
harder to sustain themselves.  
However, this is not saying that current food and agriculture movement is solely created by frus-
trated young people who find their future dimming and decide to give up. Rather, the issues and vi-
sions that young farmers propose are shared by other members of society from diverse backgrounds, 
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wide range of age group, and doing various jobs. Practitioners or supporters could be farmers, farm 
lovers, farmers’ market customers, farm visitors, activists, NGO workers or academics. People from 
different corners and circles gathered together for similar concerns and visions. They met on oc-
casions including farmers’ markets and handicraft markets, farm tours, agriculture courses and fo-
rums, food-processing and handicraft workshops, film screening, food sharing parties, and local food 
home cuisine restaurants. Some strangers who met during these events became close friends and even 
co-established farms and organised more activities. It is believed that the organic market provides 
space for social movement activities and thereby might strengthen civil society (Allen and Kovach, 
2000). In the case of Hong Kong, the ‘cultural resistance’ (Duncombe, 2007) of groups other than the 
ruling class is embodied in an exceptional emphasis on the value of local food. 
The rhetoric of local food and self-sufficiency
Construction of good food
Food safety has always been the central issue of the agriculture and food movement in Hong Kong 
(Bai, Wang and Chow, 2015; Chan, 2016). During the 1990s, thousands of Hong Kong residents were 
impacted by an array of toxic vegetable accidents: to reduce the cost of production and increase mar-
ketability, imported vegetables were cultivated with poisonous amounts of pesticides and irrigated 
with industrial waste water polluted with heavy metals (Siu, 1993). Today, interlocutors of this re-
search always put food safety first when asked about their motivation for growing food by themselves. 
Even people who do not intend to grow food prefer to shop at farmers’ markets or choose organic 
food from supermarkets. Many of them reflexively told me that this might be the consequence of food 
scandals reported via mass media every now and then, including imported vegetables overly dosed 
with pesticides, or ‘fake food’ made or supplemented with chemical ingredients. This haunting con-
cern creates a ‘risk society’ in which the loss of security invokes a reintegration into social relations 
(Beck, 1992). There have been numerous pieces of research justifying an emerging market of quality 
food in China (cf. Shi et al., 2011; Sirieix, Kledal and Sulitang, 2011). A research project focused on 
the ‘Good Food Movement’ in Chinese cities Beijing, Xi’an and Wuhan finds that the exploration of 
a reliable food system is an initiative to establish new social relations and community resilience in 
reaction to profit-driven food production (Zhang, 2017). 
In the long history of agriculture, there were no such thing as ‘inorganic’ farming. Methods and 
principles that fit into organic standards including fertilisation, tillage, and irrigation system are eas-
ily found in traditional East Asian societies such as China, Japan and Korea (cf. Bray, 1986; Netting, 
1993; King, 1911; Gonçalo, 2011). The terminology ‘organic’ was not invented until the twentieth 
century. The term ‘organic farming’ was coined by an English agriculturist Lord Northbourn in his 
wartime book Look to the Land, in which farm and the farming system are described as a dynamic and 
balanced living whole(Paull, 2006). Since the beginning of the twentieth century, features of modern 
agriculture such as mechanisation and the spread of hybrid plants, or the use of synthesised fertilisers, 
herbicides and pesticides have continued to kindle all kinds of organic movement (Scofield, 1986; 
Paarlberg, 2009). After two World Wars, chemicals for warfare were repurposed for agricultural use 
(Fedigan, 2015), scientific research among the international Green Revolution campaign advanced 
modern agricultural technologies as a respond to concerns of global population growth and the con-
sequent issues of food security (Shiva, 1991; Ross, 2003; Soby, 2013). 
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During the 1960s and 1970s, organic agriculture was associated with the worldwide environmen-
tal movement; at the same time, organic agriculture was popularised by the counterculture and a 
back-to-the-land movement, primarily initiated in Europe and the US (Kuepper, 2010). Before long, a 
more integrated expression, sustainable agriculture, was published in the US in 1980 (Jackson, 1985). 
It not only focused on reducing damage to the natural environment, but also considered the efficient 
use of non-renewable resources and the quality of life for farmers and society as a whole. Since the 
1990s, in the retail market for organic food, consumer demand has been increased by concerns for 
food quality and safety, and also environmental damage caused by conventional agriculture. There is 
no consensus on whether organic farming and sustainable agriculture are synonymous or separate 
notions; organic farming is sometimes regarded as the transitional stage from conventional farming 
to sustainable agriculture (Rigby and Cáceres, 2001). Both terms are used as core concepts of current 
local agriculture initiatives in Hong Kong.
From the Hong Kong government’s point of view, reliable food means that the production pro-
cedures, pesticide and herbicides management, quality of soil and irrigation water are monitored 
and certificated by governmental or organic certification sectors (Vegetable Marketing Organization, 
2008). The government launched the Accredited Farm Scheme in 1994 to encourage farmers to adopt 
more environmentally friendly techniques and produce safer vegetables. In 2017, the scheme has 
certified 276 farms in the New Territories and 35 farms which supply the Hong Kong market from 
Guangdong and Ningxia Provinces. The designation ‘accredited vegetable’ falls between organic and 
conventional vegetables. They may be sold at a price 10 per cent higher than regular vegetables (Sit, 
2015), but cheaper than vegetables certificated as organic.    
According to some young farmers, although ‘organic’ is a selling point for ordinary consumers, 
when compared to food that is locally grown, young farmers care less about organic labels. For them, 
sustainable farming is not equal to organic farming. Organic farming is bonded with organic certifi-
cate systems, while although sustainable farming shares some values with organic farming, including 
avoiding pesticides, plant seasonal food and keep the original taste of food, sustainable farming fur-
ther reflects upon industrial production of food and global food system that transport food to dis-
tant places. Interlocutors of this research—farmers, farm workers, frequent farm visitors and farmers’ 
market customers—stressed that sustainable farming implies less profit-driven and more awareness 
of environmental and human costs. Based on the same philosophies, their perceptions of good food 
have the following features. 
On the one hand, good food is ‘tasty’, which means that the food has its original taste. It might 
appear straightforward, but in the opinion of my interlocutors, it is now rare that ‘food tastes like it 
should’. Farmers argue that most agri-food that can be easily purchased on the market is tasteless 
due to commercialisation and the industrial process of production. For example, one young farmer 
explained that the smell of crown daisy is generated to repel pests. If farmers use pesticides, the crown 
daisy will not have to protect itself, so will not produce its natural scent, and will be tasteless. More-
over, overusing fertilisers to boost plant growth will increase efficiency at the cost of taste of food. On 
the other hand, food must be grown naturally and environmentally friendly in the right season. For 
instance, vegetables that only grow in lower temperatures cannot be grown in Hong Kong during the 
summer. The only option for having these vegetables in hotter seasons is to import from northern 
provinces in mainland China. To ensure the supply of certain foods out of season, food is grown in a 
faraway place overly dosed with pesticide and then transported to Hong Kong. It will raise concerns 
about mistrust of food imported from mainland China. As a result, local and seasonal food, and ide-
ally food grown by themselves or farmers they know, soothes their anxiety about unsafe food. More 
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radically, some people even refuse to dine in restaurants because they are convinced that food served 
there is always cheaper food which is imported and grown with chemical and synthetic fertilisers and 
pesticides. 
Only a handful of Hong Kong’s food supply is local. According to government statistics, 90 per 
cent of the total food supply is imported; in 2010, 92 per cent of vegetables come from mainland 
China, while major sources of fresh fruits are the US, followed by mainland China and then Thai-
land (Food and Health Bureau (HKSAR), 2017). In 2017, Hong Kong is the fourth largest market for 
US consumer-oriented agricultural exports (Li, Lai and Yuen, 2017). My observation at a local fruit 
wholesale market suggests that hardly any fruits grown locally. It is also the case for vegetables. Only 
specific wet market stalls, street vendors, greengrocers, farmers’ markets, or high-end supermarket 
chains provide a small quantity of locally grown vegetables.
It is argued that imported food displayed on the market in China has the symbolic value of mo-
dernity and a Western lifestyle which are the motifs of consumers’ preference for purchasing food 
of non-local origin (Zhou and Hui, 2003). However, in the case of today’s Hong Kong, local food is 
imbued with symbolic meanings and thus has transcendental status compared to other categories of 
food. This ‘localness’ of food is more than a geographical concept. Many farmers emphasised to me 
that soil in different places will generate unique tastes of food. At farmers’ markets, farmers believe 
that the taste of their product is different from the same product displayed on other stalls because they 
are grown at different farms. Many young farmers believe that the human being is inseparable from 
the environment, so local food that is cultivated locally is the most suitable for people to consume. 
Furthermore, local food is the effort of local smallholder farmers. Some farmers put much effort in 
cultivating the quality of soil because they believe that, compared to fertilisers, soil is the essential 
element of good food. ‘Food is the product of soil, water, air and farmers’ endeavours’, said a young 
farmer. Food is therefore personalised and locally embedded. Some farmers even elaborated that 
‘food is the carrier of local culture and history’.  
 Implications of food self-sufficiency 
Local food has gained a supreme status in Hong Kong society as the outcome of being associated 
with smallholder farmers, sustainable agriculture and food self-sufficiency. However, it is over-sim-
plified to argue that local food is merely a political statement for a defensive localism. Zhang (2017) 
compares the food movement in China with Ulrich Beck’s concept of ‘cosmopolitan risk community’ 
resulting from the industrialisation and globalisation of food production, pointing out that rather 
than being influenced by a homogenised global community, people are motivated by personal en-
counters with food crises. Meanwhile, global agenda is taken in reflexively and pragmatically to deal 
with local circumstances. Likewise, although there are global initiatives such as Community Support-
ed Agriculture (North America), permaculture (Australia), natural farming (Japan) and eco-villages 
(Europe) circulating in the agricultural movement in Hong Kong, farmers related themselves to these 
global agenda by emphasising the philosophy of ‘think globally, act locally’. Indeed, the philosophy 
behind promoting local food is rather ‘cosmopolitan’. According to young farmers, local food is re-
garded as good food not only because of the reasons mentioned in previous paragraphs, but also that 
the production of local food reduces carbon footprints created by long-distance transportation of 
food; it also pays attention to exploitations of smallholder farmers and environmental consequences 
imposed on residents at areas polluted by industrial production of agri-food. At the same time, When 
I asked whether it is necessary for a place like Hong Kong which struggles with land resources to have 
its own agricultural industry, my interlocutors always answered yes. They emphasised that consuming 
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good food is crucial for quality of life. I heard many times that young farmers prefer to eat proper 
food rather than taking medicine if they are ill. Good food is entangled with local food. Therefore, it 
worries them that Hong Kong city dwellers may have various choices of restaurants providing inter-
national cuisines, but due to a complete dependence on food import, people lack the choice of locally 
grown food. They further elaborate that relying on other places for food means lack of choice and 
autonomy not only regarding food supply and food quality, but also multiple aspects of everyday life. 
This statement of ‘food sovereignty’ (Edelman, 2014) resonates with the policy orientation of the 
British-Hong Kong government during colonial times. Before the signing in 1984 of the Sino-Brit-
ish Joint Declaration which settled the future of Hong Kong, the colonial government regarded the 
development of local agriculture as an important issue for the administration of Hong Kong because 
sufficient food supply and stable livelihoods for farmers would prevent the influence of communism 
and ensure the city’s independence from mainland China (Potter, 1968; Bai, Wang and Chow, 2015). 
Water supply was another challenge for the colonial government. From the 1920s to 1970s, one res-
ervoir construction scheme following another was launched to increase the water self-sufficiency of 
Hong Kong (Hayes, 2012). The ‘Bamboo Curtain’ between the communist People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) and the British-ruled capitalist Hong Kong paralleled the ‘Iron Curtain’ of Europe during the 
Cold War period (Mizuoka, 2017). 
The ‘Bamboo Curtain’ was removed in the 1980s, but nowadays local food production in Hong 
Kong is somehow still associated with the independence of the city. On a farmers’ market organised 
by a farm, there were not only locally grown fresh vegetables but also mainland imported processed 
food from farms or factories known personally by the farm workers, who could thus guarantee the 
quality. However, I was told by the salesperson that mainland imported products were harder to sell 
because customers might refuse to buy them once they realised the origin. It is true that many farmers 
and food movement activists are making arguments from the perspective of the city’s food self-suf-
ficiency. After the handover in 1997, tension between Hong Kong and mainland China has been 
noticeable (Lee and Chan, 2008; Tse, 2014). Farmers’ and activists’ arguments are, somehow, immedi-
ately politicised and associated with this tension. It has been argued that local food discourse is part of 
the resistance to China’s influence since the turn of this century (Chan, 2016).   As a result, food issues 
are lifted to the level of nationalism. Nevertheless, jumping from the concept of self-sufficiency to 
nationalism might be a misinterpretation caused by concentrating on contradictions between Hong 
Kong and mainland China, and failing to consider other factors resulted from everyday struggles in 
this city. Externalising reasons behind the current resurgence of interest in agriculture among the 
younger generation risks neglecting more profound and long-existing issues inside the society. Food 
self-sufficiency is a metaphor for independent living, but does not necessarily have anything to do 
with political independence. 
The pursuit of independent living is manifested in the emphasis on where to purchase food and 
daily necessities. Although it is believed that the domination of supermarket sales over wet markets is 
the outcome of customers’ pursuit of high quality food (Li, Lai and Yuen, 2017), interlocutors in this 
research project expressed that shopping in supermarkets is a compromise to convenience because 
supermarkets are more widespread, open longer and more frequently. Some consumers will purpose-
ly make a trip for purchasing local food at farmers’ markets which only open at weekends. Moreover, 
young farmers are prone to shop in traditional wet markets or at street vendors rather than supermar-
ket chains, no matter whether the product is labelled organic or not. Many interlocutors told me that 
they try not to shop in supermarket chains and would rather buy the same product from wet markets 
or farmers’ markets even at a higher price. They explained that this is resistance to the big companies 
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behind supermarket chains, usually real estate tycoons, which monopolize food and estate markets 
and thus take control of ordinary people’s everyday life in this city. In recent years, there has been ex-
tensive backing for a movement called ‘Go beyond the mall’ (ńgh bōng chan deih cháan sēung), 
meaning ‘do not patronize the business of real estate companies’. The movement aims to promote local 
grown and home-made food or handicrafts. In one hēui (street market) festival at the end of 2016, 
the slogan was ‘Constructing life through hēui: economic and space autonomy’. The festival was held 
at the most well-known shopping area of Hong Kong, Causeway Bay, which has the world’s most ex-
pensive retail unit rent. In the event, there were dozens of vendors selling local agri-food, homemade 
pickles, second-hand groceries and handicrafts made by local artists. There were also stalls displaying 
flyers and pamphlets concerning the planning and ownership of urban space. 
Reflections on the food system and consumption are eventually associated with hands-on food 
production and self-sufficient forms of life. Young farmers believe that agriculture is a comprehensive 
system and thus is the answer to all the enquiries. After becoming farmers, several young farmers 
not only started to grow and process their own food, they even learned to produce daily necessities 
such as furnitures and farm equipments with their own hands. They emphasised to me that elder 
farmers are capable to do this, while themselves, as urban dwellers, used to be heavily dependent on 
exchanging daily necessities with cash. They are doing things rather differently now. They recycle used 
materials and upcycle them into household goods. Sometimes they exchange for meals at friends’ 
houses or yoga and handicraft classes organised by other farmers with labour or vegetables grown 
by themselves. They also collect food leftovers from restaurants or food factories to make compost, 
using it to nurture the soil and then to grow food. They no longer need to rent expensive apartments 
in the downtown because they do not have to rush to the office. It is not saying that they are already 
completely independent from the existing social system. Actually, most of them do not take such an 
extreme approach. By contrast, they seek to move from the extreme of a loop in which they have little 
choice but to take well-paying jobs, exhaust the earnings for making a living not necessarily with 
good quality, spend more on repairing mental and physical health, and then go back to the job in 
order to sustain themselves. Food growing empowers them to have more control over their own lives 
and thus becomes a mean of materialising alternative forms of life:  people can achieve the ultimate 
goal—sustaining one’s self and living a decent life—without going through the above mentioned ‘so-
cial sufferings’ (Kleinman, Das and Lock, 1997). As young farmers explained: some people work for 
high salaries so that they could afford safe and tasty vegetables. We work for quality food straightaway. 
Some young farmers were explicit about their critical attitudes toward capitalism and neoliber-
alism. The system of neoliberalism or capitalism in Hong Kong is by no means a new thing invented 
after the handover. On the other side of the Bamboo Curtain, Hong Kong has been developed as a 
capitalist city since the colonial period. Since then, Hong Kong identity was rooted in economics 
because there was no room in the governmental administration structure (Carroll, 2007). As Abbas 
(1997, p.5) comments: ‘The more frustrated or blocked the aspirations to ‘democracy’ are, the more 
the market booms.’ People in this city used to be proud of their economic achievement, celebrating 
the Lion Rock Spirit, the Hong Kong version of the American Dream, and establishing confidence 
based on the identity of economic advancement compared with other parts of Chinese society (cf. 
Turner, 1995; Tam and Evans, 1997; Lee, 2010; Ren, 2010). Rather than transformations after 1997, 
what is subject to critique is the basis on which people have built their identity for decades. Having 
said this, destruction is followed by construction. 
A magazine launched in 2016 by some key figures in the current agriculture movement mentions 
not a single word about ‘nationalism’ or ‘Hong Kong independence’. Instead, they discuss a lot about 
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the concept and value of ‘community’. ‘Methodological individualism’ suggests that group identity is 
oriented by social individuals’ subjective intentionality (Weber, 1968; as reviewed in Camic, Gorski 
and Trubek, 2005). Weber stresses that social groups are consisted of individuals; collective actions of 
such groups are the product of individual intentionality and action. Participants in the food and ag-
riculture movement in Hong Kong form a new community, or in their own words, a ‘hyūn ji’ (circle)’. 
Through various events and occasions, such as workshops, farming courses, forums, film screenings, 
farm tours, food-sharing parties, farmers’ markets or interpersonal networking, the insiders of this 
circle including farmers, farm lovers, farm workers, customers and activists are able to get to know 
each other. The more I carried out participant observation on various occasions at different places 
and talked to participators from diverse backgrounds, the more a sociality became evident for me. 
Participators did not act nor expect to act as complete self-sufficient individuals who are isolated from 
other people. Alternative thoughts and actions are taking shape when existing values and norms are 
confronted.  
Bottom-up renaissance of local agriculture
This paper addresses a resurgence of interest in local agriculture, which was the most important 
economic activity during the middle of the last century but now regarded as an unlikely topic in 
highly urbanised Hong Kong. From the perspective of the younger farmers who have no agricultural 
family background and are not expected to become farmers given the education they receive, this 
study analyses the social and economic structure which the movement is cultivated in, and demon-
strates how reflections on the food system transformed into hands-on food growing. Meanwhile, not 
limiting the scope of this research only to food and agriculture, this paper attempts to show how a 
community (or communities) are forming due to the change of perception of food, land, life forms 
and thus the reset of social relations between food producers and consumers.
People who were born during the era of economic boom in Hong Kong were promised that good 
education would guarantee decent, well-paying jobs, and good quality of life. But when they are nearly 
there after years of commitment to the goal, they suddenly realise that the world has changed. Today, 
disillusioned young people have learned that due to downward social mobility, the myth of the Lion 
Rock Spirit which once enabled the hardworking to make good, is now an unattainable dream be-
cause of dimming prosperity and the soaring costs of living. This paper therefore argues that although 
there are many other qualities which attract people to be urban farmers, daily struggles and the pur-
suit of alternative lifestyles are essential factors of the current agriculture movement among the young 
generation. Being completely urban dwellers, almost all interlocutors of this research lacked for agri-
cultural knowledge and had absolutely no farming experience. They had no choice but to accept stable 
and well-paying jobs to pay for their food and other living costs. However, even paying lots of money 
does not guarantee the quality of food. The doctrine of laissez-faire is highly respected in this city 
(Ngo, 1999). As a result, soaring land rates extinguish small capital businesses, and old, independent 
stores are replaced by supermarket and restaurant chains which are backed by powerful companies 
and thus able to afford high rents. The monopoly of food chains means few alternative choices. As 
long as there is no competition, commodities with poor quality but high prices become an inevitable 
outcome. Therefore, young farmers argued that only if city dwellers can grow and process their own 
food, are they free from the loop. Growing food becomes a means of empowerment to materialise 
alternative lifestyles. 
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This paper has argued that political discourses of nationalism should not be forced on the ini-
tiatives of local agriculture and food self-sufficiency. Food movement is often associated with food 
imports from mainland China and exaggerated to an assertion that influences from China since the 
handover in 1997 have ‘made Hong Kong no longer the Hong Kong we have known’. Although dis-
crimination against ‘China’ is expressed clearly, there is no clear acknowledgment of the complexity 
and fluidity of the concept of ‘China’. An appeal for local products and local food is often arbitrarily 
attributed to a defensive localism and xenophobia. However, this paper has pointed out that com-
pared to such political statement, daily life struggles play a more important role. An oversimplified 
interpretation will cause a misdiagnosis of inherent issues within the society. Food self-sufficiency is 
often over-interpreted as an appeal for political independence. Nevertheless, self-sufficiency has ne-
glected but fundamental meanings. From the individual perspective, self-sufficiency refers to a sense 
of security and confidence in being an independent human who has the freedom to determine how to 
use natural resources, what food to grow and eat, what job to take, where to live, and what life goals 
to pursue. From the social perspective, the whole food and agriculture movement roots in practical 
struggles, including reliable food supply, variety of options, reasonable price of housing and dining in 
restaurants, healthy work-life balance and opportunities for career development.
Many researchers believe that urban agriculture participants are economically and politically 
privileged middle-class residents instead of the grassroots. However, this paper points out that urban 
farmers in Hong Kong are from diverse social stratifications. Although economic and social capital 
have impacts on whether being a farmer is feasible and sustainable, the developing civil society plays 
a supportive role to make the circle of urban farming inclusive and accessible for the grassroots. Res-
onating with the ‘positive side effects’ of the cosmopolitan risk society (Beck et al., 2013), this study 
finds that city dwellers’ dissatisfaction with quality of life leads to new paradigms of food system based 
on sustainable agriculture and local food. The global ‘farm to table’ agenda has been taken into Hong 
Kong society as a narrative about food freshness and ethical consumption. This atmosphere creates 
new public spheres for envisioning healthy and ethical eating and civilised use of urban space. Mean-
while, it also forms communities consisted of like-minded people.
Endnotes
Conversations and quotations were in Cantonese. The translations are mine. The Chinese words are romanised 
in Cantonese, using the Yale system. 
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Harmony at Play 
ENVIRONMENTAL NGOS’ POLICY ADVOCACY IN CHINA
Abstract:The general assumption of civil society in China is that it is insignificant or almost non-existent. However, the recent 
development of the Chinese civil society might challenge this conventional view. In 2015, environmental NGOs achieved their 
agenda of incorporating environmental public interest litigation into the new Environment Protection Law. Why small civil 
society organizations can achieve such a significant policy influence? In this research, I draw insights from the cultural pragmatic 
theory of social performance and social movement theory of framing to advance our knowledge of the communicative power of 
civil society in China. I argue that it is these environmental NGOs’ skillful transplant of the symbols which Chinese government 
agrees with, such as harmony, into their framing strategies and action tactics that made their success. Their stability-concern 
proposals and pro-dialogue actions correspond well with the value of the Chinese government. Through performing this sym-
bols in their policy advocacy process, these civil society agents achieved cultural resonance from the state. While former studies 
on Chinese civil society tended to explain the success or failure of cases through an institutional perspective, this research in-
cludes the elements of culture and meaning into the analysis.
Keywords: ENGOs, Policy advocacy, Cultural resonance, China, Harmony.
Gyvenimas harmonijoje: Kinijos aplinkosaugos organizacijų įtaka politikai
Santrauka: Bendra prielaida apie pilietinę visuomenę Kinijoje yra ta, kad ji nesvarbi arba beveik neegzistuoja. Tačiau pastarųjų 
metų Kinijos pilietinės visuomenės vystymasis gali pakeisti šį tradicinį požiūrį. 2015 m. aplinkosaugos NVO pasiekė savo tikslą 
įtraukti aplinkosaugos viešųjų interesų gynimą į naująjį Aplinkos apsaugos įstatymą. Kodėl mažos pilietinės visuomenės organi-
zacijos gali taip stipriai paveikti politiką? Į šį klausimą atsakoma remiantis socialinės veiklos kultūrinio pragmatiškumo teorija ir 
socialinio judėjimo teorija. Taip siekiama geriau suprasti, kokią informacijos skleidimo galią turi Kinijos pilietinė visuomenė. Ty-
rime teigiama, kad NVO įgyvendina sumanią ir sėkmingą strategiją, grindžiamą simboliais, kuriems pritaria Kinijos Vyriausybė, 
pvz., harmonijos. Tarsi palaikydama Kinijos Vyriausybės vertybes, pilietinė visuomenė remia stabilumą ir dialogą, tokiu būdu 
pasiekdama kultūrinį rezonansą su valstybe. Nors ankstesni Kinijos pilietinės visuomenės tyrimai jų sėkmę arba nesėkmę aiški-
no remdamiesi institucine perspektyva, šis tyrimas įtraukia kultūrinius ir reikšmių elementus į analizę.
Reikšminiai žodžiai: NVO, poveikis politikai, kultūrinis rezonansas, Kinija, harmonija. 
Introduction
“Judicial Interpretation on Environmental Public Interest Litigation, which is a powerful sword, 
has been made. We hope this sword can cut through the dirty stream and clean the grey smog air. 
It will be like a sword of Damocles that hangs above the polluters.”(Lin &Tuholske 2015) This a fa-
mous quote from Justice Zheng Xuelin, who is also the director of Environment and Resources Law 
Tribunal from the Supreme People’s Court in China. The Environmental Public Interest Litigation 
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(EPIL) Zheng refers to is a new legal system which allows the environmental NGOs (ENGOs) in 
China to prosecute the polluters. Before the year 2015, Chinese ENGOs did not have the rights to 
file environmental public interest lawsuit, even though ENGOs in the West have been practicing this 
for decades.  Chinese ENGOs did not get their rights to EPIL easily. They have handed in numerous 
policy proposals on various levels in the past decade to fight for it. Finally, in the 2015 Environment 
Protection Law, ENGOs are allowed to file claims against the polluters in the People’s Court as long 
as the ENGO (1) is registered with the civil affairs department at or above the municipal level and (2) 
has been focused on environment-related public interest activities for five consecutive years or more 
(Xinhua 2015). This substantial progress in Chinese Environment Protection Law can be interpreted 
as a successful case of ENGOs’ policy advocacy. 
While Chinese civil society is known for being weak, why was the policy advocacy of Chinese EN-
GOs on EPIL particularly effective? Conventional research on Chinese civil society has focused main-
ly on the institutional factors to explain the success or failure of NGOs. Some say NGOs are effective 
because they are able to adapt themselves to the political opportunities, economic opportunities, and 
personal opportunities presented to them (Hildebrandt 2013), or their leaders are able to mobilize re-
sources through networking strategies to establish cooperative relations (Fulda, Li and Song 2012; Tai 
2015). Others say some NGOs are ineffective because of the lack of meaningful engagement between 
the state and NGOs attributed to isomorphic pressures within state–NGO relations (Hasmath & Hsu 
2014). Such research made a meaningful contribution to our understanding of Chinese civil society, 
but the effectiveness of NGOs’ interaction with the state cannot be explained by institutional factors 
alone. Instead, the seemingly insignificant cultural background has to be included in the analysis. 
This research brings culture into the analysis of Chinese civil society. It answers the call of Sax-
onberg and Jacobsson (2016) on doing systematic comparisons between different movements in one 
cultural context to see how factors such as cultural resonance influence the outcomes of social move-
ments. Drawing on Alexander’s cultural pragmatic theory of social performance and Snow and Ben-
ford’s social movement theory of framing, I introduce a new framework to look at the interactions 
between Chinese NGOs and the Chinese government. I argue that culture creates a rational and emo-
tional context for both NGOs and the state. Whether the NGOs can incorporate the cultural symbols 
in their action tactics and framing strategies explains whether they can achieve cultural resonance 
from the policymakers.
In the sections below, I first review the literature on Chinese civil society and explain how a new 
theoretical framework can fill in the lacuna in current studies. I then turn to my methodology, elab-
orating how I collect the data and conduct the data analysis. The methodology section is followed by 
my analysis of Chinese ENGOs’ framings and actions in the case of EPIL. I conclude with putting this 
case in my theoretical framework of cultural resonance and illustrating how this new framework can 
explain the aspects of Chinese civil society the others have neglected.
NGOs’ Policy advocacy in China
NGO’s Policy advocacy is the attempt by NGOs as “policy entrepreneurs” to “prod the government 
to do the right thing” (Najam 2000). Although most NGOs in China lack the capacity for substantial 
policy participation and Chinese political environment is still relatively hostile to advocacy activities 
(Kang and Feng 2011), some Chinese NGOs have ventured to participate in policy process at vari-
ous levels. For example, Friends of Nature, the oldest environmental NGOs (ENGOs) in China, has 
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participated in more than 30 national level policymaking in the past 20 years. Some other NGOs also 
found their way to policy advocacy, though on a smaller scale.
This new role of Chinese NGOs in policy participation attracted scholarly attention. Jessica Teets 
(2013; 2014) has noticed this change in the recent decade and, she termed it “consultative authoritari-
anism” to refer to the positive interaction between NGOs and officials at the local level. Andrew Mer-
tha (2008, 2009) argues that NGOs’ participation in the policy process is due to the fragmented nature 
of the Chinese state. The fragmented authoritarianism lowered the threshold for political participa-
tion, which allowed Chinese NGOs to participate in policymaking. But Mertha (2009) points out 
that even though such a structural space is there, a policy advocacy would not have been successful 
without effective framing. For example, Mertha (2009) noticed that in three similar cases of ENGOs’ 
policy advocacy against dam building, the result could be different and he attributes the difference to 
NGOs’ choice of frames. Tony Saich (2000) also agrees with the importance of framing, but he puts it 
in different terms. Saich (2000) says that it is the Chinese social organizations’ ability to reconfigure 
their relationship with the state in more beneficial terms that allow for policy input of these social 
organizations. Saich points to the content of the framing — mutual interests instead of antagonism. 
Likewise, Fürst and Holdaway (2015) noticed the ENGO’s relationship with local enterprises and the 
government has shifted from one of tension to the form of dialogue in the recent decade. Dialogue, 
instead of confrontation, creates more space for Chinese NGOs. This corresponds to the finding of 
Schroeder (2015), who suggests that Chinese ENGOs working on climate change exclusively use 
“soft” approaches in their local activism and policy advocacy. Schroeder (2015) further explains that 
in comparison with their Western counterparts, Chinese ENGOs draw on a different repertoire of 
cultural resources and strategies in entering policy process. Whereas the West tends to be confron-
tational, Chinese ENGOs apply a cooperative approach to amplify their influence (Schroeder 2015). 
Three major informal rules are emphasized by Schroeder (2015), which are respecting authority and 
status, building social connections, and maintaining or gaining “face” for the authorities.
Above studies have agreed on two things: firstly, Chinese NGOs are participating in the policy 
process; secondly, Chinese NGOs have to draw on a “soft” repertoire in their interactions with the 
state, such as creating cooperative dialogue instead of confrontations. However, none of them look 
into the dialogue to see how the persuasion has happened. Also, the strategies, such as building so-
cial connections, seem general and vague. The readers are left to ask “how” and “why” after reading 
these case analysis. Therefore, even though we have a number of studies claiming that Chinese NGOs 
can participate in the policy process, the mechanism behind is still unclear. How has the persuasion 
happened? What differentiates a successful policy advocacy from a failed one? Where is civil society’s 
communicative power from? Dialogue works, framing matters, cultural repertoire helps. But most 
importantly, cultural resonance is what all these strategies and tools aim at, and the mechanism of 
cultural resonance explains whether an advocacy succeeds or fails.
Theoretical Framework
Why are some policy advocacies more successful than the others? Now I will present my theo-
retical framework to explain the mechanism behind a successful policy advocacy (Figure 1). This 
framework builds on the cultural pragmatic theory of social performance and social movement the-
ory of framing. The cultural pragmatic theory of social performance perceives a social interaction as 
a theatrical drama. In the drama of ENGOs’ policy advocacy in China, the actors are ENGOs and the 
audiences are policymakers. The ENGOs’ performance includes both their advocacy actions and their 
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policy proposals. These two aspects can be interpreted as what the actors did and said on the stage. 
Just like a performance cannot be carried out without a script that directs what the actors should do 
and say at any particular moment, a policy advocacy also needs such a script to direct their perfor-
mance. To refine the concept of scripting, I divide it into framing strategies and action tactics. Fram-
ing strategies are constituted by framing tasks and utilizing of master frames. Three core framing tasks 
are “diagnostic framing”, “prognostic framing,” and “motivational framing” (Snow & Benford 1988). 
“Diagnostic framing” is when social movement actors seek to remedy or alter some problematic is-
sue by identifying causality, blame, and/or culpable agents (2000:616). “Diagnostic framing” is often 
paired with adversarial framing, which delineates the boundary between “us” and “them”. “Prognostic 
framing” involves the articulation of a proposed strategy to solve a problem (2000:616). “Motivational 
framing” calls for collective action, including the construction of motivative vocabularies pointing 
out the severity and urgency of the issue (2000:616). In addition to framing tasks, another concept 
which is key to the content of framing is “master frames”. Master frames most often refer to those 
collective action frames that are “broad in terms of scope, functioning as a kind of master algorithm 
that colors and constrains the orientations and activities of other movements” (Snow and Benford 
2000:618). But as one of the inventors of this concept has noticed, this term has been used in differ-
ent ways in different empirical studies (Benford 1997). In my understanding, master frames refer to 
the frames which are broader and more generic. Movement participants draw on master frames to 
portray their perceived social problems in ways that suit the tenor of the times and thus often paral-
lels other social movements. Action tactics are usually how the framing tasks and master frames are 
reflected in actions, with more details to direct the deeds. 
Different from Alexander’s theory of social performance, which focuses only on the scripts of ac-
tors, I reckon not only actors have a script, also audiences’ obtain their script. Audiences’ script directs 
audiences’ actions and reactions towards the actors. Scripts are not random. They have derived from 
the socio-cultural context the actors and the audiences living in. The long-term and general context is 
the background representations; the short-term and concrete background is mis-en-scene. However 
powerful background representation and mis-en-scene seem, they only constrain and enable but do 
not determine. The actors’ and audiences’ interpretation of the socio-cultural background shows the 
agency in them. 
Whether a performance is successful or not is reflected in audiences’ reaction. A successful per-
formance is when audiences identify with actors and applaud the actors’ performance. By analogy, 
a successful policy advocacy is when policymakers identify with the ENGOs and incorporate their 
proposal into policy or lawmaking. Whether policymakers react positively or negatively depends on 
the level of cultural resonance. When the cultural resonance level is high, audiences are more likely to 
react positively; when the resonance level is low, audiences react indifferently or even negatively to the 
actors’ performance. The level of resonance depends on two things. Firstly, the level of congruence: 
whether the script embodied in actors’ performance is in alignment with audiences’ script. Secondly, 
the level of usefulness: whether the scripts can help audiences to solve their problem or not (Mc Don-
nell et al. 2017). This double-decker approach admits that there can be an objective level of congru-
ence in cultural symbols at the first place, but this basic familiarity does not directly lead to resonance. 
To reach cultural resonance, actors also have to engage with the challenges their audiences are facing.
Similar to the cultural pragmatic theory of social performance, my theoretical framework down-
plays the organizational and instrumental factors. Even though I acknowledge that these factors influ-
ence civil society actors’ performances, I do not put them in the central place. The first reason is that 
although organizations and resources remain crucial, in the process of policy advocacy, their value 
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is to provide access to the “means of persuasion” (Alexander 2011:148). Such structural-institutional 
factors make the policy advocacy possible, but they do not determine the result. The second reason 
is that numerous studies on Chinese civil society have focused on these instrumental and organiza-
tional factors already. They have analyzed how the abysmal political, economic, and social situations 
of Chinese NGOs have influenced the actors’ behaviors and what NGOs do to survive such objective 
difficulties (see Tai 2015, Hildebrandt 2013, Spires 2011 et al.). On the contrary, what is crucially im-
portant, the process of communicative mobilization itself, remained understudied. In my research, I 
centralize the symbolic communication and marginalize the instrumental factors, which is based on 
both an ontological understanding and an analytical strategy. 
Methodology
To ascertain how ENGOs carry out policy advocacy in China, I use the method of process-trac-
ing. Process-tracing methods are “tools to study causal mechanism” (Beach & Pedersen 2013: 2). It 
is normally used in single research design.  Beach & Pedersen (2013) distinguished three types of 
process-tracing: theory-testing process-tracing, theory-building process tracing and explaining-out-
come process tracing. In this research, since the goal is to find out the causal mechanisms of two 
specific cases, the method is the closest to explaining outcome process-tracing. Causal mechanism in 
explaining-outcome process-tracing is defined in a broader term (Beach & Pedersen 2013:19). Causal 
mechanism here means to craft a “minimally sufficient explanation of particular outcome” (Beach 
& Pedersen 2013:19). From an interpretivist perspective, the restraint of causal explanation is even 
further loosened. A search for “forcing causes” in traditionally understood process-tracing method is 
transferred into looking for “forming causes”, which means take the less tangible but no less powerful 
networks of meaning into consideration (Reed 2011).
To collect data regarding the EPIL case, I carried out extensive fieldworks in China in 2015 and 
2016. During the first phase of data collection in 2015, covering a period of two months, I interviewed 
five ENGOs in Beijing. During the second phase of my research, I did a three-month participatory ob-
servation at an ENGO in Beijing and conducted additional interviews. As the capital of China, Beijing 
Figure 1. The mechanism of cultural resonance in social performance
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attracts the majority of ENGOs that are interested in state policy advocacy. But during the participato-
ry-observation, I also traveled to other cities with the ENGO I worked at. Thus, the data are centered 
around Beijing NGOs, but not limited to Beijing NGOs. In total, 20 semi-structured interviews with 
ENGO leaders were conducted so far. Besides of doing interviews and participatory-observation, I 
also utilize documentations provided by ENGOs and independent information as supplementary. 
Among these, the actual proposals ENGOs handed in during the National People’s Congress (NPC) 
are especially valuable. 
With the assist of Atlas.Ti software, I analyzed my interview transcripts together with other doc-
umentation. I began with an initial round of “pre-coding” (Layder 1998). After patterns of NGOs’ 
frames in proposal appeared, I moved on to “provisional coding” (Layder 1998), guided by the theo-
ries and theoretical framework I mentioned above.
Actors’ scripting: ENGOs’ framing strategies and action tactics in EPIL
Framing strategies: what ENGOs wrote
Drafting policy proposals and delivering them to the legislators are how NGOs influence the polit-
ical core; thus, the framing of NGOs’ policy proposal is critical. Good frames ring a bell with the law-
makers, which opens the door for further discussions; bad frames immediately block the tunnel for 
negotiations. In the EPIL case, ENGOs framed their policy proposals around the concept of harmony. 
The core of harmony is to devalue antagonisms and appreciate peace. In recent years, harmony has 
been emphasized even more by the party-state because this concept helps the party-state with stability 
maintenance. Scholars have noticed how harmony is widely used as a frame in Chinese discourse (Shi 
2014: 97). Therefore, harmony is a master frame in the sense that it is broad in terms of scope and can 
function as a kind of master algorithm in different social movements and advocacies. 
In this part, I will analyze the EPIL policy proposals of ENGOs from the year 2005, 2009 and 2014 
to show how ENGOs internalized the master frame harmony in their proposals. The analysis shows 
that the harmony-related frames, such as “order”, “stability”, “national interests” are both increasing 
and becoming more explicit with the time going. Frames against harmony, such as “right frames”, are 
decreasing. 
Order and Stability
In the proposal of 2005, the ENGOs tried to justify the EPIL by referring to its role of stability 
maintenance. Using “prognostic framing”, the ENGOs proposed strengthening the punishment of 
environmental pollution to expand the scope of the subject of environmental litigation. The ENGOs 
claim that expanding the scope of the subject of environmental litigation can bring the growing en-
vironmental requirements of the public into a “standardized and orderly management”. “Order” is 
opposite to social mess, so it contributes to social stability. In other words, allowing ENGOs to file 
EPIL helps to maintain a harmonious society. 
In the proposal of 2014, this role of ENGOs in maintaining order is expressed more explicitly: 
Nowadays the public pays more and more attention to environmental issues. Mass incidents caused by en-
vironmental issues happen often, and the environmental administration is too busy to tackle all the envi-
ronmental violations. In such a social context, we should include more social forces in the environmental 
protection through legal means in an orderly way. Environmental public interest litigation system is such an 
effective legal approach.
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This paragraph starts with a “diagnostic framing” — environmental administration is too busy to 
tackle all the environmental violations and moves to “prognostic framing” — to include more social 
forces in the environmental protection through legal means in an orderly way. The ENGOs explain 
that EPIL helps the environmental administrations to punish environmental violations and this is to 
avoid mass incidents. EPIL is interpreted as a system contributing to social stability and relieve the 
burden of social welfare. 
Above text follows the logic of the proposal of 2005 to emphasize “order”, but the next paragraph 
from 2014 is even more vocal in expressing the stability-concern:
If we block the judicial channels, more and more people will turn to non-institutionalized ways to solve the 
problem. At present, less than one percent of all environmental disputes have entered the legal system. The 
remaining nighty-nine percent of the disputes are unstable social factors. Such restrictive provisions (on 
the subject of environmental litigation) will push more environmental disputes away from institutionalized 
solutions and creates potential oppositions. Only by letting the social forces participate effectively in environ-
mental protection through lawful channels can environmental problems gradually be alleviated and social 
conflicts be solved.
This text is a combination of “diagnostic frame”, “motivational frame” and “prognostic frame”. It 
diagnoses that environmental disputes which are not solved properly are unstable social factors. It 
motivates the audience to act immediately by pointing out the urgency. In the end, it articulates the 
strategy to solve the problem through the prognostic frame: if ENGOs are allowed to file EPIL, then 
these environmental disputes can be better solved, and the potential unstable social factors might be 
decreased. 
If the last paragraph has already made it clear that the accumulated grudges are becoming a threat 
to stability, the next paragraph elaborates even more thoroughly why the government has to change 
the situation:
The polluters are not taking the responsibilities. The greater the environmental damage, the more likely the 
damage was made up by the government and the taxpayers.
In this “boundary framing” or “adversarial framing”, the ENGOs draw a clear boundary between 
polluting industries and the government plus taxpayers. The polluters are the evil; the government 
and taxpayers are the innocent. The evil gets the profit, but the innocent pay the bill. That is why this 
situation has to be changed. Otherwise, the public grudges are all towards the government, who be-
comes the scapegoat of the polluting industries. Involving ENGOs in the EPIL can bring the polluting 
industries to the spotlight. This is, to some extent, to help the government.
Comrade In The Same Trench 
So far I have shown that in the EPIL case, the ENGOs have incorporated the symbol of “order” 
and “stability”, which is the core of harmony. In the following parts, I will show that the ENGOs also 
delivered the message that they are fighting in the same trench with the government. Thus, there is no 
conflict between NGOs and the government, which is another embodiment of harmony. 
One illustration of their comradeship is that in the proposals of all three years, it is common to 
see that ENGOs justify their agenda by quoting state policies or legislation. For example, in 2005, the 
ENGOs stated that “in accordance with the provisions of the sixth article of the Environmental Law 
of the People’s Republic of China, all units and individuals have the obligation to protect the environ-
ment and have the right to report environmental pollutions and damages”. In 2009, the ENGOs also 
started their proposal by quoting state policies: 
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On December 3, 2005, the State Council announced the creation of the “State Council on the Implementation 
of the Scientific Concept of Development to Enhance Environmental Protection Decision.” […] The decision 
put forward: “encourage the social organizations to play a role in prosecuting and exposing environmental 
violations. It also mentioned that “environmental public interest litigation should be promoted.” Therefore, 
the Chinese government has made it clear that it wants to establish the environmental public interest litiga-
tion system. The urgent need is to find the practical program that fits our social condition.
This time it is even clearer that the ENGOs are working in line with the government. As the pro-
posal claimed, the State Council has already decided to encourage the ENGOs to play a role in EPIL. 
This announcement from the State Council is the “gate pass” for ENGOs. Therefore, the ENGOs can 
claim that they are working on the same agenda with the government. More specifically, they are 
helping the government to materialize its policy. 
What the ENGOs are doing is not only in line with the state, it also contributes to the interest of 
the state. This is another statement the ENGOs are trying to make in their proposals. This strengthens 
NGOs’ position that they are on the same side of the state, at least standing together with the poli-
ticians who sincerely care about the national interest. This mission created an imagined community 
between the NGOs and the state. For example, in 2005, the ENGOs lobbied to establish the environ-
mental public interest litigation system based on the argument that this system can “more effectively 
protect the public’s environmental rights, public interests, and national interests”. To argue for an 
unlimited period of litigation, the “national interest” frame is stressed again:
The EPIL is to protect the national interests and the public interest. It should not be restricted by the pre-
scribed period for litigation, so the crimes violating national interests and public interests can be prosecuted 
at any time.
Besides, when it comes to the calculation of damage, the ENGOs also strengthen that this damage 
is “national and public”. Therefore, to punish the offender is to protect the national and public interest: 
[…]the national and public interest damage is still difficult to calculate. There are many legal and technical 
barriers. However, the offender shall bear the liability for compensation for the damage confirmed by the 
legal principle.
Since the damage is on the national level, to establish the EPIL system is to help to decrease the 
damage and build a better China. In the proposal of 2014, the ENGOs call for action on “beautiful 
China” through a motivational frame:
After many years of accumulation of environmental pollution and ecological destruction, China today faces 
growing pollution and ecological crisis. “The beautiful China” task is arduous. It needs more social and in-
stitutional participation.
No go: rights frame and international norms
It is worth mentioning that while the order, stability and national interest frames are increasing 
with the time going, two types of frames are appearing less and less these years. One is the “rights 
frame”, which is a popular frame when it comes to social movements in the West (Snow and Benford 
2000). The Chinese ENGOs have noticed that rights-based liberalism does not ring a bell with the 
Chinese government.
The rights-oriented liberal argument only appeared in the 2005 proposal -- “litigation right is a 
fundamental right of citizens, so ENGOs’ right to environment public interest litigation should be 
affirmed by the environmental law.” As explained above, the 2005 proposal did not succeed in gaining 
support among policymakers. The Chinese government apparently prepares to talk about “duties” to 
“rights”. Therefore, in the following years, the ENGOs cut down the right-based liberal argument and 
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added more framings around the concept of stability and national interest, which turned out to be 
better received by the political core. 
 Another frame appeared less these years is “international norms frame”. In 2005, an underlying 
logic of the proposal was that the environmental public interest litigation system is widely adopted 
in the European and American countries, so we should also have it. In 2009, an underlying logic 
was that many developing countries have established environmental courts, including our neigh-
bors Philippines, Thailand and other Asian countries, so we should hurry up to establish it. Among 
policymakers, these international norms argument did not gain resonance. The reason might be that 
the Chinese government is getting more interested in setting its own order, instead of copying the 
international rules. As Lee Kuan Yew, the former president of Singapore put it “It is China’s intention 
to become the greatest power in the world and to be accepted as China, not as an honorary member 
of the west” (Allison&Blackwill 2013). The “international norms frame” does not fit the party-state’s 
agenda of setting a new world order and start a new China-led paradigm; therefore, it is not well re-
ceived by the policymakers. 
Action tactics: what ENGOs did 
ENGOs’ action strategies play a big role in either they can achieve success in their policy advocacy 
or not. The ways of conducting advocacies are various and some appear to be better than the others. 
The following case shows that in the process of fighting for ENGOs’ right to environmental public in-
terest litigation (EPIL), the ENGOs have managed to use the tactics which show their non-conflicting 
tendency.
The ENGOs had a long journey to incorporate their right of EPIL into the Environment Protec-
tion Law. As early as 2005, the founder of Friends of Nature, Liang Congjie, submitted a proposal 
claiming that the ENGOs should be the subject of the environmental public interest litigation. Al-
though Liang’s proposal was rejected by the National People’s Congress (NPC), the ENGOs began to 
fight for this right of EPIL since then. Therefore, in 2015 when the ENGOs’ right of EPIL was finally 
confirmed in the Environment Protection Law, it has been already ten year’s effort from the side of 
ENGOs. The process of incorporating EPIL into the new Environment Protection Law is an example 
of how NGOs can participate in the policy-making process and make substantial changes. The final 
success did not come quickly. The grassroots NGOs have to be very strategic in their negotiations. 
Three crucial tactics emerged from this specific case.
We never wait. It seldom happens that the government would come to you to ask what you want, so most of 
the time it is us who initiates the interaction.
This quote reveals the first tactic of NGOs’ policy advocacy - be proactive. Incorporating EPIL 
into the new law was never on the agenda nor in the interest of the legislature. It is likely that the 
EPIL would never have been added into the new law had not Liang put it forward in 2005 and had 
not ENGOs worked sturdily on it afterward. Moreover, in this process of revision, it is ENGOs who 
acted proactively to stop the approval of the ill-regulated second draft and substantially enlarged the 
subject of EPIL in the fourth draft. Had ENGOs not acted, the second draft would probably have been 
passed as it was.
The second action tactic is to get access to political entrepreneurs. Friends of Natures understands 
the influence of political entrepreneurs in the process of policymaking:
Representatives of NPC (National People’s Congress) and CPPCC (Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference) have big influence. When revising the second draft, we united mainly media, NGOs, big Vs, but 
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the result was not ideal. It shows that the force from outside has only limited influence. But when making the 
fourth draft, we found supporters from inside. The positive result shows that the insiders’ influence is bigger.
Friends of Nature tends to keep a positive relationship with the political entrepreneurs who are 
interested in the environmental issues. The process of Environment Protection Law-making offered 
Friends of Nature a good precedent: to deliver their proposal to the political core, Friends of Nature 
looked for representatives of NPC and CPPCC openly online before the two sessions in 2014, and got 
positive responses from several representatives. In the future, Friends of Nature plan to work even 
harder to look for supporters from the decision-making level.
The third tactic, which is closely related to the second point, is to create a dialogue with the state. 
As stated by Zhang Boju,the General Director of Friends of Nature: “We are not too radical. We are 
reasonable. Therefore, the state is often willing to join the dialogue we created.” In the Environment 
Protection Law case, Friends of Nature managed to communicate with the legislators from the begin-
ning to the end in a very rational and professional manner. The reaction of Ge and her colleagues on 
the second draft further illustrates their position: 
We were quite shocked. As law school graduates, we found the legislative technique very problematic. My 
colleges and I felt we must issue our voice in a strong way. We drafted a proposal and posted a short version 
of it online. At the same time, we sent our proposal to the NPC legislature and a few influential media.
Although being shocked by the faultiness of the second draft, Ge and her colleagues reacted to 
this problematic draft in a professional manner. “Issuing their voices in a strong way” did not mean 
deciding to go to the street or writing hateful comments; instead, these law school graduates decided 
to deliver their amendments. In the following process, Friends of Nature conducted their dialogue 
in a similar manner: seminars, discussion, and roundtable talks are always the preferred forms. “We 
are neither a collaborator nor an opponent (to the government). We maintain a proactive dialogue 
relation with the government”, as Zhang explains.
This typical case in environmental legal advocacy and policy advocacy shows that proactively 
creating dialogues with political entrepreneurs is an effective way for ENGOs to achieve their spe-
cific policy agenda. This pro-dialogue attitude corresponds well with the harmonious culture deeply 
rooted in the Confucius and Daoist culture. Treating political entrepreneurs as a partner to talk with, 
instead of an enemy to fight with, shows the kind-will of the ENGOs. This kind-will is a pre-condition 
of successful advocacy. 
What ENGOs’ action tactics and framing strategies have in common is a tendency to promote 
the non-conflict or harmonious features. During the process of promoting their views to the poli-
cymakers, aka policy advocacy process, ENGOs acted in an extremely rational and friendly man-
ner. They neither went to the street themselves, nor did they mobilize the masses to put pressure on 
the policymakers. Instead, they chose to proactively create dialogues with political entrepreneurs to 
deliver their message to the political core. Dialogue is the opposite of conflicts and cooperation is 
the opposite of antagonism. Therefore, dialogue and cooperation with policy entrepreneurs are the 
best illustrations of ENGOs’ pro-harmony intention. In the frames of ENGOs’ policy advocacy, this 
pro-harmony intention is even more obvious. Even though the term “harmony (harmonious society)” 
was mentioned openly only once in the ENGOs’ policy proposal, this concept is the underlying logic 
of most of their proposals. When ENGOs claim that EPIL can contribute to stability and decrease 
social grudges, they mean that EPIL system can help to build a harmonious society; when ENGOs say 
that EPIL is in line with the state policy and it protects the national interest, they mean that ENGOs 
and the government are in a harmonious relation.
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Audience’s scripting: Chinese official discourse  
on civil society and state-control strategy regarding civil society
 Why the framing strategies and the actions tactics above could ring a bell with the Chinese gov-
ernment?  In the following parts, I will present the framings and actions of the state on Chinese civil 
society. According to my theoretical framework, if the actors’ framing and actions 1) achieve align-
ment 2) seems useful to the audience, then cultural resonance is likely to happen. 
Chinese official framing strategies on civil society
Official discourse on civil society weaves a “web of significance” (Geertz 1973:5) for NGOs’ pol-
icy advocacy. If NGOs want their advocacy practice to be accepted by the state, their actions have to 
conform to the value system or the meaning structure of the policy-makers. Meanwhile, NGOs’ logic 
of action, no matter they want or not, is also influenced by this meaning structure. But the meaning 
structure is a fluid and almost intangible thing. Thus, the contemporary cultural analysts often turn 
to discourse to trace the clues of the cultural environment (Wuthnow 1989; Swidler 1995). Similarly, 
I turn to the discourse of Chinese official media on “civil society” to find out the cultural-meaning 
web surrounding Chinese NGOs, especially those involved in policy advocacy. In the following part, 
I will analyze the iconic text “Why People’s Society is Better Than Civil Society” that appeared both 
in People’s Daily and Xinhua. People’s Daily and Xinhua are the undisputed most important official 
news outlets in today’s China. If an article appears on both platforms, it signals the importance of this 
article. Because of the authoritative feature of the platforms, and also because  “Why People’s Society 
is Better Than Civil Society” was published in 2013, it is fair to say that this article represents the Chi-
nese authoritative understanding of civil society in the recent years. 
In “Why People’s Society is Better Than Civil Society”, the author argues that “people’s society” is 
a superior Chinese substitute to the Western “civil society”. One way the author tries to support his 
standpoint is by linking the Chinese cultural symbols with people’s society. The first and most obvious 
symbol or frame is the concept of harmony. The following excerpt is just one example:
The fundamental characteristic of the people’s society is the harmonious society […] Unlike civil society 
theory, the government and the masses in the people’s society are integrated, not antagonistic. Social organi-
zations and the government are not in conflict with each other, but in a harmonious and unified relationship.
Harmony is rooted in the traditional Daoist philosophy: living harmoniously with the Dao to 
achieve a balance between Yin and Yang (Chan 2008). The ultimate Harmony transcends dichotomy. 
People and the government are therefore two in one; NGOs and the government are not in conflict. 
The harmonious status is achieved through a cooperative attitude and a focus on inclusivity and tol-
erance in the society. These statements explain why civil society, which involves autonomous NGOs 
opposed to the government, is not so welcomed in the Chinese context.
Another frame the author draws on is the Chinese Dream. Chinese President Xi Jinping has been 
promoting the Chinese Dream since 2012. The author elaborates the importance of the Chinese 
Dream as such: 
“Chinese Dream” is different from the “American Dream” or “European Dream”. Their social bases are also 
essentially different. Therefore, Chinese people’s society is different from the Western civil society. The peo-
ple’s society built and shared by 1.3 billion people is the base to achieve the great (national) rejuvenation. It is 
the biggest driving force to unite the people of all ethnic forces and to achieve “Chinese Dream”.
In contrast to the American Dream, the Chinese Dream is not only about personal achievement, 
but also, and even more, about national rejuvenation. In this way, the article linked nationalism and 
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patriotism with people’s society instead of civil society. Chinese remember their history of the mid-
19th century to the mid-20th century as “one hundred years of humiliation” (Wang 2014). This part 
of the history left a deep trauma on the Chinese population. The Chinese collective memory of last 
century is a good base for nationalism to sprout and thrive. Therefore, it is not surprising that nation-
alism and patriotism play big roles in the current Chinese public discourse. Exactly because of this, 
the frames of Chinese Dream and “national rejuvenation” ring a bell among the Chinese public.
As shown before, in “Why People’s Society is Better Than Civil Society”, “civil society” is presented 
as a binary opposition of ‘people’s society’. Civil society is described in a negative tone and understood 
as inferior to people’s society. For example, this article starts with the following line:
People’s society is a major theoretical and practical innovation in China. Compared with Western civil soci-
ety, people’s society is more superior.
The superiority of people’s society to civil society is further explained by two sub-binary codes. 
The first one is Chinese vs. foreign and the second one is public vs. private.
The Chinese vs. foreign binary is the most prominent one in this text. This binary draws a line be-
tween insiders and outsiders. People’s society is built and belonged to the first group and civil society 
the second. This Chinese vs. foreign binary is elaborated in the following excerpt:
The people’s society is different from the civil society of Western countries. It is from the Chinese culture, in 
line with China’s social conditions, with the Chinese characteristics and it is a socialist society constituted 
by all the Chinese people[…]People’s society is the most basic social condition in China. The concept of the 
people’s society is not imported, but a Chinese innovation; the idea of the people’s society is not copying 
foreign civil society, but all Chinese people’s society.
This excerpt shows that people’s society is an original home-grown Chinese concept. In contrast, 
civil society is an imported western concept that does not fit the Chinese reality. The words “import” 
and “copy” give readers a negative impression. It signals that the civil society is neither original nor 
authentic. This Chinese vs. foreign binary is not random. Instead, it is closely linked with Chinese 
history and socio-cultural context. As explained before, the Chinese collective memory of 20th cen-
tury is marked by Western invasion and humiliation. Thus, this concept of being “foreign” invokes the 
Chinese memory of being invaded and colonized by the foreign powers. 
The second binary is public vs. private. While people’s society is about the whole population, civil 
society is only about citizens or those with properties; while people’s society is socialism, civil society 
is capitalism; while people’s society focuses on the public, civil society focuses on the private. Follow-
ing excerpt discussed this position openly:
Compared with the civil society in the West, the people’s society is composed of basic principles such as 
public ownership, public welfare, fairness and justice. The “public” is opposite to “private” and people is 
opposite to “citizens”. “Citizens” highlights private right/selfishness; “people” highlights public interest and 
public welfare.
In the west, the idea of civil society is a synthesis of two traditions. One is the rights-oriented 
liberalism and another one is public-oriented communitarianism (Cohen and Arato 1994). But the 
Chinese counterpart tends to be reduced to only the public-oriented communitarianism, which is 
“people’s society” in the Chinese official discourse. The Chinese non-governmental organizations are 
often being called public-welfare/public interest organizations. This shows how much the public-ori-
ented communitarianism has prevailed in the Chinese context.
So far I have presented Chinese official discourse on civil society. In the next part, I will present 
Chinese state’s actions on NGOs in recent years to trace the scripts of the audience. This analysis is 
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important because without knowing the scripts of the demand side, we cannot evaluate the perfor-
mance of the supply side.
Chinese official action tactics on civil society 
The Chinese official discourse shows what kind of state-society relations the state prefer. But how 
the state acts towards NGOs in reality? Based on their research, scholars have come up with com-
plicated models that explain the state’s action tactics when it comes to dealing with NGOs. They 
claim that on one hand, NGOs’ positive role in social management is gaining recognition from the 
government, but on the other, the NGOs are distrusted as a potentially disruptive force and therefore 
are controlled by the state (Liu 2016:11; Wang; Yu; Kang and Han 2008; Chan 2010). Kang and Han 
(2008) provided a graduated control model to explain the various levels of state control imposed 
on various types of social organizations. This system categorized social organizations into five levels 
according to their capacities to deliver public goods and their potential to pose a threat to the state. 
Kang and Han believe that this graduated control system is different from “both the old model of 
totalitarianism before reform, civil-society-against-the-state in Eastern Europe, and corporatism and 
civil society in the West” (2011:51). Chan (2010), similarly, agrees that instead of talking about NGO-
state relations as a whole, we should realize there are different levels of control upon different orga-
nizations. Chan (2010) proposed another graduated control model, which emphases the influence of 
business nature (service/advocacy), funding sources (government/private/foreign) and scale (small/
large) on the level of government control. Chan also concludes that the less risky the NGOs seem, 
which means service-oriented, government/domestically funded and small scale, the less likely the 
state will take harsh action towards it. 
These action tactics correspond well with the Chinese official discourse on civil society. In sum-
mary, the Chinese state would like to see the NGOs being non-confrontational. If these NGOs can 
both be non-confrontational and relieve some social burdens of the state at the same time, then this 
would be the best case.
Cultural resonance in social performance
According to my framework, the level of cultural resonance depends on two things. Firstly, the 
level of congruence — whether the script embodied in actors’ performance is in alignment with audi-
ences’ script. Secondly, the level of usefulness — whether the scripts can help audiences to solve their 
problem or not. In the ENGOs’ EPIL policy proposal, they managed to meet both this two standard. 
First of all, the non-confrontational tendency showed in ENGOs’ framing strategies and action tactics 
is well in alignment with the understanding of good society-state relations reflected in the official 
discourse of civil society. Second, the problem-solving instead of trouble-making altitude reflected in 
both ENGOs’ framing strategies and action tactics, such as the diagnostic and prognostic framings, 
assured the state that the EPIL the ENGOs are proposing could solve the problems the state are facing, 
instead of adding more troubles. 
ENGOs and the state’s scripts do not come from a vacuum. I argue that culture creates a rational 
and emotional context for both NGOs and the state. Whether the NGOs can incorporate the cultural 
symbols in their action tactics and framing strategies explains whether they can achieve cultural res-
onance from the policymakers. The background representations I have presented earlier have to be 
taken into account to explain this process. If we roughly divide the Chinese society into civil society 
and the party-state, then ENGOs are apparently on the side of civil society and policymakers are on 
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the side of the party-state. These two sides have one thing in common — they are immersed in same 
cultural context, in other words, they share the background representations. These background repre-
sentations, in the current Chinese context, are very complex. It includes the traditional Confucianist 
and Daoist culture, the Communist and Socialist legacy, the Western influence after Reform and 
Opening up, and the recent nationalist upsurge. Different social groups might focus on the different 
stream of thought. From the official discourse on civil society presented earlier, we can see the offi-
cial scripts and the background representations behind it. In the official discourse, people’s society is 
sacred and civil society is profane. This is because people’s society is Chinese, civil society is foreign; 
people’s society is public, civil society is private; people’s society contribute to harmony, civil society 
contribute to conflicts; people’s society helps to realize Chinese dream, civil society ruins this nation-
al rejuvenation. Therefore, when ENGOs present the EPIL system as a contribution to stability and 
order, it links well with the harmony frame in official scripts, which leads to the cultural resonance. 
While harmony frame causes the key resonance here, reverberations also come from other frames. 
“National interest” not only resonates with the harmony frame, it also rings a bell with the Chinese 
Dream frame in the official scripts. On the contrary, because right frames, which follows the indi-
vidual right-based liberalism, emphasize the private side of civil society instead of the public side of 
communism, this right frames had to be deleted in the 2009 and 2014 proposals to avoid a negative 
connotation. Similarly, since international norms, which is on the binary side of “foreign” instead 
of “Chinese”, are not compatible with the official scripts, this frame was also taken out in the 2014 
proposal. Social movements in the Western world especially prefer the human right frame among 
the right frames and democracy frames among international ideals, but the Chinese ENGOs dodged 
“human right” and “democracy” completely in their proposals, because they know that these floating 
signifiers either cannot be used in its original meaning in the Chinese context, or they will be inter-
preted as dangerous ideology which causes troubles.
The element of mis-en-scene, which is another essential factor in the social performance frame-
work, has to be included in the analysis also. Mis-en-scene stands for a specific historical juncture in 
Chinese society. In the past 40 years, China has experienced tremendous economic development, but 
at the same time, also paid a heavy price. Environmental degradation is one of them. According to 
a report by the Ministry of Environment Protection, in 2014, only eight out of 74 big cities of China 
met the national air quality standard (BBC 2016; Ministry of Environmental Protection 2016). This is 
already much better than the previous year, where only three cities met the standard. Not only air, the 
river and soil pollution are also ringing alarms. The environmental degradation is bringing in a con-
sensus crisis in China. This crisis started to challenge people’s belief in the managerial capacity of the 
party-state. The party-state needs to build an open image in responding the general public who are 
united with a common goal and priority of environment protection. Therefore, showing an attitude 
of standing together with the government in front of this crisis to solve the social crisis is especially 
effective for Chinese ENGOs at this moment. 
It is necessary to clarify that even though I use the term “strategy” or “tactic” when referring to 
ENGOs framings and actions, I do not mean that the ENGOs have full agency towards their actions. 
A lot of research has explained NGOs’ limitation from the institutional perspective. Even though I 
acknowledge the restraint of social power, this is not the focus of my study. The limitation here refers 
to the influence of another dimension of the structure, namely culture. Culture has the same influence 
on ENGOs as on the policymakers. When ENGOs choose what actions to take, they neither invent 
their scripts nor do they create their background representations, at least not in the short run. Instead, 
they choose from the scripts available to them and the background representations they live in. Even 
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though the civil society might have a different emphasis from the party-state, none of them can escape 
the four major sociocultural streams I mentioned before: traditional Chinese culture, the Communist 
and Socialist legacy, the Western influence, and the recent nationalist upsurge. Therefore, the ENGOs 
are not so much pleasing the policymakers in a clever way than they are persuading the policymakers 
in a right way.
Conclusion
In this research, I have used the cultural pragmatic theory of social performance to advance our 
knowledge of the communicative power of civil society in China. I showed that ENGOs’ incorpora-
tion of the cultural symbols that Chinese government can resonate with, such as harmony, into their 
action tactics and framing strategies is the key to their success. Their pro-dialogue attitude and their 
stability-concern proposals correspond well with the scripting of the Chinese government. Through 
performing this cultural symbols in their actions and frames, these civil society agents successfully 
triggered cultural resonance from the policymakers, which resulted in a successful policy advocacy. 
This research has two major contributions. Empirically, it is fundamentally different from con-
ventional research on Chinese civil society. While former studies on Chinese civil society tended to 
explain the success or failure of NGOs’ activities through an institutional perspective, this research 
includes the crucial elements of culture and meaning into the analysis. Although social power and 
institutional factors are important, I believe that they only facilitate the ground game, but do not de-
termine it. The cultural meaning system is a crucial factor that often misses being discussed. Theoreti-
cally, on the one hand, it completed the cultural resonance mechanism in the social movement theory. 
I have demonstrated that the credibility and salience of frames are not enough to explain the whole 
resonance process. To explain the cultural resonance, we have to turn back to culture. Adding the 
element of background representations and scripts into this framework, we see a fuller picture of the 
overall mechanism of cultural resonance. On the other hand, my research also enriched the cultural 
pragmatic theory of social performance. Social performance theory was criticised for not focusing 
on the hermeneutic side of the background representations enough (Binder 2017). My case study 
confirmed that a general structural analysis, which features only binaries, is not enough to account 
for the complexity of the cultural norms and value systems in different societies. By presenting how 
the framework can be applied in a social context different from the Anglo-Saxon context (where this 
framework was often applied), I have illustrated how a deeper analysis which goes back to the history 
to dig for the cultural streams can be fruitful. 
Being a single case study, this research has its limitations. Even though it explains well how the 
framework works in an effective policy advocacy case, it is not tested when the advocacy is less effec-
tive. Further study on the ineffective advocacy needs to be done to test the validity of this framework 
on social performance and cultural resonance. 
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Civil Society in South Korea 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO DEMOCRACY AND FUTURE CHALLENGES1
Abstract: In this paper, I trace and examine the history of civil society activism in the post-transitional period in South Korea. 
I first contextualize the South Korean case in the relevant theoretical discussions and debates on the relationship between civil 
society and democracy/democratization. Next I provide a detailed description of how civil society has continued to remain high-
ly relevant in the post-transitional politics of democratic consolidation, surveying successive governments in South Korea since 
1987. I conclude the paper with preliminary thoughts on the necessary and desirable change South Korean civil society needs to 
make in order to continue to contribute to the furtherance and deepening of South Korean democracy.
Keywords: South Korea, civil society, democracy, democratization
Pilietinė visuomenė Pietų Korėjoje: indėlis į demokratiją ir ateities iššūkiai
Santrauka: Šiame darbe analizuojama pilietinės visuomenės aktyvizmo istorija po Pietų Korėjos pereinamo laikotarpio. Pirmi-
ausia pristatomas Pietų Korėjos atvejis bendrame teorinių diskusijų apie pilietinės visuomenės ir demokratijos arba demokra-
tizacijos santykį kontekste. Toliau detaliai aprašoma, kaip pilietinė visuomenė sugebėjo išlikti svarbi pereinamojo laikotarpio 
demokratijos konsolidavimo politikoje. Tai atliekama tiriant Pietų Korėjos vyriausybes nuo 1987 metų. Darbas baigiamas min-
timis apie būtinus ir pageidaujamus pokyčius, kuriuos Pietų Korėjos pilietinė visuomenė turi įgyvendinti siekdama tęsti savo 
indėlį į Pietų Korėjos demokratijos skatinimą ir gilinimą. 
Reikšminiai žodžiai: Pietų Korėja, pilietinė visuomenė, demokratija, demokratizacija. 
Democratic transition and civil society in South Korea
South Korea holds a special place in the literature on democratic transition, known as “transitol-
ogy.” When Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter inspired and spearheaded a wave of the-
oretical and empirical works on democratic transition in the 1980s (and later on democratic consol-
idation too), the then dominant theoretical paradigm put exclusive focus on elite—its composition, 
calculations, strategies, behaviors, interactions, negotiations, and so forth (O’Donnell and Schmitter 
1986; Higley and Gunther 1992). The “founding fathers” of “transitology” (and later “consolidology”) 
paid utmost attention to the highly strategic interactive dynamics between duros (hard-liners) and 
blandos (soft-liners) in the ruling bloc, which often precipitated incremental undermining and fateful 
dismantlement of the incumbent authoritarian regime (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). They were so 
confident of the centrality of the political elite to assert that “there [was] no transition whose begin-
ning [was] not the consequence—direct or indirect—of important divisions within the authoritarian 
1  Presented at the International Conference on “Civil Society in East Asian Countries: Contributions to Democracy, Peace 
and Sustainable Development,” Kaunas, Lithuania, October 26-27, 2017.
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regime itself, principally along the fluctuating cleavage between hard-liners and soft-liners” (O’Don-
nell and Schmitter 1986, p.19).
South Korea, as most analysts now concur without much hesitation, stands as an outstanding 
exception to the mainstream elite-centered paradigm of the 1980s. A few scholars, immediately fol-
lowing the 1987 transition, mechanically—and thus erroneously in retrospect—applied the elite par-
adigm to South Korea and claimed that there was in fact an elite split in South Korea too—between 
President Chun Doo Hwan and ruling party chairman Roh Tae Woo—and that this was the main 
cause of the 1987 democratization. To their embarrassment, later works confirmed and reconfirmed 
that the two authoritarian leaders were in neither disagreement nor conflict with each other. Rather, 
they meticulously designed and collectively orchestrated a scheme starting with the unexpected ac-
ceptance of all the demands of the opposition and ending with Roh Tae Woo’s triumph in the presi-
dential elections in December 1987.
Instead of elite splits that had brought about democratic transitions earlier in Southern Europe 
and Latin America, what prompted the authoritarian breakdown and democratic transition in South 
Korea was civil society’s protracted and strenuous struggle for democracy—its mass mobilization and 
persistent anti-government protest throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. The growth and expan-
sion of civil society’s scope and capacity from a largely intellectual/student movement in the early 
1960s to a student-labor-church (“triple solidarity”) plus the main opposition party alliance in the 
1970s and to a student-labor-church-opposition party plus middle class “grand coalition” in the 1980s 
was what forcefully pressured the ruling authoritarian bloc to accept and accommodate the opposi-
tion’s demands for democratic reform (Kim 2000).
In short, South Korea constitutes a crucial counterexample and challenge to the existing elite-cen-
tered paradigm of the 1980s. South Korea in essence showcased a new paradigm of mass-ascendant 
transition. After South Korea, a series of Asian, African, and eventually Central and East European 
countries again and again featured bottom-up civil society-led transitions, although the pace, scope, 
nature, and specific characteristics of these transitions certainly varied from case to case.
Naturally, in any account of South Korea’s transition to democracy, civil society, social movement, 
and mass mobilization figure prominently. Yet, there is a poignantly anticlimactic element in South 
Korea’s otherwise dramatic and triumphal story of mass-ascendant, civil society-led transition to de-
mocracy, which in turn explains why South Korean civil society continued to be very active after 
the transition, well into the consolidational phase. South Korea’s transition to democracy was by no 
means a revolution, a rupture, or a cataclysmic breakdown of the ancien régime. Continuity rather 
than discontinuity, stability rather than rupture, conservatism rather than radicalism characterized 
the relationship between the pre-transitional and the post-transitional political orders. Who was 
elected in the first (“founding”) democratic presidential elections held in December 1987 was none 
other than the authoritarian ruling party candidate, Roh Tae Woo, who was destined to be the next 
president of South Korea according to the existing authoritarian rule of the game, without any help of 
the democratic constitution and elections.
Such unbelievable (even surreal) equifinality—i.e., whether democratization took place or not, the 
election result would remain the same, with Roh fated to be the next president of South Korea—was 
chiefly due to the opposition split between Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung. At the same time, it 
was also due to the “premature delegation” by civil society of all the work associated with the “poli-
tics of transition” to political society in the second half of 1987, extremely important months during 
which the basic structure and matrix of the post-transitional South Korean politics were to be mold-
ed. Civil society was virtually excluded from the important discussion on making a new democratic 
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constitution, a new electoral system, and a new political party configuration. Its voice and pressure 
did not work effectively when it tried to make the two opposition candidates agree on and field a uni-
fied candidate in the upcoming presidential elections. In this regard, civil society’s reaction to Roh’s 
election and inauguration was quite predictable. Civil society groups in South Korea had no choice 
but to continue their “democracy” movement under Roh’s “dictablanda.” They concluded that their 
historic mission was not accomplished, and their struggle for democracy had been largely nullified 
by the election of one of the main architects and beneficiaries of the old authoritarian order. This had 
civil society in South Korea continue to be highly relevant in the post-transitional politics of demo-
cratic consolidation.
Against this backdrop, this paper traces and examines the history of civil society activism in the 
post-transitional period in South Korea. It probes the “rise,” “fall,” and “re-rise” of civil society—the 
“rise” in the first twenty years after the 1987 transition, the “fall” during the conservative governments 
of nine years, and the very recent “re-rise.” I first contextualize the South Korean case in the relevant 
theoretical discussions and debates on the relationship between civil society and democracy/democ-
ratization. Next I provide a detailed description of how civil society has continued to be highly rele-
vant in the post-transitional politics of democratic consolidation, surveying successive governments 
in South Korea since 1987. I then provide a few hypothetical reflections that may help explain the rise 
and fall of civil society. I conclude the paper with preliminary thoughts on the necessary and desirable 
change South Korean civil society needs to make to continue to contribute to the furtherance and 
deepening of South Korean democracy.
Theoretical reflections
In the literature, civil society is generally considered to positively correlate with democracy. Alexis 
de Tocqueville, a French aristocrat, visited America in 1831 and authored Democracy in America. In 
the book, he argued that the real secret of a vibrant democracy in America was its unusually active 
and rich associational life. Profusion of voluntary public associations, according to Tocqueville, un-
derpinned America’s democracy, by protecting individual liberty, preventing tyranny of the majority, 
decentralizing power and authority, and fostering active engagement of citizens in politics and gov-
ernance. The viability and durability of a democracy would therefore largely depend on the robust-
ness of its associational life. This observation was later developed into the Tocquevillean thesis: civil 
society, composed of diverse voluntary associations cooperating for collective and public purposes, 
meeting unmet social needs, preventing the tyranny of the majority, and limiting state power, makes 
significant contributions to democracy.
Elaborating on Tocqueville’s original thesis on the positive correlation between civil society and 
democracy, neo-Tocquevillean scholars subsequently demonstrated that a vibrant civil society is not 
only a facilitator of democracy but even a prerequisite for effective democracy. Civil society is what 
democratizes, supports, and complements the state. Associational life is postulated to provide the 
social infrastructure for liberal democracy; supply the means to limit, resist, and curb the excesses 
of the state and market; present alternatives when the state or market fails; facilitate service delivery 
at the local level; assist in conflict management; and deepen democracy (Edwards 2004; Shils 1991; 
Alagappa 2004).
Civil society plays various positive roles not only in supporting and maintaining existing democ-
racies but also in promoting the dynamic process leading to democracy, namely democratization. 
As soon as the first steps toward political liberalization had been made, civil society is “resurrected,” 
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and the subsequent “popular upsurge” precipitates the demise of authoritarian rule, “pushing the 
transition further than it would otherwise have gone” (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, pp.48-56). 
The independent and “reconstituted” civil society serves as a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for 
transition (Bernhard 1993, p.326).
It is further envisioned that civil society will play equally significant roles in consolidating and 
institutionalizing the fledgling democracies that have just completed transition. For example, civil so-
ciety will inculcate conceptions of interest and civic norms of behavior; disseminate information and 
empower citizens in the collective pursuit and defense of their interests and values; stabilize expecta-
tions within social groups; structure and provide multiple channels for the identification, articulation, 
expression, and representation of interests; serve to govern the behavior of its members with regard 
to collective commitments; reduce the burden of governance for both public authorities and private 
producers; supplement the role of political parties; recruit and train new political leaders; give the 
citizens respect for the state and positive engagement with it; and contain the power of democratic 
governments by providing important reservoirs of potential resistance to arbitrary or tyrannical ac-
tion by rulers (Schmitter 1997).
With such abundant and solid confirmations of positive linkage between democracy and civil 
society, Tocquevilleans and neo-Tocquevilleans have recently made efforts to find the specific mech-
anisms that causally connect civil society and democracy—those mechanisms through which civil 
society actually helps, promotes, and reinforces democracy. The most recent such efforts focus on 
“social capital.” According to its proponents, voluntary associations produce “social capital” that in-
cludes features of social organizations such as networks, norms, and trust that facilitate coordination 
and cooperation among individuals and organizations. Quality of life, quality of representative gov-
ernment, and eventually quality of democracy are generally better in a community with a high stock 
of social capital. In contrast, a decline in voluntary associations leads to a reduction in social capital 
that also eventually erodes the vitality of democracy.
One of the most important works on social capital is Robert D. Putnam’s Making Democracy Work: 
Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (1993). In this book, Putnam observes that Northern and Southern 
Italy differ in terms of four dimensions: 1) civic engagement: citizens’ interest in public affairs and 
willingness to participate in politics; 2) political equality: treating each other as equals—ability to 
relate each other on the basis of reciprocity and cooperation rather than hierarchy and authority; 3) 
solidarity, trust, and tolerance: mutual respect, acceptance of different life-styles; and 4) social struc-
tures of cooperation: willingness to join clubs, organizations, and political associations and to learn 
the habits of trust and tolerance. Northern Italy manifests a greater measure of civic virtue measured 
in civic engagement; political equality; solidarity, trust, and tolerance; and cooperation. The reason 
why the two different regions of Italy had differing levels of democratic institutional effectiveness was 
largely because they had different levels of civil society or civic community (Putnam 1993).
Later, Putnam analyzed the American case in Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American 
Community (2000). In this book, Putnam surveys the decline of social capital in the U.S. since 1950. 
He describes the reduction in all the forms of in-person social interaction upon which Americans 
used to found, educate, and enrich the fabric of their social lives. He believes that this undermines the 
active civic engagement that a strong democracy requires from its citizens. Putnam notes the aggre-
gate loss in membership of many existing civic organizations and points out that the act of individual 
membership has not migrated to other, succeeding organizations. To illustrate why the decline in 
Americans’ membership in social organizations is problematic to democracy, Putnam uses bowling as 
an example. Although the number of people who bowl has increased in the last 20 years, the number 
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of people who bowl in leagues has decreased. If people bowl alone, they do not participate in social 
interaction and civic discussions that might occur in a league environment (Putnam 2000).
Putnam’s analyses of Italy and the U.S. have caused a series of interesting debates on civil society 
and democracy (Edwards 2004). Theda Skocpol, in her book Diminished Democracy: From Mem-
bership to Management in American Civic Life (2003), agrees with Putnam that there has been an 
important change in American civil society over the past decades, and it seriously threatens the sur-
vival and prosperity of American democracy. But she disagrees with Putnam and argues that what 
has transpired is not in fact a “decline” of American civil society but rather its transformation from 
membership organizations to managed organizations. According to Skocpol, “Where once cross-class 
voluntary federations held sway, national public life is now dominated by professionally managed 
advocacy groups without chapters or members. And at the state and local levels ‘voluntary groups’ 
are, more often than not, nonprofit institutions through which paid employees deliver services and 
coordinate occasional volunteer projects” (Skocpol 2003, p.7).
According to Skocpol, therefore, what should be deplored is not that the American civil soci-
ety generally declined but that it changed from a very political nationwide advocacy movement to 
a de-politicized, professionally managed campaign. The professionally managed organizations in 
America today are less democratic and participatory than the pre-1960s membership federations 
they displaced (p.13). What American conservatives, including Putnam, miss is the essentially polit-
ical nature of civil society organizations. To Tocqueville, civic associations were “great free schools to 
which all citizens come to be taught the general theory of association.” From Skocpol’s point of view, 
Putnam’s idealized civil society in the 1950s—local and voluntary associations isolated from national 
government and politics and involving friends and neighbors to solve local problems—is an idyllic 
myth. The net result of such transformation of American civil society is “diminished democracy.” A 
diminished democracy is a stunted democracy that is far worse than the old “civic democracy” where 
membership-based voluntary associations operated in close symbiosis with representative govern-
ment and democratic politics.
Whether what happened in the United States in the past few decades is a general decline of civil 
society or a change in the composition and nature of civil society will be subject to debate for long. 
Participants in the debate have presented different positions on the issue. However, what the two op-
posing sides of the debate share in common is that there is very close linkage between civil society—
its composition, structure, activities—and the quality of democracy. Transformation of civil society 
often brings about a significant change in the quality and status of democracy. The American debate 
between Putnam and Skocpol also demonstrates that civil society’s Tocquevillean, democracy-pro-
moting roles are never static: civil society’s contributions (or lack thereof) to democratic development 
change over time, especially according to the change in the quality and nature of democracy itself. In 
short, different civil societies support different democracies, whereas different democracies necessi-
tate the emergence and development of different civil societies.
Civil society in post-transitional South Korea2
South Korea’s 30-year old democracy has had seven governments so far—Roh Tae Woo (1988-
93), Kim Young Sam (1993-98), Kim Dae Jung (1998-2003), Roh Moo Hyun (2003-08), Lee Myung 
Bak (2008-13), Park Geun Hye (2013-17), and Moon Jae In (2017-present) governments. Over these 
2  This section is drawn in parts from Kim & Jeong (2017), pp. 4-8.
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successive governments, developments in procedural democracy have been substantial: a democratic 
constitution, free and fair elections, multiple political parties, civil liberties, solid civilian control of 
the military (i.e., absence of military coups), non-violent horizontal power transfers between conflict-
ing political forces, increased check and balance between state institutions, and so on.
During the pre-1987 authoritarian period, the political sphere in South Korea was sharply dichot-
omized between the authoritarian state and its state-corporatist apparatuses (i.e., “official,” state-spon-
sored labor organizations, interest groups, youth organizations, women’s associations, etc.) on the 
one hand and underground, mostly outlawed dissident organizations that fought against authoritar-
ianism. The South Korean civil society at the time—underground and illegal, variegated in terms of 
ideological inclinations but united in terms of their pursuit of an authoritarian breakdown—played 
crucial roles in various stages of democratization, compelling the authoritarian government to yield 
to the popular pressure for reform, supplying an alternative reservoir of elite politicians, and mobiliz-
ing people in nationwide campaigns for democracy.
Civil society has undergone a fundamental transformation since 1987. Above all, the previous-
ly state-corporatist groups, such as FKTU (Federation of Korean Trade Unions, Hanguk nochong), 
were released from the control and management of the authoritarian regime and became gradually 
autonomous from the state. On the other hand, many formerly outlawed organizations were officially 
acknowledged by the state and openly participated in the policymaking process. In particular, the 
Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU, Minju nochong), which had been formed to represent 
the interests of democratic unions opposed to state-corporatist FKTU, emerged as a significant force 
to pressure the democratic governments after 1987.
Meanwhile, new social groups, called “citizens’ movement groups (simin undong danche),” emerged 
in distinction from the existing “people’s movement groups (minjung undong danche).” While the 
“people’s movement groups,” consisting of seasoned movement activists who had participated in the 
previous pro-democracy struggles, did not shun violent movement methods and preferred to con-
centrate on political issues, the “citizens’ movement groups,” composed of professionals and middle 
class citizens, used non-violent methods to identify and raise new issues such as economic justice, 
environmental protection, and gender equality.
During the Roh Tae Woo government (1988-93), social groups, particularly the radical “people’s 
movement groups,” had profound skepticism about the nature of the newly installed “democratic” 
government. They regarded the Roh regime as soft authoritarianism (dictablanda) rather than a genu-
ine democracy, especially because Roh himself was a general-turned-president who had been directly 
involved in the military coup of 1979-80. The most important task of movement groups naturally 
was to “democratize” Roh’s pseudo-democratic regime. Especially alarmed by the continued state 
suppression on social movements and the grand conservative party merger in January 1990, peo-
ple’s movement groups focused their efforts on achieving “unfinished democratization.” A number of 
important national umbrella associations of people’s movement groups, such as the National Coun-
cil of University Student Representatives (NCUSR, Jeondaehyeop), the Korea Coalition for National 
Democracy Movement (KCNDM, Jeonminryeon), the Korean Peasant Movement Coalition (KPMC, 
Jeonnong) and the Korean Teachers’ and Educational Workers’ Union (KTEWU, Jeongyojo), emerged 
and actively led anti-government pro-democracy campaigns.
Newly created citizens’ movement groups rapidly increased their influence during the Roh Tae 
Woo government too. The Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ, Gyeongsillyeon) was 
founded on July 7, 1989 by 1,000 or so scholars, lawyers, religious leaders, and others to achieve 
economic justice through citizen power. CCEJ effectively waged a series of civic movements aimed at 
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economic justice, supporting augmented state regulation of real estate speculation, expanding sup-
plies of public housing on long-term loans, increasing property taxes and tax exemptions for the poor, 
and ensuring the independence of the Bank of Korea from the government. Many of these issues and 
campaigns were very well received by the South Korean public, and the Roh government accepted and 
implemented some of CCEJ’s policy proposals.
During the Kim Young Sam government (1993-98), public doubts about the legitimacy of the 
regime considerably subsided. The Kim Young Sam government was the first civilian government 
in South Korea since the early 1960s. Although Kim Young Sam joined the ruling authoritarian bloc 
through the grand conservative party merger in early 1990 and hence lost much of his credibility as a 
pro-democracy fighter, it was no longer easy for the dissident social groups to characterize the ruling 
regime as “authoritarian.” People’s movement groups, with their focus on “pro-democracy struggles,” 
rapidly lost their appeal and underwent a crisis. Their crisis became particularly profound when the 
Kim government aggressively designed and carried out various reforms such as the disclosure of pri-
vate assets of the public officeholders, expulsion of corrupt officials, enactment of a law on officehold-
ers’ ethics, removal of high ranking military personnel identified with the past regimes, reduction in 
the size and role of the Agency for National Security Planning and the Defense Intelligence Com-
mand, and the introduction of a “real name banking account system” to break the intimate relations 
between business and politics.
By contrast, new citizens’ movement groups incrementally enlarged their influence. They began 
exploring new social issues, thereby rendering the “pro-democracy struggles” of the people’s move-
ment groups obsolete, if not anachronistic. CCEJ was particularly prominent during the Kim govern-
ment. CCEJ emerged to be the ideal partner in the government’s overall plan to build a symbiotic and 
collaborative state-civil society relations, which greatly favored the involvement of particular groups 
into the policy process. CCEJ became quite instrumental in Kim Young Sam’s campaign to clean up 
nepotism and influence peddling. 
Meanwhile, as a result of the people’s movement groups’ serious soul searching, People’s Solidarity 
for Participatory Democracy (PSPD, Chamyeo yeondae) was created in 1994. From the very begin-
ning, PSPD intended to marry the “people’s movement” with the “citizens’ movement,” retaining its 
focus on democratic institutional reforms but at the same time identifying and addressing new social 
issues, and eschewing violent and illegal movement tactics. PSPD organized and waged movements, 
for example, to monitor and evaluate the performance of government ministries and national assem-
blypersons, to file lawsuits against corrupt public officials, and to support “whistle blowers” embroiled 
in public scandals.
During the Kim Dae Jung government (1998-2003), competition among citizens’ movement 
groups intensified further: PSPD emerged as the most influential NGO in South Korea, overshadow-
ing CCEJ. This was mainly thanks to PSPD’s effective response to the economic crisis in 1997-98 and 
the subsequent economic restructuring and reform. PSPD waged movements to pressure the Kim 
government to accelerate corporate restructuring, focusing on the governance structure of big busi-
ness conglomerates. This movement, known as the “Minority Shareholders’ Rights Movement (soaek 
juju undong),” was so well received by South Korean citizens, experts, and the mass media that the 
government responded warmly to PSPD’s movement, endorsing and enforcing many of the reform 
policies PSPD proposed and supported.
PSPD successfully led a movement for political reform too, the Nakcheon/Nakseon movement. 
Along with many other citizens’ groups, PSPD organized Citizens’ Solidarity for the General Elec-
tions (CSGE, Chongseon yeondae) on January 13, 2000, about three months before the National As-
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sembly elections. CSGE designed and envisioned two different stages for the movement. The first was 
to create a list of politicians who should not be nominated by political parties to run for the upcoming 
National Assembly elections and then to campaign against their nominations (Nakcheon movement). 
Second, if those “blacklisted” candidates were nominated anyways, the next step was to campaign 
against their actual elections (Nakseon movement). CSGE disclosed on January 24 a list of sixty-six 
politicians who should not be nominated and on April 3 a list eighty-six candidates who should not be 
elected. The selection criteria for both lists included involvement in previous bribery and corruption 
scandals, violation of the election laws, dearth of legislative activities (e.g., too many absences in Na-
tional Assembly sessions), destruction of the constitutional order (e.g., direct involvement in previous 
military coups and/or active cooperation with the Chun Doo Hwan’s authoritarian regime), failure or 
refusal to endorse anti-corruption laws, instigation of regionalism, tax evasion, inappropriate remarks 
and behaviors during the National Assembly sessions, and so forth. In the national assembly elections 
held on April 13, 2000, fifty-nine out of eighty-six candidates on CSGE’s list failed to be elected.
The third significant contribution PSPD made during the Kim Dae Jung government was its role 
as a policy entrepreneur for the legislation of the National Basic Livelihood Security (NBLS) Act in 
1999. Since its establishment in 1994, PSPD had raised public awareness of the need for a complete 
revision of the social assistance program. After the onset of the economic crisis, PSPD, in 1998, as-
sisted by numerous other social organizations and professionals, tried to increase public interest and 
to sensitize the National Assembly members to the necessity of enacting the NBLS Act. Initially, the 
general indifference to the introduction of the bill by politicians and bureaucrats in the Ministry of 
Health and Welfare undermined the efforts of civil society groups. The economic ministries were par-
ticularly resistant, arguing that the bill would be financially unsustainable. PSPD did not give up but 
rather established a new organization, the Solidarity for the Enactment of NBLS Act, and launched 
a nationwide movement for enacting the bill (Fiori and Kim 2011, p.72). The Kim Dae Jung govern-
ment, in an attempt to achieve a more solid legislative majority in the upcoming General Elections in 
April 2000, was interested in reinforcing support for the low income class and in helping social move-
ments for enacting the NBLS Act. In June 1999, Kim Dae Jung—despite the diffidence shown by the 
Ministry of Finance and Economy and the Ministry of Health and Welfare—made clear his intention 
to introduce the NBLS Act. The bill passed the National Assembly in August 1999 and was enacted 
in October 2000, representing a watershed in the way South Koreans conceptualized and understood 
social assistance.
The influence of the citizens’ movement groups continually increased during the Roh Moo Hyun 
government (2003-08). Most of all, the movement against the Saemangeum Reclamation Project or-
ganized by a coalition of environmental groups ultimately convinced the Local Court to rule that the 
project should be discontinued. Although this decision was later reversed at the Higher Court and the 
Supreme Court, this movement vividly demonstrated to South Korean citizens and the government 
the essentialness of obtaining citizens’ consent to pursue large-scale construction projects.
Civic groups also played an important role in waging campaigns against the Korea-US Free Trade 
Agreement (KORUS FTA). Pointing to a gamut of negative effects of the KORUS FTA on the South 
Korean economy, civic groups collaborated with labor unions, peasant organizations, the Korea Dem-
ocratic Labor Party, and other social movement groups to organize and wage nationwide demonstra-
tions against the KORUS FTA.
On the other hand, “conservative” social groups emerged prominent during the Roh government. 
For example, social groups such as the Free Citizens’ Alliance of Korea (FCAK, Jayu simin yeondae) 
and the Korea Forum for Progress (KFP, Hanguk seonjinhwa forum) have come into play to influence 
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the policymaking process. For most of the post-transitional period since 1987, the civil society arena 
in South Korea has long been dominated by “progressive” social groups that share ideological com-
monalities in believing in democratic reforms, economic equality, and engagement with North Korea. 
By contrast, new “conservative” social groups or “New Right” organizations have different ideological 
traits, decrying too much democracy (“populism”), lamenting the loss of global competitiveness due 
to the overemphasis on welfare and redistribution, and supporting a more hard-line policy toward 
the North.
The election of Lee Myung Bak in the 2007 presidential election was greatly aided by the rise and 
crystallization of conservative social groups during the preceding Roh government. Since its inau-
guration in February 2008, the Lee government (2008-13) has designed and carried out policies to 
weaken progressive social groups and to strengthen conservative ones. For example, it dispensed with 
most of the deliberative committees and advisory commissions introduced during the previous “par-
ticipatory” government, because those forums had mostly been dominated by progressive groups. 
Instead, the government created alternative forums, now heavily influenced by conservative “New 
Right” groups that played pivotal roles in Lee’s election in 2007. The staff position that dealt with civil 
society affairs in the presidential office (i.e., “Senior Presidential Secretary on Civil Society Affairs”) 
was downgraded to a junior secretary position under the Senior Presidential Secretary on Political 
Affairs.
The most decisive incident in the civil society-state relations during the Lee government is a series 
of popular protests and candlelight demonstrations in May-July 2008. The apparent motive for the 
civic mobilization was citizens’ concern with the safety of the beef imported from the U.S. But the mo-
bilization was not only about food safety or “food sovereignty.” The protests subsequently expanded 
to address other issues such as the secretistic and non-transparent ways in which foreign policies of 
the country were made; the extremely controversial “Korean Grand Canal” construction project; the 
government’s educational reform; and privatization of public corporations.
In early January of 2009, a group of Yongsan tenants who had been opposed to the redevelop-
ment project and compensation policies of the Lee government occupied a building and waged sit-in 
protests there, demanding just compensation. A SWAT team stormed the building to remove the 
protesting tenants. Police began the eviction operation at 6:42am by using a crane to lift a container to 
the rooftop of the occupied building, with fifty SWAT officers inside. Fire broke out in the middle of 
the violent confrontation between the protesting tenants and the police. Six people died—five tenants 
and one policeman. Distrusting the prosecutorial investigation’s conclusion that the fire was caused 
by Molotov cocktails the protesting tenants prepared to use and the police operation was a perfectly 
legitimate implementation of the relevant laws, civil society groups demanded full investigation, ap-
propriate government response, and promise that similar tragedies will never recur. In early August 
of the same year, hundreds of sit-in labor strikers at Ssangyong Motor Company’s Plant in Pyeongtaek 
were violently raided by the police also. The sit-in strikes were a response to the lay-off of thousands 
of laborers at the plant. There was civil society mobilization criticizing the violent suppression and 
supporting the strikers.
Overall, however, civil society mobilization during the Lee government was inconspicuous. The 
Lee government was a very tough opponent to civil society. The government looked repentant and 
seemed to change its course of policy—this never happened in fact. The government continued to 
apply the “law and order” unilateralism, turn deaf ears to the persistent popular demand for partic-
ipation and communication, and engage itself in questionable activities such as the monitoring and 
surveillance of civilians. The erosion or democracy during the Lee years was so gradual, intangible, 
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subtle, and imperceptible that it was simply very difficult to mobilize the mass against the govern-
ment’s violations of democratic principles.
Park Geun Hye was elected in the 2012 presidential elections, and her new government was in-
augurated in February 2013. In terms of its policies vis-à-vis civil society, the new government does 
not seem very different from the previous Lee government. The government implemented a hard-line 
policy toward illegal anti-government demonstrations, keeping wary eyes on the “progressive” civil 
society groups and their possible alliance with opposition parties, and maintaining close relationship 
with “conservative” social groups. The Park government continued to apply a “law and order” stance 
on candlelight protestors, labor strikers, and anti-government activists. The civil society-party alli-
ance of the progressive nature became far more problematic, after the prosecution of the leader of 
the United Progressive Party on the charge of plotting an armed rebellion against the South Korean 
government. Meanwhile, both the Chief Presidential Secretary and the Intelligence Chief met with 
and consulted the leaders of major conservative groups (The Chosun Daily, 17 October 2013).
There were several upsurges of mass mobilization and protest against the Park government (2013-
17). Immediately after Park’s inauguration, a series of mass demonstrations, signature collection cam-
paigns, declarations of anti-government statements ensued to protest against the intelligence agency’s 
intervention into the 2012 presidential election. Throughout the first year of Park’s government, i.e., 
2013, South Koreans from all walks of life—civil society activists, university and high school students, 
religious organizations, labor unions, professors and teachers—participated in the nationwide move-
ment to reprimand the anachronistic, illegal election-meddling of the intelligence agency.
Another important incident that provided a strong rallying point for civil society’s politics of 
protest was the tragic sinking of Sewol ferry on April 16, 2014. More than 300 people, mostly young 
high school students from Ansan, were killed in the accident. South Koreans were outraged by the 
ineptitude of the president and top government officials as well as the irresponsibility and evasiveness 
of relevant ministries and agencies. They were particularly frustrated by the slow pace and incomplete 
nature of the police and prosecutorial investigation into the accident, the increasing indifference and 
inability of the president in handling the incident, and the systematic attempts of the ruling party 
lawmakers to discredit and delegitimize the popular protest as politically motivated and partisan, 
instigated by the opposition politicians and anti-government elements.
The most prominent re-ascendance of civil society’s mass mobilization in South Korea took place 
in late 2016, with the revelation that Park Geun Hye was influenced by a friend who had no public 
position. The fact that she was masterminded by an unelected civilian to wring money from chaebol 
tycoons, order appointment and dismissal of certain public officials, interfere with the policymaking 
process, and so on, greatly outraged South Koreans who thought that the South Korean democracy 
had been solidly institutionalized. The various irregularities that marred the Park government clearly 
demonstrated that the South Korean democracy had been in fact slipping back to authoritarianism, 
with the president privatizing the state apparatus to engage in organized corruption and illegal influ-
ence-peddling and state agencies blacklisting and monitoring citizens. After several months of huge 
weekend mass mobilization in downtown Seoul and an unprecedented constitutional crisis, Park was 
finally impeached in March 2017. Civil society, again, came to the foreground of South Korea’s de-
mocratization drama and played crucial role in recovering democracy and demanding institutional 
and policy reform.
The new government of Moon Jae In (2017-present) encapsulates the comeback of a government 
that is, after a nine-year-long hiatus of the two preceding conservative governments, friendly to civil 
society. The Moon government openly confesses that it is undeniably a direct outcome of the “Citi-
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zens’ Candlelight Revolution of 2016-17” that ousted the Park government. It introduced the senior 
officer position in the Presidential Office (“Blue House”), called “Social Innovation Senior Officer,” 
that deals with civil society, social innovation, and institutional reform. This is an expanded and more 
sophisticated version of “Civil Society Senior Officer,” during the Roh Moo Hyun government. Moon 
himself was the Civil Society Senior Officer between 2004 and 2005. Keenly aware of the power and 
centrality of civil society in South Korean politics, the Moon government is expected to be much 
more participatory and accessible to civil society, involving citizens and civil society organizations 
into the policy making process. The main challenge is how to institutionalize civic participation so as 
to make it more sustainable and thus irreversible.
Explaining the change
The South Korean case confirms that civil society does not simply vanish after the transition. 
South Korean civil society played an important role in the democratic transition, and its activism did 
not stop after the transition. It continued to play important roles even in the phases of democratic 
consolidation and deepening, by waging a campaign to remove authoritarian legacies, calling for 
more democratic reforms, exploring post-democratic and post-modern new social movement issues, 
to name but a few. Overall, South Korean civil society emerged an arena of effective political advoca-
cy and significantly contributed to democratic institutional and policy reforms during the first two 
decades after the 1987 transition to democracy.
After the Roh Moo Hyun government, however, the South Korean civil society experienced a 
downturn. Civil society groups were not as influential as they had been; their campaigns were not 
as popular as they had used to be; and their policy influence was not as powerful as it had used to 
be. According to serial data compiled by East Asia Institute, a South Korean private think-tank, civ-
il society groups—both “progressive” and “conservative”—went down in terms of their rankings in 
both “influence” and “public trust.” In terms of “influence,” PSPD went down from 12 to 19 to 21 in 
2005, 2009, 2013 respectively. CCEJ went down from 13 to 18 to 19. “New Right” went down from 
19 to 20 to 22. In terms of “public trust,” PSPD went down from 8 to 15 to 17; CCEJ recorded 11, 18, 
and 18; “New Right” from 12 to 21 to 22. As compared with ten years ago, the influence, popularity, 
and public trust civil society groups enjoy in South Korean society have substantially dwindled (East 
Asian Institute 2013).
It is true that civil society’s mobilization and protest played crucial role in the latest impeachment 
and ouster of Park Geun Hye. However, this return of a formidable civil society is only exceptional. 
The mass mobilization of 2016-17 was not organized by civil society organizations. It was joined by 
millions of unorganized and uncoordinated individual citizens who were enraged by irregularities 
and abuses of the Park regime. Neither civil society groups nor political parties were in control or in 
charge of organizing and leading the recent popular mobilization for democracy: the movement was 
spontaneous and acephalous.
A few tentative and hypothetical explanations are possible for the current change in South Korean 
civil society. First of all, the South Korean people themselves are changing. South Koreans today are 
becoming more and more difficult to mobilize. As compared with ten years ago, they are far less in-
terested in and sympathetic to the vague cause of “democracy,” unless the erosion of democracy was 
so blatant to warrant a constitutional crisis and presidential impeachment. Also, they have become 
far more individualistic. As a result, protests and demonstrations have become more amorphous and 
acephalous, without clear organizations that spearhead or coordinate diverse elements of the move-
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ment. Furthermore, the media, with progressive outlets weakened and conservative ones proliferating 
since the Lee Myung Bak government, simply do not report much on protests and demonstrations. 
What is not reported, to the general public, is what does not exist. 
Lastly and most importantly, the current change in civil society in South Korea is also a result 
of over-politicization of civil society. Over-politicization has two different dimensions. On the one 
hand, a lot of civil society activists have joined political society over the years—movement activists 
became career politicians and left the civil society arena. This physical migration of leaders from civil 
society to political society has demoralized and undermined the civil society arena as a whole, rather 
than reforming or changing political society. The other dimension of the over-politicization is the 
polarization of civil society between “progressive” groups and “conservative” groups. Unlike during 
the immediate aftermath of the democratic transition, now if “progressive” groups in civil society mo-
bilize themselves, “conservative” groups counter-mobilize themselves against “progressive” groups’ 
mobilization, as we witnessed during Park’s impeachment. 
This mobilization vs. counter-mobilization pattern constantly dilutes the previously clear-cut bat-
tle-line between civil society and the state and raises public doubts that civil society groups are not 
neutral, not impartial, not non-partisan, and thus not publicly-minded. The repeated conflict be-
tween ideologically different and clashing civil society groups has made the civil society arena, to the 
public eyes, no different from the political society where partisan and factional—incompetent and 
corrupt to boot—politicians bicker for petty and egocentric interests. In this sense, the current change 
South Korean civil society is experiencing has the danger of making the traditional public apathy and 
distrust about political society flow over to civil society as well.
Different democracies, different civil societies
Unlike many new democracies where civil society played little significant role, played a role only 
in the transitional phase, or stopped playing any role in the consolidational stage, South Korea is 
unique in that civil society substantially contributed to both the transition and the consolidation of 
democracy. Yet, upon a closer look, we notice that there has been important change in civil society 
and its engagement with the state over different governments in the past thirty years. For the first 
three governments after the 1987 democratization, there was a discernable pattern of increased and 
deepened cooperation between civil society and the incumbent government. Civil society groups 
were engaged in various movements and campaigns, and the democratic governments were relatively 
accommodative and cooperative toward civil society’s advances. The general social atmosphere was 
supportive of democracy and democratization, and South Koreans remained largely sympathetic to 
and patient about those civil society activists who had often been former democracy fighters. Howev-
er, during the Roh Moo Hyun government, a new pattern of mobilization (by progressive elements in 
civil society) vs. countermobilization (by conservative elements) became evident and continued into 
the Lee Myung Bak and Park Geun Hye governments. Now, the main schism in civil society is not 
between people’s movement and citizens’ movement within the progressive camp, but between the 
progressive camp and the conservative camp.
The origin of this new, ideological bifurcation of civil society could be traced back to the clash 
between pro-Sunshiners and anti-Sunshiners with respect to Kim Dae Jung’s engagement policy to-
ward North Korea. Whatever the origins are, civil society in South Korea today is clearly divided and 
embattled, which has considerably diminished the unity, influence, credibility, and legitimacy of civil 
society vis-à-vis the state, political society, or market. As well, civil society in South Korea is often 
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confronted with prominent challenges, such as a largely unfriendly government that is not interested 
in communicating or collaborating with it (although this may not be the case with the current Moon 
government, it was certainly the case with the Lee and Park governments), a public that is much more 
skeptical about democracy and has little confidence in civil society’s positive role in furthering polit-
ical development, citizens who are far more worried about their jobs and welfare than the health of 
their country’s democracy, governmental and market organizations that are much more resourceful 
and influential than civil society organizations, to name but a few.
South Korea seems to have arrived at a crossroads where the nexus between civil society and 
democracy must be problematized, reviewed, and reassessed to figure out the conditions and strate-
gies that help recover the positive effects of civil society on democracy. To do this, it appears crucial 
to diversify the roles of civil society in democracy. South Korean civil society has most of the time 
focused on the contestatory and advocacy functions. During the pre-transitional period, civil soci-
ety challenged and resisted the authoritarian state. During the post-transitional period, it identified 
reform issues and mobilized the mass for public causes. However important these contestatory and 
advocacy functions, they constitute only part of the many functions civil society can and should play 
to enrich, deepen, and sophisticate democracy. Many of the functions civil society is supposed to play 
in democratic consolidation have not been considered or explored seriously in South Korea, such 
as inculcating in citizens conceptions of “interest”; structure and provide multiple channels for the 
identification, articulation, expression, and representation of interests; serve to govern the behavior 
of its members with regard to collective commitments; and reduce the burden of governance for both 
public authorities and private producers (Schmitter 1997).
In this regard, it is now time to explore other roles of civil society, particularly roles that can 
deliver tangible goods and services to citizens and can generate practical policy alternatives. South 
Korean civil society has always been crowded with those movement groups advocating a number of 
causes ranging from the environment to national reunification. Now we need to see more and more 
groups that work to promote and enhance people’s interests, thereby increasing the quality of citizens’ 
daily life and the quality of democracy. As well, criticizing the government for poor performance is 
no longer enough: civil society groups should become effective non-governmental think-tanks that 
can ably develop and produce competitive policy alternatives. Only via diversifying the functions of 
civil society groups to meet citizens’ increasingly various interests and demands, civil society in South 
Korea will be able to regain public trust, popularity, and influence. 
Massive and intensive popular mobilization is no doubt one impressive measure of civil society’s 
power. Yet, it can never be the only (or best) measure. An equally important—or perhaps more im-
portant—indicator of civil society’s power is the degree of its organizational diversity and functional 
richness and the level of effectiveness of its practical problem-solving capacity. If the positive relation-
ship between civil society and democracy cannot be re-postulated in South Korea, the once-potent 
civil society and its multiple and significant contributions to democratic transition and consolida-
tion will fade away as an ancient episode that happened long time ago and therefore has no present 
relevance. 
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The Role of South Korean Civil Society  
in the North-South Korea Relations
Abstract: Since the end of 1980s, South Korea witnessed rapid growth of civil society: social movements, networks, and NGOs. 
To promote global agendas such as human rights or humanitarian aids, transnational and domestic civil society groups try to 
expand cooperation with governments and other civil society groups. This paper reviews the role of civil society groups and 
NGOs in inter-Korean relations, focusing on their influence on government policies on inter-Korean relations. South Korean civil 
society groups and NGOs started their activities toward North Korea from the mid-1990s, after North Korea made an official 
request for humanitarian aid in 1995. The role of civil society has been expanded as a pillar of state policy toward the North, to 
change North Korean society in a long-term perspective. Civil society activities contributed to increase inter-Korean exchange 
and cooperation, which was critical for peace and security in the Korean Peninsula. 
South Korean civil society, however, could not expect any partnership with North Korean social groups due to the lack of civil 
society in North Korea. NGOs had to deal with North Korean government to continue their work. Moreover, there has been split 
between the civil society groups on the policy toward North Korea. Divided between the progressives and conservatives, NGOs 
were also involved in social split and separately pursued their goals. These conditions made the role of civil society compli-
cated and limited in policy decisions toward the North. Still, the growing capability of civil society is positive for the future of 
North-South relations. Despite the lack of civil society counterpart in North Korea, NGOs and groups can expand their influence 
over both governments, continue the discussion for more effective policies toward North Korea, and would eventually help the 
emergence of North Korean civil society.
Keywords: North Korea, South Korea, Inter-Korean relations, Korean Civil Society, Humanitarian NGOs, Human Rights NGOs, 
South-South conflict.
Pietų Korėjos pilietinės visuomenės vaidmuo Šiaurės ir Pietų Korėjos santykiuose
Santrauka: Nuo XX a. 9-ojo dešimtmečio pabaigos Pietų Korėja išgyveno greitą pilietinės visuomenės augimą – ėmė plėstis 
socialiniai judėjimai, sąjungos, nevyriausybinės organizacijos (NVO). Siekdamos atkreipti dėmesį į globalias problemas, tokias 
kaip žmogaus teisės, humanitarinė krizė ir kt., tarptautinio ir valstybinio lygio pilietinės visuomenės grupės siekia išplėsti ben-
dradarbiavimą su vyriausybėmis ir kitomis pilietinės visuomenės grupėmis. Šiame darbe apžvelgiamas pilietinės visuomenės 
grupių ir NVO vaidmuo abiejų Korėjų santykiuose, ypač darant poveikį vyriausybių politikai.
Pietų Korėjos pilietinės visuomenės grupės ir NVO savo veiklą Šiaurės Korėjos atžvilgiu pradėjo XX a. 10-ojo dešimtečio viduryje, 
po to, kai 1995 m. Šiaurės Korėja oficialiai paprašė humanitarinės pagalbos. Pilietinės visuomenės vaidmuo tapo vienu iš valsty-
binės politikos Šiaurės Korėjos atžvilgiu ramsčių, kuriuo siekiama pakeisti Šiaurės Korėjos visuomenę. Pilietinės visuomenės 
veiksmai prisidėjo prie taiką ir saugumą užtikrinančių mainų didinimo ir bendradarbiavimo  tarp Korėjų stiprinimo. 
Pietų Korėjos pilietinė visuomenė nesitiki partnerystės su Šiaurės Korėjos socialinėmis grupėmis, nes šioje šalyje tiesiog nėra 
pilietinės visuomenės, ir privalo bendradarbiauti su Šiaurės Korėjos Vyriausybe. Be to, pilietinės visuomenės grupės yra pasidali-
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jusios Šiaurės Korėjos politikos atžvilgiu, paveiktos bendro visuomenės pasidalijimo į progresyviųjų ir konservatorių stovyklas. 
Tai apsunkino ir apribojo pilietinės visuomenės vaidmenį, paveikiant  politinius sprendimus Šiaurės Korėjos atžvilgiu. Nepaisant 
pilietinės visuomenės Šiaurės Korėjoje nebuvimo, NVO turi potencialą išplėsti savo įtaką abiem vyriausybėms ir lemti tolesnes 
diskusijas dėl efektyvesnės Šiaurės Korėjos politikos. Tai galiausiai gali prisidėti prie pilietinės visuomenės atsiradimo Šiaurės 
Korėjoje. 
Reikšminiai žodžiai: Pietų Korėja, santykiai tarp Korėjų, Korėjos pilietinė visuomenė, humanitarinės NVO, žmogaus teisės, 
Pietų–Pietų konfliktas. 
Introduction
Since the end of Korean War in the 1950s, South Korea has achieved rapid growth of economy and 
democratization of politics until the 1980s which finally allowed rapid growth of civil society since 
1990s. Civil society groups and organizations in South Korea grew fast in numbers and capacity, with 
people enjoying more access to various social movements, networks, and organizations. To promote 
their own political and social goals, these civil society groups make close relationship with govern-
ment or political parties. When having certain goal to achieve through policy changes, they seeking 
ways to put influence or directly participate in the policy making processes. 
For easier access to policy making with more influence, civil society groups also try to make do-
mestic or transnational networks for more support and cooperation. Actors in transnational networks 
would include NGOs, research institutes, advocacy organizations, local associations, the media, reli-
gious organizations, trade unions, intellectuals, etc. In many cases, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) play a central role to initiate and expand networks to gain supports from powerful actors for 
policy changes (Keck and Sikkink 1999, p.92). In case of South Korea, many members of those NGO 
have inherited former democratization movement organizations as their backgrounds. Former activ-
ists who worked as student leaders and underground activists in the 1970s and 1980s gained skill and 
strategies to establish networks and expand campaigns to criticize authoritarian government policies. 
Having specialty in dealing with government policies, they continued to work on agenda setting, 
public debates, and evaluation of policies. 
Civil society groups in South Korea rapidly expanded their role in various fields, and North-South 
relations has not been an exception. South Korean civil society groups and NGOs started their activ-
ities toward North Korea from the mid-1990s. Some NGOs have achieved influential positions with 
growing capability and networks. Although the history of civil society has been only two decades, 
many NGOs of South Korea established their role of agenda-setting and supporting policymaking 
process. 
This paper reviews the role of civil society, mainly NGOs, in inter-Korean relations focusing on 
their influence on government and society. In Part II, theoretical frame will be explained using the 
concept of transnational networks. NGOs and civil society actors organize networks to pursue their 
goals to change government policies. South Korean NGOs in this frame turned out to be experiencing 
the lack of civil society counterpart in North Korea. They had to make relationship only with govern-
ments, both in South and North Korea, to pursue their goals such as humanitarian aids. Part III will 
briefly review the history of NGO activities in North-South Korean relations since the mid-1990s and 
explain the main focus of NGOs on either humanitarian or human right issues, within the changing 
environment and relations.
More analysis on NGOs activities follows in Part IV. While NGO activities on North Korea-related 
issues were generally evaluated as positive to promote mutual understanding, there have been many 
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problems to limit their influence on policies. Due to the lack of civil society in North Korea, the South 
Korean NGOs found it difficult to establish sustainable civilian relations. In South Korean society, the 
divided campaigns between NGOs overlapped with the split of civil society on North Korea issues, 
which became the so-called “South-South conflicts.” Humanitarian NGOs continued to put priority 
on economic aids to North Korea, largely supported by progressive groups. Human rights NGOs em-
phasized the human rights abuses and refugee issues in North Korea, which were largely supported 
by conservative groups. This split in civil society and NGOs diverted their goals, made them difficult 
to cooperate, and frequently offset each other’s policy influence. The conclusion will wrap up these 
trends and problems, still with some positive prospects on the potential of civil society in the future 
of inter-Korean relations.
Civil Society Groups and Transnational Networks on Policies
Since the late 21st Century, civil society groups and organizations started to make transnational 
networks to promote agenda effectively in the process of globalization. The democratized states have 
recognized how important and necessary to have active civil society actors to achieve certain policy 
goals. Activities of NGOs and civil society groups have been particularly active on the issues such as 
human rights, environment, humanitarian aids, economic development, gender equality, and so on. 
NGOs have clearly realized the usefulness of international connections to gain support, information, 
resources, and sometimes pressure from outside to change domestic policy. The on-line networks 
strengthened the links to make civil society partners in different countries. 
By making transnational networks, NGOs and civil society groups can exchange information and 
respond to domestic challenges with more emphasis on their agenda. Civil society groups under dic-
tatorship or authoritarian system can get outside information and support for their domestic activity. 
The power of civil society vary by state and region, and the civil society under an oppressive regime 
or underdeveloped economy usually face much difficulty to overcome. To put their agenda in the 
government policy-making process, civil society groups choose variety of activities from militarized 
struggles to collaborative partnership with governments (Appadurai 2002, p.2). Even in the countries 
full of political freedom, the activity also varies: lobbying, advocacy groups, research projects, cam-
paigns, and street demonstrations. Whatever kinds of activity they choose, all the civil society groups 
recognize the importance of transnational network and tend to utilize the networks (Batliwala 2002, 
pp.394-395).
While the civil society groups recognize the necessity of transnational networks, it still depends 
on the situation of each state whether these groups would be possible to participate the transnational 
networks or not. Smith and Wiest (2005) analyzed the factors on the possibility of transnational par-
ticipation of NGOs. Political integration of the state to the global society matters more than economic 
integration on the NGO participation to the transnational networks. If a state tended to participate 
actively in intergovernmental organizations and in regional cooperation bodies, it would be easier for 
the civil society to engage in transnational networks and improve their activities (Smith and Wiest 
2005, pp.637-639). In case of non-democratic states, this process would encourage political democra-
tization and economic marketization with the spillover of norms from outside.
The effectiveness of civil society’s activity on government policy makings will be largely deter-
mined by their relationship with the government. The NGOs are most active at the stage of agen-
da-setting. At this stage, NGOs present campaigns and public discussions on issues such as the envi-
ronment, human rights, and humanitarian aids to increase awareness. NGOs are usually established 
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for a single, issue-specific purpose and naturally are highly expertized on the issue. Some NGOs 
might have connections with the top-level of government bureaucracy to put their argument more 
directly in the policy-making process (Moon 2016, pp.273-274). Partnerships and regular meetings 
with government officials or national assembly would be helpful for this purpose. After they success-
fully achieved the policy change, NGOs and civil society groups turn to deliver the policy and assist 
application of the policy in society.
Civil society groups also can change the priority of policies on inter-state relations through their 
participation in the transnational networks. With active participation in transnational networks, 
some NGOs contribute to set agenda in the state-to-state negotiation, and even change the relation-
ship between state entities. Keck and Sikkink (1999) analyzed the mechanisms of transnational ad-
vocacy networks in international politics. Transnational networks were able to support certain issues 
in the international cooperation or regional integration. They could build links between civil society 
and governments for information and communication. NGOs can forge a transnational advocacy 
network to accumulate information on issues, create policy agenda, and put pressure on govern-
ments. Some expertized advocacy networks can advocate even fundamental changes in institutional 
bases of state interactions (Keck and Sikkink 1999, pp.89–92). They frame issues to attract states and 
civil society and encourage policy changes. When dealing with globally recognized issues like human 
rights, it is easier for transnational advocacy networks to expand partnership and put more pressure 
on the targeted government. 
When an NGO pushes forward its agenda through transnational networks, it starts with narrow-
ing down the focus and disseminating information. If the issue was the humanitarian aids for certain 
region with famine, the NGO can make an agenda, for example “the food for children”, to attract au-
diences and share the information. Then the NGO would establish a network with other civil society 
groups or governments to gain more support within and across states. If the networking was to create 
a new norm or principle, it is more important to make their new norm persuasive and supportive as 
possible. When they successfully achieved support from governments and civil society through the 
transnational networks, now they can demand the target government to recognize the new norm to 
change its policy (Price 1998, p.617). The target government might not hear the voice if it comes only 
from its domestic civil society, but it is difficult to ignore when the voice was echoed through transna-
tional network and comes in altogether to put pressure from outside.
Transnational networks link NGOs in developed countries with others in developing countries. 
This frame would work most effectively when there are friendly relationship between states to coop-
erate with each other. More importantly, there should be civil society with certain level of political 
freedom. If a NGO in a developed country intended to make a transnational network to persuade 
the government in a developing country, it is best to work closely with the civil society in that target 
country while dealing with both governments. When the state refuses to hear from its domestic civil 
society, NGOs seek outside support through the transnational network to bring pressure on their 
state. Keck and Sikkink called this the “boomerang” pattern of pressure for a policy change (Keck and 
Sikkink 1999, p.93). The existence and growth of civil society is the premise of transnational network 
to be efficient and successful. 
Relationship between the two Koreas has been tricky, not been an ordinary state-to-state rela-
tionship but a special “temporary” relation since the armistice in 1953. It has been complicated with 
overlapping issues from security crises to humanitarian aids. Due to the lingering Cold War context 
in Northeast Asia, it is still the governments as the main actors to decide any issue. Even commercial 
and cultural exchanges were considered within the strategic approach on security and politics. North 
 YU-REE KIM. The Role of South Korean Civil Society in the North-South Korea Relations 103
Korea, in particular, has been emphasizing the security concern as the top and absolute priority in all 
policies and campaigns. This government-oriented frame was the most prominent in North-South 
Korea relations. 
Civil society has been in conflict with government in process of democratization and still sensitive 
in some aspects, but South Korean government also recognized the role of NGOs and other civil so-
ciety groups in many area the government could not approach easily. Their role on the issues such as 
human rights and humanitarian aids has strengthened rapidly in South Korea, deeply connected with 
transnational networks including UN organizations and other transnational NGOs (Cho and Park 
2000, pp.139-140). It was expected that these NGOs would take a greater role to accelerate exchanges 
and cooperation in parallel with North-South government relations.
Whereas the civil society rapidly grew in South Korea, North Korea has not yet shown any positive 
sign of growing civil society. South Korean NGOs sought to make network with North Korean actors, 
but they could only work with government agencies and local administrative bodies. Due to the lack 
of society-level partners, the NGOs could not fully enjoy the effect of transnational network in the 
Korean Peninsula. Without civil society partners in the North, NGOs had to deal with governments 
to push forward their agenda, with turned out to be not an easy task. NGOs pursued direct contacts 
with government officials, conferences, media campaigns, and sometimes street-level demonstra-
tions. The success of their efforts depended largely on the political relationship between governments 
(Richardson 2008, p.170). Lacking society-level partnership, the civil society could not continue their 
projects on certain issues when the political situation deteriorated. 
With this unbalanced frame of network, South Korean civil society groups often found themselves 
dependent on governments. Government agencies were selective on NGOs to allow access, discuss 
agenda, or support their activities. Government often invite some selected NGOs into policy-making 
process, who are easy to collude with, and exclude the voice of loud and militant groups who are 
difficult to control (Batliwala 2002, p.398). Even in domestic policy-making process of South Korea, 
government agencies and staffs became selective on NGO participations. They recognized the impor-
tance of NGO participation, particularly at the initial stages of agenda-setting. The role of policy eval-
uation, monitoring and feedback after the policy implementation was also positively valued. While 
the government officials happily cooperated with NGOs for meetings, conferences, discussions or 
petitions, they strongly opposed street demonstrations or aggressive campaigns (Yun 2008, pp.595-
596). South Korean NGOs also have weaknesses from shortages of professional know-how, financial 
resources and human resources.
Growth of South Korean Civil Society on the Issue of North-South Relations
Inter-Korean Cooperation and Exchange from the 1990s
Civil society in South Korea started its rapid growth around the year 1987. There were nationwide 
demonstrations demanding direct presidential election, and Chun Doo-hwan government was forced 
to agree and allow much higher level of political freedom. The first generation of civil society groups 
in South Korea around this time defined themselves as “liberal” groups to pursue certain “liberation” 
of people from authoritarian regime, which had been branded as pro-North “leftist” by conservative 
groups. The democratization was the liberalization of politics and society, and it led to sudden in-
crease in the number of NGOs and various kinds of civil society groups through 1990s (Richardson, 
2008: 166-167). This new phase of South Korea soon met the end of the Cold War with the demise 
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of the Soviet Union. The situation in North Korea suddenly became an issue of public discussion in 
South Korean society, which dragged attention of many NGOs and civil society activists. 
Governmental level exchanges between North and South Korea existed before the end of the Cold 
War. The first cultural exchange happened in 1985 when the first separated family visit took place with 
exchange of performance teams. It was the first civilian visits organized by both governments that the 
performance teams from Seoul and Pyongyang visited each other’s city for two days each. North and 
South governments continued to have high-level officials meetings in the early 1990s, and they often 
agreed to exchange art performances to promote the reconciliation and mutual understanding. At 
this stage, many civilian exchange events were held outside the Peninsula – Japan, China, Russia, and 
USA, based on supports of diaspora communities (O 2000, p.115). From the mid-1990s, however, 
they could not expand the relations due to the first nuclear crisis and deteriorated political relations. 
When North and South Korea started their “exchange and cooperation” projects in the early 
1990s, the programs were strictly under the control of governments within the boundary of official 
agreements. North Korea approached this exchanges as a new strategic opportunity toward South 
Korea under the political guidance of the Party (the Workers’ Party of Korea). Lee (2004) analyzed 
socio-cultural exchanges in this stage that North Korea utilized the events to support their political 
position on international negotiations. For example, exchange programs on women were focused on 
the theme of “comfort women,” which North Korea wanted to emphasize with the purpose of strategic 
use in North Korea-Japan normalization negotiations. They were also active to participate in women’s 
peace movements, which turned to be useful in negotiations on nuclear crisis, such as the inspection 
request of international society (Lee 2004, pp.7-8). Civil society participation was minimal. North 
Korea invited only small number of South Korean civil activists who were preferred by North, and 
they could only meet North Korean government officials during short visits for events. There was few 
opportunity for both North and South Korean people to see each other. 
While the government-led exchange and cooperation programs came to a halt with the first nucle-
ar crisis, North Korea was struck with serious draught and famine. North Korean government made 
an official request to the international community for humanitarian aid in 1995. Many humanitarian 
NGOs in South initiated nationwide aid campaigns. These NGOs cooperated with religious groups 
to advocate the need of humanitarian aids and development assistance to North Korea. According to 
Moon (2014), the number of humanitarian NGOs increased rapidly from 91 in 1995 to 112 in 1997. 
Among these humanitarian NGOs, the Uriminjok-seoro-dopgi-undong (Korean Sharing Movement, 
KSM) and Joeun Beot-deul (Good Friends) later took highly influential role as leading humanitarian 
organization toward North Korea (Moon 2014, p.70). The growing number and capacity of South 
Korean civil society provided fertile ground for these new NGOs to actively participate in the North-
South exchange and cooperation, mostly regarding humanitarian aids in mid and late 1990s. 
As the famine in North Korea gradually passed from the late 1990s, the policy agenda toward 
North Korea started to change and diversified. The humanitarian aids, however, continued to be the 
biggest part of NGO activities in the 2000s (Cho and Park 2000, p.147). After the first North-South 
summit in June 2000, the two governments revived large-scale exchange visits between civil society 
groups. Civil society organizations of farmers, women, and students were allowed to visit the North to 
hold joint events under various titles in their fields. These events were often held in collaboration with 
newly launched tourism to Mt. Geumgang or Mt. Baekdu. Joint cultural and sport events were also 
planned, for example to invite North Korean sport players and cheering squad to the international 
events in South Korea. These were civil society joint events planned and worked out by civilian groups 
and associations, but strongly supported and supervised by governments. The government agencies 
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financially backed the events, and were actively covered by news media. Many exchange visits to the 
North were not free of charge. South Korean groups brought “financial compensation” to continue the 
visits and dialogue in regular basis (Lee 2004, pp.10-11). Later this habit of financial compensation 
was criticized by conservative groups as unnecessary payment to support the North Korean regime. 
By the early 2000s, increased number of humanitarian NGOs were conducting their aid cam-
paigns and projects toward North Korea using various resources and methods of each. They realized 
the necessity of an umbrella association to harmonize the aid programs, which resulted in the foun-
dation of Daebuk-jiwon Mingan-danche Hyeopuihoe (the Korea NGO Council for Cooperation with 
North Korea, KNCCN) in 2001. Humanitarian NGOs focused more on continuous relationship with 
the North and quick transfer of assistance to resolve the famine and extreme poverty. Unlike other 
international organizations, they did not put much emphasis on conditions such as monitoring or 
evaluation. They knew that these conditions of humanitarian principles would make the relations dif-
ficult and the process protracted. South Korean humanitarian NGOs tend to understand the position 
of North Korea while trying to keep neutral on political issues. It was necessary for them to respect 
North Korean pride and emphasize positive image of North (Lee 2004, pp.63-65). In South Korea, this 
tendency of humanitarian NGOs were perceived as too friendly with North Korea, while the general 
public gradually became more worried with security and political tensions. 
The North Korean nuclear crisis restarted from 2002, and the security and political relations rap-
idly deteriorated with more missile and nuclear tests in North Korea. After North Korea rejected to 
have government-level dialogue with the South from 2004, civilian groups also experienced grow-
ing difficulties to visit and cooperate with the North. Even cultural exchanges actually stopped since 
2008 with several conflicts and conservative turn of South Korean administration. There were some 
attempts to revive cultural relations with some contact regarding sports competitions, such as or-
ganizing one team to participate Asian Games or Olympics. Sports cooperation has been one effec-
tive initiative to revive friendships, but these attempts were not successful in recent years (Lee 2015, 
pp.25-27). With endless spirals of nuclear threat and political conflicts, NGOs are only possible to 
continue their agenda in domestic society and politics in South Korea and to expand transnational 
networks in international society. Although they cannot pursue any activities with North Korean 
partners directly, the NGOs and other civil society groups on North-South relations are still working 
on campaigns and networks to prepare future situation changes.
Focus of Civil Society Groups in South Korea
South Korean NGO activities were naturally regarded as a pillar of South Korean government 
policy toward North Korea, to help and change North Korean society in a long-term perspective. 
Until the mid-2000s, the majority of this government-supported organizations were humanitarian 
NGOs to provide aids to the North and conduct the exchange and cooperation programs. Kim Dae-
Jung administration (1998-2003) pushed forward the engagement policy toward North Korea, which 
allowed humanitarian NGOs more space to expand their activities. Some NGOs cooperated with 
international humanitarian organizations to conduct campaigns in more active ways, for example to 
provide assistance to the North Korean refugee who came across the North Korea-China border. In 
many cases these actions violated Chinese law which might risk South Korea-China relations (Cho 
and Park 2000, p.138). With strong support from progressive administrations, humanitarian NGOs 
could expand their aids toward North Korea to contribute to a peaceful unification in a long-term 
perspective. 
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Many humanitarian NGOs had close cooperation with, or even founded by, the religious groups. 
Christian, Buddhist, and other religious groups had common goal with humanitarian NGOs to pro-
vide assistance to North Korea. It was firstly to practice the religious love for all people, and to prepare 
for missionary works when there come the unification. Whether related with religious groups or not, 
the official purpose of humanitarian NGOs were largely same: to relieve North Korean people from 
extreme poverty and expand North-South exchange and cooperation. For this purpose, they argue 
that the humanitarian aids should be separated from political dynamics in the Korean Peninsula, to 
keep exchange and cooperation and prepare peaceful unification in the future (Kang 2016, p.1). Cate-
gorized as the “unification NGOs”, these NGOs have established their role to share sufferings of North 
Korean people and promote mutual understandings between two Koreas.
While the humanitarian NGOs were engaged in assistance to North Korea, human rights NGOs 
also became increasingly active from the late 1990s. It was widely known that the human rights prob-
lem in North Korea was serious, and the people started to see the situation in the North and hear 
stories from refugees. Human rights NGOs rapidly enlarged critical voices disclosing human right 
violations in North Korea. These organizations included Amnesty International Korea, Bukhan-ing-
won-simin-yeonhap (Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights, NKHR), and Bukhan-Min-
juhwa Network (Network for North Korean Democracy and Human Rights, NKnet). These NGOs 
were not many in number as humanitarian NGOs and were not much active until the late 1990s. 
During 1996 and 1998 when the famine reached its peak, they also focused on food aids to resolve the 
issue of survival. Later in the 2000s, however, these NGOs, for example NKHR, started to put priority 
on human rights issues such as political prisons with strong alliance with international NGOs (Moon 
2014, p.72). Growing number of North Korean refugees provided astonishing stories and proofs of 
human right abuse, and this trend overlapped with deteriorating security relations with the second 
nuclear crisis.
The focus of NGO activities on North-South Korea relations so far categorized in two. Humani-
tarian NGOs continued to focus on aid and development cooperation to help North Korean people. 
Human rights NGOs concentrated more on basic and political rights of North Korean people and 
tried to put pressure on North Korean government through transnational networks. Though work-
ing in quite different directions, all these NGOs were depending on the increasing information and 
knowledge on North Korea. North Korean people has not been seen throughout the Cold War era, 
but now South Koreans came to see and hear about North Korea thanks to wider access and contacts. 
Civil society could learn about North Korea after they started food aid programs, and found various 
aspects of the regime and society. NGOs and civil society groups chose to focus on certain aspects 
to set up their agenda on North Korea, either on economic difficulties or human right abuses, and 
pushed campaigns forward in both domestic and international society to get support for certain pol-
icies toward North Korea. 
In South Korea since the mid-2000s, the divided structure between NGOs became clear with 
growing capacity of both groups. Humanitarian NGOs tried to expand people-to-people engagement 
with North Korea, and human rights NGOs to put pressure on North Korean government to stop 
human rights violations. By working separately to pursue the different goals, the NGO influence on 
policies frequently changed its direction, in many cases offset their effects and limited only with short-
lived outcomes. Many NGO activists preferred not to reveal their work in public nor to be associated 
with apparent political pressure, which made them even more difficult to communicate and cooperate 
with each other. In case of humanitarian NGOs, it was not to hurt their connections with North Ko-
rea in the hope it would eventually make the relations strong as before (Yeo, 2017: 332). The problem 
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not just stayed with the fact the NGOs are divided in their top priority agenda and activities. NGO 
activities became one of borderlines of the so called “South-South conflict,” which in turn made their 
influence on policies even more limited, if not disturbing, by attracting unnecessarily heated debates 
from either conservative or progressive groups. 
The Role and Influence of Civil Society on the Cooperation and Exchange Policies 
The Lack of Civil Society in North Korea
South Korean NGOs and civil society groups could not expect any civilian partnership with North 
Korean social groups due to the lack of civil society in North Korea. They had to deal only with North 
Korean government agencies to hold any event, project, or aid program. There was already a problem 
of contact points with North Korea from the mid-1990s. Until the early 2000s, the civil society groups 
in South Korea contacted individually to the North Korean agencies to hold an event. To hold a cul-
tural exchange program, for example, South Korean management companies used their private con-
nections with North Korean agency and asked South Korean government support afterwards. North 
Korea had a monopolized mechanism and hierarchy to take care of exchanges with South Korea. All 
the North Korean agencies and officials were under the control of Party’s United Front Department 
(O 2000, p.115). These agencies took the form of civilian organizations, but still were governmental 
agencies following direct orders from the Party.
From the perspective of South Korean government, it was a problem not to have a control tower 
over the NGOs and associations who were making contacts separately with North Korea. There were 
negative side effects of this freedom that the events were often overlapped, mismanaged or failed 
to make progress. There were competition between civil organizations for more exchanges with the 
North, which resulted in excessive waste of time and money. Having North Korea as its partner, South 
Korea felt necessity to manage the actors in a similarly organized mechanism (O 2000, p.119). Each 
NGO also had difficulties to deal with North Korea. They tried to understand the special situation of 
the North and accepted the top-down control of government to continue their connection without 
making troubles. They hoped to improve the procedure gradually based on mutual trust by giving 
material assistance. This was the main reason why many NGOs did not put many conditions about 
statistics, survey, or monitoring in their aid programs. 
North Korean agencies who dealt with South Korean actors were the National Reconciliation 
Council (NRC), Korean Asia-Pacific Peace Committee (KAPPC), National Economic Cooperation 
Federation, and religious associations. When North Korean government moved the focus of eco-
nomic assistance from humanitarian aids to development cooperation, most of NGOs working on 
economic programs had to change their contact points to the agencies under National Economic 
Cooperation Federation (Lee 2004, pp.53-55). While South Korean NGOs hoped to expand their 
connections to reach local communities to provide help, North Korean agencies focused more on 
strategic use of these projects to mobilize resources for certain fields of core projects the Party put 
priority on. 
Due to the deterioration of relations with nuclear crisis and missile programs, many international 
NGOs left North Korea. Economic sanctions and international campaigns on human right issues also 
made the exchange and cooperation project hard to proceed. It was not only because of the security 
crisis and sanctions, but also due to the little improvement of North Korea’s attitude as an assistance 
recipient country. International society requested North Korea to keep the humanitarian principles 
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to allow direct access to local communities, monitoring, and verification of aid delivery, all of which 
North Korean government did not respond positively. Global humanitarian NGOs such as Oxfam, 
Doctors Without Borders, and CARE left North Korea in the early 2000s due to these reasons (Yeo 
2017, pp.327-328). South Korean NGOs remained to continue aid programs as long as possible by 
not asking strictly about these humanitarian principles. This tendency did not turn out to be positive 
for sustainable relations. It was hard to expect any change from North Korean government in a short 
time, and they also could not avoid the deteriorated political relations much longer.
Along the expansion of aid and exchange programs, South Korean NGOs tried to meet more 
North Korean people directly in various regions and fields. It was to initiate and support gradual 
change toward economic and social reform and opening, and help North Korean civil society to 
emerge in the future. If they could have civil society counterpart in North Korea, so called the second 
track partnership, it would create much effective and sustainable environment for the NGOs. It was, 
however, in a way natural for North Korea not to allow any direct access or delivery of aids from for-
eign and South Korean NGOs to its people. There were many previous cases to see how dangerous it 
is to allow direct contacts and inflow of outside information for the regime security. As much as South 
Korean government and civil organizations expected gradual opening and change of North Korean 
society, North Korean government was determined to keep its people away from the outside world. 
Although the socialist planned economy was destroyed during the famine, the political control over 
the population has been still strong not to see any political or social disturbance, let alone the growth 
of civil society networks. 
Unofficial markets spread throughout North Korea recently, but this trend had no spillover effect 
to political fields. The markets in North Korea has become the most important part of economic life of 
people, and they have new conceptual thinking about market economy. This new perception is, how-
ever, disconnected with any political thoughts toward political freedom or liberal democracy. Having 
no former experience of civil society or networks like former Eastern Germany, North Korean society 
has little possibility to link this economic change into political pressure on the regime (Heo 2005, 
pp.15-18). Under this structure, South Korean NGOs had no choice but to deal with North Korean 
government agencies to continue their work in North Korea. 
Dealing with the government agencies in the North, the NGOs also had to carry out their proj-
ects in close consultation with South Korean government not to make troubles in government level 
relations or international cooperation. In result, the exchange and cooperation projects with North 
Korea became almost nonexistent after 2008, due to security and political conflicts. It was hard to 
find sustainable network among South Korean NGOs even before 2008 to continue their relations 
and projects with North Korea in a long-term perspective. The problems such as the overlapping 
events, mismanagement or miscommunication with government departments continued to confuse 
the public with the effect of these North-South cooperation projects. The changing political situation 
of South Korea aggravated the situation, intertwined with the so-called “South-South Split” (Kim and 
Jung 2008, pp.179-181). The civil society groups tried to expand the projects to the fields of cultural 
cooperation. By the end of 2000s, however, the society-level exchange with North Korea remained 
with only a number of humanitarian aid programs by small number of transnational NGOs.
The Split of South Korean Civil Society on North Korea Issues
Intertwined with government changes and security concerns, there came a clear split between the 
progressive and conservative groups in South Korean civil society. The groups who defined them-
selves either progressive or conservative separately pursued their agenda by seeking cooperation with 
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different government bodies, international NGOs or transnational networks. The split on the issue 
of North-South relations became critical with the debates on “Sunshine Policy” during the two pro-
gressive administrations from 1998 to 2008. Progressive groups supported the Sunshine Policy as the 
most reasonable policy to pave the road to a peaceful unification. Conservative groups criticized that 
Sunshine Policy was pouring money to the North Korean regime in the name of economic aid with-
out condition to make sure about their use. 
Most South Korean people knew the fact that there had been huge amount of humanitarian aid 
through both government and NGOs into North Korea. The exchange and cooperation projects, how-
ever, had not widely recognized by the general public about the progress and effects. North Korea 
seemed not to be motivated by the humanitarian aid or development cooperation to change any of 
economic or political doctrine. To many South Koreans, North Korean regime not only remained 
same, but became more dangerous with nuclear crisis. It was difficult to make a consensus in South 
Korea whether to continue the economic support to North Korea (Kim and Seong 2011, p.14). The 
political and social division was still clear with the vivid memory of Korean War. The nuclear issue 
aggravated the chasm between progressives and conservatives to be impossible to agree on any policy 
regarding North-South relationship. By the mid-2000s, the unification issue and the exchange and 
cooperation projects became the borderline of this “South-South Split” in South Korea. Due to the 
endless debate between two sides, the policies on North-South relations could not be decided and 
applied effectively (Kim and Jung 2008, p.185).
The split between progressives and conservatives has been accelerated in parallel with other social 
conflicts such as generational differences. The ideological left-right division worsened the split, and 
political parties amplified the conflict as their election strategies. The sharp division on the policy 
toward North Korea resulted in ideologically separated support to NGOs, which again divided the 
NGOs to be defined as either progressive or conservative toward North Korea-related issues. Those 
NGOs who enjoyed governmental support under the Sunshine Policy to provide humanitarian aid 
were defined as progressive ones on the left. They were represented by the Korea NGO Council for 
Cooperation with North Korea (KNCCN) which had almost all of humanitarian NGOs as its mem-
bers. Other NGOs who concentrated more on the human rights situation of North Korea were de-
fined as conservative ones. They tend to take a critical and hardline opinions toward North Korean 
regime, and were supported by conservative groups on the right. By 2007, it became clear that there 
was a division in South Korean civil society and between NGOs about North Korea issues.
This South-South Split has also been a serious issue within religious groups. Religious organiza-
tions have been leading groups to help North Korea during the famine. Korean Christian churches 
took large part in humanitarian aids, either by directly providing aids or supporting humanitarian 
NGOs. While they continued humanitarian aids toward poverty-stricken regions, the split between 
conservative and progressive groups appeared in each religious community. North Korea also has its 
own Christian association, Joseon (Korean) Christian Federation (KCF), under the guidance of the 
Party. The KCF mainly dealt with the National Christian Council (NCC) of South Korea from 1986. 
Conservative groups and churches, however, did not recognize the KCF as a proper partner, nor 
agreed with the approach of NCC. The Christian Council of Korea (CCK) took different path to ini-
tiate campaigns to help North Korean refugees, prepare plans for missionary works including the re-
construction of former churches in North Korea (Kim et al. 2003, pp.25-27). While the NCC and pro-
gressive churches focused on reconciliation and sustainable relationship, the CCK and conservative 
churches focused more on refugee protection, networks for evangelical missions and reconstruction 
of churches. For North Korea, both progressive and conservative churches were necessary during the 
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famine. After the famine, the official contact with the KCF and unofficial missionary-related efforts 
took different paths (Huh 2015, pp.7-11). The NCC and progressive groups inclined more on official 
relations with the KCF, while the CCK and conservative groups focused more on refugees and secret 
missions in cooperation with human rights organizations. 
Social polarization and disagreements became clear by the end of 2000s, especially when the 2007 
North-South summit took place. Roh Moo-Hyun government managed to have the summit with Kim 
Jong-Il in Pyongyang, which was harshly criticized by conservative groups, while openly welcomed 
by progressive groups. For conservative groups, the summit was nothing but a political performance 
of Roh government to create a favorable environment in the presidential election which was in the 
same year (Richardson 2008, p.172). Humanitarian NGOs advocated the economic cooperation along 
with progressive groups. They supported the Sunshine Policy to engage North Korea in a long-term 
perspective. Conservative groups did not find any meaningful change in North Korea and wanted to 
put priority on national security of South Korea. Conservative civil society groups and human rights 
NGOs intensified campaigns on the human rights abuse in North Korea.
Increased number of North Korean refugees in South Korea also started their campaigns, mostly 
on behalf of conservative groups. They worked with human rights NGOs as the victims of human 
right violations in North Korea. Some North Korean defectors and refugees established human rights 
NGOs themselves to promote campaigns in Korea and abroad. NGOs such as Bukhan-ingwon-tal-
buk-cheongnyeon-yeonhap (Young Defectors’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights) and Seong-
gongjeogin-Tongireul-Mandeureo-ganeun-Saramdeul (People for Successful Corean Reunification, 
PSCORE) were established by North Korean refugees from the mid-2000s. They provided detailed 
information of human rights violations to the larger human rights NGOs such as the Citizens’ Alli-
ance to increase public awareness (Moon 2014, pp.79-80). Their stories were also effective to attract 
attention from international society, particularly in the United States to achieve certain declarations 
and human rights acts on North Korea. It was a meaningful progress for the conservatives and human 
rights NGOs, but a blow to the progressives and humanitarian NGOs.  
Human rights NGOs and conservative groups often made conflicts with humanitarian NGOs and 
progressive groups regarding their campaigns. One of the most favored campaigns of conservative 
groups and NGOs toward North Korea is to deliver leaflets, for example the balloon program by the 
North Korean refugees’ NGOs. The balloon program was to deliver short pieces of information and 
leaflets using balloons to fly and burst in North Korean sky. Many people criticized this balloon pro-
gram not to be cost-effective to promote any change in North Korea, while it was openly disliked by 
the North Korean government (Lankov 2011, p.27). Humanitarian NGOs still pushed South Korean 
government to allow contacts and visits to North Korea to continue relationship and projects. South 
Korean government has declared intensified sanction against North Korea and strictly controlled 
humanitarian NGOs from providing aides. The KNCCN tried to cooperate with transnational orga-
nizations such as the Red Cross to continue aid projects (Kang 2016, p.3). They often criticized the 
balloon program and other campaigns of conservative groups which made North Korean unhappy 
and even more difficult for them to continue relationship with the North.
There have been various attempts to overcome this social split by some civil society groups and 
organizations. Medical and healthcare organizations, for example, have expanded their activities in 
North Korea to provide medical facilities and technical cooperation and detached their activities 
from ideological debates. In most cases, it is not easy to keep distance from social split when any 
professional group initiates a project toward North Korea. Many professional groups and NGOs have 
already been involved in the split and experienced internal conflicts (Kim and Jung 2008, pp.187-
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193). The government relations between North and South deteriorated with the nuclear crisis without 
any positive sign to expect reconciliation and cooperation in a short term. The society-level NGO 
activities toward North Korea also came to a halt, only with domestic debates and conflicts within 
South Korea following divided agendas of the conservatives and progressives. 
Effects on Policies toward North Korean Society
As part of civil society in South Korea, the NGOs pursue campaigns and policy suggestions to 
make effective input in the policy making process. The split among the society between the conser-
vatives and progressives took the North-South relations as the key issue to divide groups and orga-
nizations on each side. This growing gap in South-South conflict made the NGOs and other groups 
hard to make cooperation on North Korea-related projects. Their influence on the government policy 
making also have been divided by taking separated channels and methods to make inputs. The role 
of civil society in inter-Korean relations, in result, became complicated, limited, and sometimes even 
harmful for effective and sustainable policies toward North Korea. 
Moon (2012) took the examples of Korea Sharing Movement (KSM) and Good Friends in the 
1990s and 2000s to show their influence on the policy makings of South Korean governments during 
those years. They indeed contributed to the agenda-setting of government and promoted the expan-
sion of food aids to North Korea. The level of NGO influence changed between governments, but they 
could promote public opinion by utilizing newly emerging networks in civil society without facing 
conservative backlash until early 2000s. During the most serious years of North Korean famine in late 
1990s, these humanitarian NGOs could successfully push forward their agenda to help North Korea 
despite their weak budget and organization. Throughout these years the NGOs could also increase 
their professional knowledge and capacity, for example establishing the KNCCN as an umbrella as-
sociation to efficiently cooperate with South Korean government (Moon 2012, pp. 42-45). The NGOs 
continued aid programs even when the government relations deteriorated with security or political 
concerns. Their continuous efforts of food aids made it possible for South Korea to stay on the engage-
ment policy even with the nuclear crisis in the early 2000s. 
These humanitarian NGOs became influential actors on policies toward North Korea during late 
1990s. They had wide networks to promote humanitarian campaigns and aid programs. Before the 
presidential election in 1997, these NGOs even held a public debate session between presidential can-
didates to hear how important they considered the humanitarian aid in their policy agenda. In 1999, 
the Kim Dae-Jung administration officially allowed humanitarian NGOs to engage directly with 
North Korea without much government intervention beforehand (Moon 2014, p.71). When North 
and South Korea had summit in 2000, South Korean government prepared meeting agenda in which 
process the humanitarian NGOs could participate through various channels. The channels for policy 
suggestions were organizations like KNCCN or government agencies such as the advisory committee 
of Ministry of Unification (Moon 2012, p.48). They could emphasize the necessity of continuous hu-
manitarian aids with policy ideas in detail.
The abrupt deterioration of security situation stagnated the humanitarian NGO activities. Al-
though they recognized the seriousness of nuclear problem, these NGOs argued it is still important 
to continue civilian contacts and relations with North Korea. The KNCCN continuously requested 
government to allow access to North Korean people, and to institutionalize humanitarian aids to 
North Korea separately from political circumstances (Kang 2016, p.4). From mid-2000s, however, 
split between conservatives and progressives deepened, and the gap between humanitarian NGOs 
and human rights NGOs also became clear and wide. Policy influence of humanitarian NGOs rapidly 
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decreased as North Korea launched several missile and nuclear tests. There were strong criticisms and 
sanctions from conservative administration in South Korea and the U.S.-led international society.
With the deepening seriousness of security threat from North Korea, human rights NGOs con-
ducted many campaigns, conferences, and other programs to increase the public awareness of hu-
man right abuses by the North Korean regime on its people. Political prison and refugee issues were 
popular topics throughout wide transnational networks. While the human right agenda was widely 
supported by conservative groups and human right NGOs, humanitarian NGOs had to endure hard 
times regarding budgets and managements. Supported by progressive groups in civil society, humani-
tarian NGOs criticized conservative turn of policies and remained to pursue their agenda to continue 
civilian relations with North Korea. The South-South conflict between North Korea-related NGOs 
and civil society groups became even more serious, intertwined with administration change and in-
ternational relations. 
Although the humanitarian and human rights NGOs are facing each other on the borderline of 
social split between conservative and progressive groups, it is still true that both groups of NGOs con-
tributed much to promote the North-South relations as the key issue in Korean society. They achieved 
the social consensus that it is now important to take the role of civil society and NGOs seriously in 
the policy making process on North-South relations. For the unification of Korean Peninsula in fu-
ture, the government came to recognize the role of NGOs to support any kind of preparation. Both 
groups of NGOs continuously provide agenda and topics for debate in society which help the people 
in domestic and international society to aware, understand, and make certain consensus on North 
Korea-related issues. 
Conclusion: Potential of Civil Society in the North-South Relations
The NGO influence on government policies depends largely on the security and political relations 
in and around the Korean Peninsula. The political stance of North and South Korean government 
have been the most important factor. NGOs could make campaigns and programs through domestic 
or transnational networks, but the problem was whether these activities would be echoed at inter-gov-
ernmental level. The positions and capacity of NGOs, however, became also an important factor to 
put some influence and pressure on policy decisions of governments. The growing capability of civil 
society is a positive development for the future of North-South Korea relations. 
South Korean NGOs continuously tried to expand their influence over both South and North 
Korean governments. They needed to figure out networks in North Korea, both in society and gov-
ernment level, while working also closely with South Korean government. The networking remained 
quite limited with North Korea, that the NGOs found themselves to remain not having any soci-
ety-level partner and only shallow and limited connections with North Korean government agen-
cies. The NGOs also needed wide support from South Korean society, for stronger influence on the 
government policies based on social consensus. But the different goals and campaigns of NGOs to-
ward North Korea became one of major issues of the South-South conflict between conservative and 
progressives. The conservative-progressive division and conflicts in society automatically linked the 
different directions of NGO campaigns between humanitarian and human rights NGOs with long-
time split of opinions on policy toward North Korea.
Despite the lack of partner in the North and the social split in the South, the NGOs still contribut-
ed to ignite public opinions on North-South relations and to prepare future unification. Their efforts 
in varied directions helped the government and society to have more intense debates on the issue. 
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With different goal which they put more value, the NGOs continued their own agenda even when 
the political situation changed and the support from the government declined. During the high times 
of friendly North-South relations in the early 2000s, human rights NGOs conducted campaigns to 
increase awareness of human right abuses in North Korea while humanitarian NGOs were in close 
cooperation with the government. When the political relations deteriorated, the humanitarian NGOs 
still pushed forward the aid and cooperation with North Korea in difficult environments while human 
rights NGOs could gain bigger voice to emphasize serious human rights violation in the North. 
By keeping their agenda and stance even in official silence of government, the NGOs can help 
the society to keep balance on its opinions and to offset extreme tendencies. Whenever the political 
relationship improved, the civilian actors would become even more important actors to expand and 
institutionalize the relations to make it sustainable in the long-term perspective. As civilian actors, the 
NGOs would continue to serve as a buffer between North and South Korean government, and help 
to keep the economic and cultural relations sustainable despite fluctuations of security and political 
circumstances. 
Considering the future unification of Korean Peninsula, the role of NGOs and civil society groups 
become more important. Experts foresee that civil society will have a major role in the process of 
unification beside the governments in the North and South. They can help to reduce political ten-
sions, and easily engage with North Korean people for cooperation (Richardson 2008, p.175). As they 
continue their efforts in North Korea, it would eventually help North Korean civil society to emerge. 
Former communist countries revived their civil society largely through both official and unofficial 
channels. Official channel was the government-supported exchanges which introduced increasing-
ly more information and ideas from outside. Unofficial channel was the information dissemination 
campaigns by civil society and NGOs which secretly delivered the truth from outside (Lankov 2011, 
p.20). South Korean civil groups and NGOs can take roles in both channels, bringing the information 
and idea to gradually change the North Korean society. 
Case of German unification also suggests significant role of civil society, with emphasis on the 
separation of societal exchanges from political dynamics. Cultural exchanges had been de-coupled 
from political relations between East and West Germany, and it was the key to continue and expand 
the society-level exchanges from 1949 to 1990 despite political conflicts (Lee 2014, p.63). It is more 
than clear that North Korea seriously wants a supportive international environment for economic 
development, of course for the sake of its regime. When the security crisis could be resolved, it would 
be also beneficial for both Koreas to separate the society-level exchanges from politics as possible, to 
allow North Korea to be engaged in regional and international cooperation. Economic and cultural 
relations with South Korea would be a double-edged sword for North Korean regime. Integration of 
North Korea into bilateral and multilateral cooperation will also push the regime to make improve-
ments on other concerns such as human rights (Frank 2009, pp.171-173). The NGOs and civil society 
groups can again contribute to this process, and eventually would bring significant improvements in 
politics and society in the whole Korean Peninsula. 
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